

PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE


It is with pride that the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) offers to the international community this issue of *Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders*, UNAFEI's Resource Material Series No. 120.

This issue contains the work product of the 1st ASEAN-Japan Criminal Justice Seminar, the 186th International Senior Seminar on Criminal Justice Issues Regarding Youth Involved in Terrorism and the 187th International Training Course on Current Challenges and Effective Countermeasures in the Fight against Money-Laundering. These programmes were held to promote Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which underscores the importance of governance and the rule of law in promoting peaceful, just and inclusive societies, as well as to follow-up on the implementation of the Kyoto Declaration adopted at the 14th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

I would like to pay tribute to the contributions of the Government of Japan, particularly the Ministry of Justice, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation, for providing indispensable and unwavering support to UNAFEI's international training programmes and other activities.

Finally, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to all who so unselfishly assisted in the publication of this series.

September 2025



YAMAUCHI Yoshimitsu
Director of UNAFEI

PART ONE

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES
No. 120

**WORK PRODUCT OF THE 1ST ASEAN-JAPAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SEMINAR**

UNAFEI

REPORTS OF THE SEMINAR

THE 1ST ASEAN-JAPAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SEMINAR: PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW AND BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY (MLA SESSION)

“Enhancing International Cooperation within the ASEAN Region:
Utilizing New Tools for Effective Mutual Legal Assistance”

1. Duration and Participants

- From 13 to 19 December 2024
- 10 participants from 9 ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat

2. Programme Overview

The main theme of the 1st ASEAN-Japan Criminal Justice Seminar’s Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Session was “Strengthening International Cooperation in ASEAN: Utilizing New Tools for Effective Mutual Legal Assistance”. Although ASEAN Member States concluded the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (ASEAN-MLAT), the increasing sophistication and internationalization of crimes in recent years requires more effective implementation of the treaty and enhanced cooperation. Against this background, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok) and the ASEAN Secretariat are currently developing model templates for use in requesting MLA under the ASEAN-MLAT. In this Session, in collaboration with UNODC, the participants drafted and mutually reviewed each other’s MLA requests using the latest drafts of the model templates based on a cross-border drug smuggling case scenario.

3. Lectures and Study Visit

(1) Lectures

The following visiting experts from overseas, as well as UNAFEI faculty members, gave lectures as follows:

- Scott Simeon
“Obtaining Foreign Evidence”
- Hiroshi SUDA
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer, UNODC ROSEAP
“The Project for the Development of a Model Template for MLA Requests Based on the ASEAN MLAT”

(2) Study visit

Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office

4. Feedback from the Participants

The Seminar participants positively commented on the practical nature of the curriculum, including the drafting exercises using the draft model templates, information exchange and consultations before and after the drafting, and frank exchange of opinions on the draft model template. We appreciate all the feedback from the participants and will take it into consideration when planning our future training programmes.

5. Comments from the Programming Officer

In this session, young and mid-career practitioners involved in MLA practice in ASEAN countries participated in drafting exercises and exchanging opinions, thereby contributing to the development of the ASEAN-MLAT Model Templates, which are aimed to be adopted at the coming ASEAN meetings. The session also contributed to the efforts to combat transnational organized crime such as drug trafficking and money-laundering in the ASEAN region.

We hope that the experiences of the participants in this session and the personal networks among practitioners from the central authorities in each country will contribute to more effective implementation

of mutual legal assistance in ASEAN.

THE 1ST ASEAN-JAPAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SEMINAR: PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW AND BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY (OTR SESSION)

“Countermeasures against Overpopulation of Prisons within the ASEAN Region, with a focus on Challenges and Developments regarding Non-custodial Measures and the Treatment of Offenders”

1. Duration and Participants

- From 11 to 19 December 2024
- 11 overseas participants from 10 jurisdictions
- 2 participants from Japan

2. Programme Overview

This programme addressed the critical issues of prison overcrowding within the ASEAN region with a particular focus on promoting non-custodial measures, ensuring effective prison management, and advancing rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders. The programme examined the current situation and challenges of addressing prison overcrowding in the ASEAN region and explored effective countermeasures while encouraging the implementation of non-custodial measures. Through participants’ presentations, expert lectures and group discussions, the programme aimed to enhance their knowledge for strengthening offender treatment and rehabilitation efforts in their respective jurisdictions while fostering mutual trust and understanding as a foundation for a network of criminal justice practitioners committed to these efforts within the ASEAN Region.

3. Contents of the Programme

(1) Lecturers

The following visiting expert from overseas, as well as UNAFEI faculty members, gave lectures:

- Visiting Expert
 - Danijela Mrhar Prelić
Director General of the Slovenian Probation Administration
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Slovenia
“The Development of the Slovenian Probation Service”
“Probation System from a European Perspective”

(2) Country Presentations

The participants shared the practices and the challenges in their respective jurisdictions regarding the theme of the programme through their country presentations.

(3) Observation Visits

The participants visited the Tachikawa Detention House and the Halfway House Step Oshiage to learn efforts and practices regarding offender treatment and rehabilitation.

(4) Creation and Presentation of Action Plans

The participants concluded the programme by presenting their own action plans to the fellow participants and faculty of UNAFEI, focusing on the challenges they identified, possible solutions, as well as what they learned in the lectures, presentations by colleagues and discussion.

4. Feedback from the Participants

Most participants found the programme meaningful, noting that they were able to obtain a comprehensive understanding of good practices in non-custodial measures and offender rehabilitation, including the role of community volunteers in reintegration and the multi-stakeholder approach for social reintegration. They also reported that the programme was effective in establishing a network among their fellow criminal justice practitioners within the ASEAN Region. On the other hand, some participants noted that the two-week duration was too short to allow sufficient time for in-depth discussions or a comprehensive understanding of

the Japanese criminal justice system and its cultural background. We appreciate all the feedback from the participants and will take it into account when planning our future programmes.

5. Comments from the Programming Officer

This new seminar, dedicated to ASEAN Member States, was launched to enhance effective international cooperation in enhancing offender rehabilitation. Given the longstanding challenges of prison overcrowding in many ASEAN countries, the first seminar highlighted the countermeasures to address the challenge. While focusing on recent developments and challenges in implementing non-custodial measures, community-based treatment and effective prison management, this programme aimed to analyse and discuss the current situation, share good practices and to propose effective countermeasures.

Through this programme, knowledge and experience were shared among participants. In particular, the experiences and initiatives of the visiting expert who developed the probation service in Slovenia, the role of community volunteers in supporting offender reintegration (e.g. Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Japan) and efforts to raise public awareness (e.g. the Yellow Ribbon Project in Singapore and the Yellow Feather Campaign in Japan) captured the participants' interest and sparked active discussions.

In their action plans, the participants identified key challenges and solutions, including creating rehabilitative prison environments, promoting community corrections, enhancing rehabilitation and reintegration, strengthening collaboration with stakeholders and increasing public awareness. These efforts are fundamental to reducing reoffending, and I sincerely hope that by promoting their plans, participants will contribute to reducing prison population and promoting desistance in their respective countries.

Through this programme, I believe the participants have reinforced regional momentum toward developing more effective systems for offender treatment and rehabilitation. We hope the knowledge gained will be applied to strengthen and enhance the systems within each participant's jurisdiction.

VISITING EXPERT'S PAPER

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBATION SERVICE - THE SLOVENIAN EXPERIENCE

*Danijela Mrhar Prelič**

I. INTRODUCTION

The deprivation of liberty is the most severe form of sanctioning the perpetrators of criminal offences, which should only be used for heavy criminal offences and after all other sanctions have failed to be effective. Imprisoning perpetrators, especially those with short imprisonment generally has no desired preventive effect and is at the same time one of the most costly state responses to criminality. This does not only mean suppression of criminality through repression, but above all the implementation of systematic measures to prevent criminality. Since 2002, Slovenia has recorded an increase in the number of imprisoned individuals, with the proportion rising by almost 32% in 12 years. Meanwhile, 80% of those admitted to Slovenian prisons were serving sentences of up to two years (short prison sentences).

The growing number of inmates was the main challenge facing the Slovenian Prison System and one of the most important reasons why the Ministry of Justice informed the Government of the Republic of Slovenia of the need to establish a national probation service in July 2015. The Ministry of Justice explained in its justification that deprivation of liberty should be the *ultima ratio* — to be used when no other sanction is effective. The criminal justice system in Slovenia has enabled various alternative ways of serving imprisonment sanctions for many years. This alternative method of serving a prison sentence is considered a measure that should help reduce reoffending by encouraging positive activity by the perpetrator for the benefit of society, as well as mitigating the negative effects of short prison sentences.

In July 2015, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia accepted the recommendation to establish a probation service as part of the system for enforcing criminal sanctions. The Ministry of Justice was directed to draw up an Action Plan by 31 May 2016, to include a proposal for the necessary institutional and normative changes with due regard to financial costs and comparative international developments. A task force, with representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Prison Administration, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, the Supreme Court, the Office of the State Prosecutor General, and the Faculty of Law and Institute for Criminology, was set up in October 2015 to progress that plan. The main task of the group was to analyse the existing situation in the Republic of Slovenia in the field of the implementation of alternative/community criminal sanctions and to prepare the establishment plan.

An analysis of the practice current at that time showed that community sanctions were rarely applied in Slovenia even though on average between 50 and 55 per cent of those in Slovenian prisons were serving sentences of two years or less. Many of the difficulties with effective sentence management arose from role confusion and the lack of clear communication channels between the relevant bodies. Before the establishment of the state body, probation activities were carried out by a wide range of authorities: social work centres (Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities) had responsibility for most probation activities, including community service, suspended sentence with custodial supervision and conditional release with custodial supervision. The judiciary was responsible for house imprisonment, with the police service responsible for the supervision of those cases.

Within the Inter-Ministerial Task Force a smaller group of experts was established. Its main role was to focus on practice and structures in other established probation services across Europe, to inform proposals on the normative and institutional frameworks that would underpin a new national Probation Service in

* Director General, Slovenian Probation Administration, Ministry of Justice, Slovenia. Dr. Mrhar Prelič was a visiting expert of the 1st ASEAN-Japan Criminal Justice Seminar, Working Group on Offender Treatment and Rehabilitation (WG-OTR).

Slovenia. In May 2016, further to the proposals from the expert group, the task force agreed an action plan for the establishment of a Probation Service in the Republic of Slovenia; this was adopted by the Government at the end of July 2016. Key objectives were:

- The integrated development of work in the field of community sanctions;
- Standardized practice in the enforcement of community sanctions and measures nationally;
- The integration of services and increased engagement with judicial authorities;
- Improved staff training and qualifications;
- The introduction of specialized areas of work;
- In-depth treatment of perpetrators;
- Centralized collation and analysis of data;
- The transfer of good practices from abroad, with recognition of the service across international probation;
- More frequent decisions by prosecutors or judges to implement community sanctions, with the aim of replacing shorter prison sentences with an alternative measure;
- Professional and skilled contributions to reducing reoffending;
- A higher level of humanity in dealing with those who offend;
- The protection of human rights.¹

Following the Government's decision, the Probation Service was established within the Ministry of Justice in October 2016, with the aim of preparing and implementing all activities necessary for the establishment of the Probation Administration.

II. THE SYSTEM OF SANCTIONS IN SLOVENIA

Prior to presenting the process of establishing the probation service, it is important to provide an overview of the criminal justice system in the Republic of Slovenia. The purpose of punishment by Slovenian Criminal code² is to enable the State to safeguard the fundamental values and principles of the legal order, to increase awareness of the harm caused, to individuals and communities, by criminal behaviour and to impose an appropriate punishment that enables perpetrators to become reintegrated into their communities and wider society, allowing for individual needs and human dignity. A prison sentence may be imposed for a period of not less than one month and not more than 30 years. Its length is determined in full years and months, unless its term does not exceed a period of six months, in which case it is determined in full months. Life imprisonment may be imposed for criminal offences of homicide, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, with the possibility of consideration for conditional release after 25 years. The Slovenian system of criminal sanctions includes:

- Admonitory sanctions,
- Prison sentences,
- Safety measures.

Within the admonitory sanctions, the court may suspend the sentence when the perpetrator has been punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or by a fine. A suspended sentence may not be imposed when a prison sentence of more than three years is prescribed by law. The court may decide that a perpetrator serving a suspended sentence should be subject to custodial supervision for a specific period of time and with specific conditions. Custodial supervision involves statutory supervision and can include one or more instructions relating to living arrangements, lifestyle and prosocial activities.

A prison sentence is usually served in prison, but under the Criminal Code it can also be executed in other ways – house imprisonment, weekend prison and community service. A prison sentence of up to nine months

¹ Action plan for the establishment of a probation service with a proposal for the necessary institutional and normative changes, 2016.

² Criminal Code (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 50/12 — Official Consolidated Text, 6/16 – Fix., 54/15, 38/16, 27/17, 23/20, 91/20, 95/21, 186/21, 105/22 – ZZNŠPP, 16/23 and 107/24 – odl. US).

may be served under house arrest if the risk of reoffending is deemed to be low and where there are strong family and social supports. The sentence can also be served in an appropriate public institution in the case of illness, disability or old age of the convicted person. A prison sentence of up to two years, except when imposed for a sexual offence, may be enforced through the performance of community service for a maximum period of two years from the enforcement of the judgment. The extent of work is defined so that one day in prison equals two hours of community service. Work placements will take account of the person's professional knowledge and skills and their commitments regarding urgent family, educational and vocational obligations. Community service is performed without remuneration. A prison sentence of up to three years, except when imposed for a sexual offence, may allow the person who meets the conditions provided by the act to continue with work or schooling and to reside at home. However, they must return to prison on work-free days and weekends.

The court may take one or more precautionary measures against the perpetrator of a criminal offence provided that the statutory conditions for it are met (safety measures). When imposing a precautionary measure (compulsory psychiatric treatment, confinement in a health institution, compulsory psychiatric treatment at liberty, the revoking of a driving licence and the confiscation of objects, a ban on performing a profession, the restraining order against the victim), the court shall, according to the principle of proportionality, take into consideration the gravity of the offence and offences which it reasonably believes might be committed by the perpetrator if no precautionary measure is taken against him or her.

III. THE ESTABLISHMENT PROCESS

The main role of the Probation Service within the Ministry of Justice was to prepare legislation and everything necessary to establish the Probation Administration. The Slovenian Probation administration (hereinafter UPRO) was officially established in January 2018 as a body of the Ministry of Justice, and the probation units started their work on 1 April 2018, when they took over the tasks from the social work centres. Certain development activities took place before the formal establishment of UPRO, while others happened after it was established.

The most significant task for the newly established Probation Service was the drafting of the Act of Probation. In order to inform the content of the Act, members of the interdisciplinary group (comprising representatives from the Probation Service, the Prison Administration and the Faculty of Law) visited the probation services across Europe. The Draft Probation Act was prepared by the second half of November 2016 and forwarded to the relevant interdepartmental and professional co-ordination units. The Bill was tabled in a government procedure in February 2017, and in March 2017 the Government adopted the Draft Act of Probation. The National Assembly adopted the Probation Act on 24 May 2017. It entered into force on 17 June 2017 and applied from 1 April 2018, with the exception of provisions relating to the establishment of a constituent body, which occurred in June 2017 when the law was passed.

Following the entry into force of the law, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia issued a Regulation amending and supplementing the Regulation on bodies composed of ministries³ and a Regulation on the number of probation units, the area of their operation and the headquarters of the central unit and probation units.⁴

In parallel with standard probation activities, work began in relation to human resources (HR) and the provision of offices, furnishings and equipment. In October 2017, the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities issued a list of civil servants who had given their consent to transfer from social work centres to UPRO. The civil service relocation agreements, which included the transfer of financial resources, were signed in December 2017, leading to the transfer of 12 staff. An agreement was also reached with the Director General of the Prison Administration to transfer five civil servants who were selected on

³ Regulation amending and supplementing the Regulation on bodies composed of ministries (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 35/15, 62/15, 84/16, 41/17, 53/17, 52/18, 84/18, 10/19, 64/19, 64/21, 90/21, 101/21 and 117/21).

⁴ Regulation on the number of probation units, the area of their operation and the headquarters of the central unit and probation units (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 41/17).

the basis of interview. Altogether, that meant 17 staff – five assuming managerial functions with some practitioner duties, and twelve Probation Officers. From April until August 2018, administrative coordinators were recruited for all probation units, and procedures were also put in place for the recruitment of civil servants to the central unit.

The provision of appropriate office spaces was expedited from mid-January to the end of March 2018, by the Ministry of Public Administration with responsibility for premises. Premises were secured in five locations (Maribor, Celje, Ljubljana, Koper and Novo mesto) with specific arrangements. Given the confidential relationship between the counsellor and the person involved in probation supervision and/or their family, it is important that each professional has their own office with all the necessary technical supports and a designated place to conduct interviews. These standards were met in all locations. The units received computer equipment at the end of March 2018, but there were several problems in all locations that needed to be addressed in real time, and the system started to be fully operational only in May 2018. Mobile phones bridged the gap until fixed telephony was installed in August 2018. Various public contracts were issued (for the purchase of furniture and equipment for probation units and the central unit, working-time registrars, provision of postal and mobile services, followed by the purchase of company vehicles for all units). In accordance with government regulations, all staff members have been issued with a service identity card.

There have been many developments in the field of practice. The transmission of documentation to UPRO, in relation to cases previously managed in the social work centres, began in the last week of March 2018 and was completed in full in April. This included a list of community-based organizations providing a range of community-service placements. Revised agreements have been completed on the regulation of mutual rights and obligations relating to the execution of community service. In the first phase of this process, 700 signed agreements have been submitted and the list is updated according to the needs of the probation units.

A priority from the outset was to develop a guidance manual for employees to inform the execution of probationary tasks. In preparing these guidelines, national and international research was undertaken on the range of tasks required for effective probation practice and on the relevant organizational and legal documentation required to underpin that practice. Based on that research, UPRO published its Guidelines, divided into specific content sets, for full implementation in April 2018, with the aim of achieving uniform practice in all probation units. The need for ongoing monitoring was recognized for the implementation of the Guidelines and the importance of learning from the first phase of their application. Based on that learning and experience from practice, the Guidelines were amended and upgraded in 2020.

To achieve the objective of uniform practice in all units, UPRO has developed a manual system for case tracking and management. It includes: standard details of all referrals; personal plans for probation tasks (enforcement of security supervision, enforcement of community service, house arrest); court reports, information from the prosecutor's office, committees for parole release, template for tripartite agreement between the person, probation unit and relevant service provider; a scheme to record ongoing contact with the probationer, and a questionnaire relating to criminogenic need/risk (as a guidance resource until the development of the organizational Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) tool). The implementation of a daily data collection table was a pivotal development in the context of monitoring, reporting, evaluation, research and statistical analyses, once the state body was established. In the course of time and in consideration of experience, UPRO has developed its own information system, ProbIS, and risk-and-needs assessment tool, MOT. Implementation of these tools into practice occurred in 2023. The probation officers played a key role in this development, with the participation of both national and international experts.

The training and development of staff has been, and continues to be, a priority for UPRO, as the foundations of professional work are still in a state of development. Slovenia is working to a model of best practice, learning from longer-established and more advanced probation services across Europe. The Education Plan is adopted on an annual basis, with its adoption being contingent upon the necessity for professional work and professional development.

Since the beginning of the process, activities related to the establishment of probation have been represented both in the media and in the professional and academic world. In the media, this has happened through interviews and press conferences organized by the Ministry of Justice.


There have also been a range of professional and academic consultations and conferences, both at home and abroad. Because UPRO was a new institution working within the judicial system, presentations were initially made to representatives of the Supreme Court and the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office, with the aim of recognizing its role and its importance within judicial proceedings. This was followed by a series of meetings with judges (covering eleven district courts in Slovenia) and District Prosecutors. Promotional materials have also played a key role in increasing awareness among stakeholders. An information leaflet, Probation, was prepared for the wider community, highlighting the key components of the Probation Service. In conjunction with the Government communication office, UPRO designed and adopted the logo, "In the Right Direction". Additional promotional materials included a leaflet designed specifically for service-users, which provides key information and contact details. After the handout was produced, a demonstration promotional leaflet was produced by UPRO, which provides key information on probation, and contact details.

UPRO is involved in a variety of activities of the Confederation of European Probation (CEP), and collaborates with stakeholders from abroad, particularly in relation to the education and training of staff. The establishment of robust connections with European probation services has been facilitated through professional visits, continuous collaboration and effective liaison. The importance of international cooperation in this regard cannot be overstated. The establishment of networks with other services has been shown to facilitate enhanced development, knowledge transfer and contribute to further development.

IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PROBATION ADMINISTRATION

The mission of UPRO is to enforce criminal sanctions in the community. Professional treatment of probationers under the Criminal Code will assist in identifying the factors contributing to criminal behaviour; resolving personal distress and difficulties; addressing poor living circumstances; and establishing acceptable forms of behaviour. Professional treatment may also include monitoring of the behaviour of persons in different living environments, in order to identify and eliminate those forms of behaviour that hinder successful integration into society. In addition to the above, Probation Administration organizes, conducts and supervises the execution of community service under the Minor Offences Act.⁵

UPRO consists of a central unit and five probation units – Ljubljana, Maribor with its subsidiary office Murska Sobota, Celje, Koper with its subsidiary office in Nova Gorica, and Novo mesto. Practice has shown that there is also a need for premises in the area of the Probation Unit Ljubljana and the Probation Unit Novo mesto. PU⁶ Ljubljana has an agreement on the use of premises provided by the municipality of Kočevje (for the needs of PE Ljubljana), and PU Novo mesto has an agreement with the Centre for Social Work Posavje, unit Krško.



⁵ Probation Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 27/17).

⁶ PU is acronym for probation unit.

The Central Unit carries out the following functions:

- Coordination and guidance of the work of probation units;
- Development and financing of programmes for persons involved in probation;
- Cooperation with other competent authorities and services;
- Supervision of the work implemented by the probation units;
- Provision of education/training of probationary staff;
- Evaluation of the effectiveness of measures and programmes;
- International cooperation;
- Projects in the area of offender management;
- Keeping and managing records in accordance with the Probation Act;
- Development of a network of sanction providers and the keeping of a list of sanction providers.

The powers of the probation units relate to the execution of probationary tasks laid down in the Probation Act. Probation units shall perform the following probationary duties:

- draw up a report for the state prosecutor so that they may decide whether to refer the criminal charge or indictment proposal to the settlement proceedings and draw up a settlement agreement,
- draw up a report on the perpetrator for the state prosecutor so that they may decide whether to initiate prosecution or define the measures and duties in the event of suspended prosecution,
- outline and manage the duty of compensating or settling the damage in suspended criminal prosecution,
- draw up a report for the court so that it may decide on a criminal sanction and custodial supervision,
- implement custodial supervision in a suspended sentence with custodial supervision,
- implement custodial supervision in release on parole with custodial supervision,
- carry out house arrest,
- organize, manage and supervise the carrying out of community service,
- cooperate with the prison facility in the process of planning a release on parole with the custodial supervision.

The fundamental task of the Probation Officer relates to assistance, protection and supervision, with the aim of reducing the risk of reoffending, and reintegrating people back into the wider community. The work is challenging as many service-users have unstable lifestyles, mental health issues, and may have histories of violence. Working with people requires a specific approach, knowledge and skills, as carrying out probationary tasks is very demanding. In addition to daily administrative tasks, each Probation Officer must interview the probationer (obtaining through conversation all relevant life information) and prepare a personal plan with clear objectives that reflect the conditions identified as part of the sanction. As part of this work, the Probation Officer will engage with a number of public bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who will assist in the provision of a range of supports, including education and training, that are compatible with the abilities and family obligations of the person. In their work, the Probation Officers will regularly establish contacts with the courts, with the family, with social work centres and with other national authorities. In advance of prison releases involving custodial supervision, the Probation Officer attends multidisciplinary team meetings for the purpose of preparing a pre-release plan in collaboration with prison staff. The Probation Act and the Rules on the Execution of Probationary Tasks⁷ direct that contact between the Probation Officer and the probationer must occur at least twice a month during the first four months. Contact may be more frequent if the Probation Officer considers this necessary when drawing.

In early April 2018, UPRO assumed responsibility for 488 cases from the social work centres. The number of probation assignments received (new and active cases) increased over the years of operation of UPRO, and by the end of the 2024 it had received 12,551 cases. Of these, 10,281 cases were closed, and 2,270 cases remained active. In December 2024, the average workload for a Probation Officer was found to be 83 cases. Since the establishment of the Probation Service, there has been an upward tendency in the number of cases, with a marked increase in 2019 and a decline in the last quarter of 2019 and 2020. This decline can be attributed to an increase in the number of Probation Officers during that period. The staff workload has been increasing since 2021 due to a combination of factors, including staff downsizing (due to the termination of the contract of probation officers employed under the EU project), staff turnover and an increasing number

⁷ Rules on the Execution of Probationary Tasks (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 21/18 and 73/20).

of tasks.

In its work, UPRO links closely with various organizations to support the implementation of all community sanctions, including community service. Where a person is carrying out community service, the organizations may be any legal person in the Republic of Slovenia carrying out humanitarian or municipal activities, nature-protection activities or other activities in the public interest that are not carried out solely for profit. The agreement on the execution of the community service is signed by the person, the organizations and the probation unit. Organizations that enable the execution of probation tasks play an important role in the enforcement of community sanctions, by contributing to the achievement of the objectives set out in the personal plan of probationers, thus reintegrating them into society and resocialization. Since the beginning, UPRO has been working to strengthen and develop already-established forms of cooperation and to expand the network of organizations. In addition to a number of NGOs, other public services and institutions are involved in the execution of probationary tasks, namely health centres, psychiatric hospitals, social work centres, regional units of the Employment Service and others, in particular in the work relating to the enforcement of instructions in the context of custodial supervision.

V. CONCLUSION

As stated in the initial presentation, the primary factors that led to the establishment of UPRO were the increasing number of individuals who had been imprisoned, the limited number of community sanctions that had been imposed, despite the fact that Slovenian legislation had already implemented alternatives to Criminal Law for a number of years, with some of these alternatives having been in effect for several decades. These alternatives were recognized as being of great importance in the deterrence of reoffending. The introduction of a national service, fully funded by the State, would not have been possible without the Government's adoption of this decision. It is also important to consider the role played by the support of the European Union. The European project "Effective Justice" was initiated in 2016 under the auspices of the Ministry for Justice and concluded in 2023. The project received financial support from the European Union, specifically from the European Social Fund, with additional contributions from the Republic of Slovenia. UPRO participated in the project with the key objective of establishing the conditions for the launch and effective operation of a system of probation in Slovenia. At the time of project implementation, dedicated funds were allocated for the following purposes: remuneration of ten employees (including reimbursement of work-related expenses), acquisition of hardware and software, computer equipment and mission expenses; information and communication; analysis and study; assessments; research; and education and training. In addition to employment, the development of an organizational information system, ProbIS, and the development of a dedicated risk-and-needs assessment tool, MOT, were crucial deliverables in the context of European funding. ProbIS has been implemented as a replacement for the existing manual system, thus contributing to the automation and standardization of the work process. In addition, it enables the electronic exchange of data with other data sources. The MOT is a system that functions in conjunction with organizational guidelines. It assists with the prioritization of criminogenic needs and the related targeting of resources.

The Slovenian Probation Administration is tasked with the vital mission of enforcing criminal sanctions and community-based measures. The primary objective of these measures is the resocialization and reintegration of offenders into society. In the initial years of its operation, the stated objectives have been achieved and the Administration has become an influential judicial stakeholder and accepted in society. It is estimated that approximately 90 per cent of cases are successfully completed. Furthermore, there is a constant increase in the level of trust and cooperation with the judiciary.

UPRO's stated objective for the future is to facilitate professional development and growth. It aims for probation staff to possess a high level of skill, which necessitates ongoing dedication to education and professional training. The efficient execution of probation tasks is contingent upon the presence of adequate caseloads of probation officers, with the target being to reach 20-30 cases per counsellor.

UPRO has successfully applied for funding under the European Cohesion Policy programme for the programming period 2021-2027. The European funding will be allocated towards the development of

specialized probation programmes for perpetrators of domestic violence, perpetrators of sexual offences and social skills workshops. The project also entails the recruitment of mentors within probation units, with the objective of providing assistance and support to probation officers, enforcement organizations and probation counsellors. This pilot project is intended to assess the practicality and efficacy of the newly developed post. In the event of a favourable response, the proposal would be integrated into the prevailing system of work organization.

UPRO will continue to consolidate its international relations and establish new contacts with foreign services. This is due to the fact that such relationships have been shown to have a significant impact on the knowledge transfer and professional development. With a committed staff and a clear vision for the future, we are confident that UPRO will continue to evolve in a prosperous direction, "In the Right Direction."

PART TWO

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES

No. 120

**WORK PRODUCT OF THE 186TH
INTERNATIONAL SENIOR SEMINAR**

UNAFEI

REPORT OF THE SEMINAR

THE 186TH INTERNATIONAL SENIOR SEMINAR

“Criminal Justice Issues Regarding Youth Involved in Terrorism”

1. Duration and Participants

- From 17 January to 13 February 2025
- 14 overseas participants from 12 countries
- 4 participants from Japan

2. Overview of the Seminar

This seminar addressed the critical issues of youth-involved terrorism with a particular focus on seeking ways to obtain credible evidence from youths in terrorism cases and ensuring effective and rehabilitative treatment of those youths to prevent them from reoffending. The seminar fulfilled its purpose by highlighting unique challenges in interviewing youths and providing practical interviewing skills to overcome these challenges. The seminar was also successful in sharing good practices of rehabilitating and reintegrating youth involved in terrorism including disengagement of these youths from violent extremism and terrorist organizations. Through participants' presentations, expert lectures and group discussions, the seminar fostered mutual trust and understanding as a foundation for a global network of criminal justice practitioners committed to combating terrorism involving youths.

3. Contents of the Seminar

(1) Lectures

- Overseas Experts

- A) “Prevention of Violent Extremism & Terrorism: Children and Youth”
Masood Karimipour
Regional Representative, UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific
- B) “Securing the future: addressing foreign terrorist fighters in custodial settings”
“Prevention measures of violent extremism in prison (and probation)”
Torben Adams
Head of Division, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Bremen, Germany
- C) “Judicial Proceedings Involving Children Suspected of Terrorism”
Cheibou SAMNA SOUMANA
Resident Fellow, Academic Unit, IIJ

- Lectures by Japanese Experts

- A) “Efforts to Support Withdrawal from Organized Crime Groups”
YAGI Gakuyo
Director of the Second Prison Service Division, Tokyo Regional Correction Headquarters, MOJ
- B) “Treatment of Young Inmates and Evaluation of Programme Effectiveness”
OTOMO Marie
Research Officer, Centre for Evidence-Based Research, Correctional Training Institute
- C) “Forensic interviews – The NICHHD Protocol-”
UEMIYA Ai
Associate Professor, Institute of Human and Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, Kanazawa University

(2) Individual Presentations

Each participant made an “Individual Presentation” describing the current situation and challenges in

the participant's country. Participants asked many questions to the presenters and an active discussion was held.

(3) Study Visits

The participants visited the following facilities to learn about effective and rehabilitative treatment of youths involved in terrorism.

- Kawagoe Juvenile Prison
- Ichihara Youth Correction Center
- With Hiroshima (Halfway House)
- Hiroshima Juvenile Training School
- Kifunebara Juvenile Training School for Girls
- Hiroshima Prison

(4) Group Discussion

The participants were divided into three groups and discussed assigned topics (below) based on the knowledge gained through the individual presentations, lectures by experts and study visits. The results of the discussions were summarized as concrete action plans for possible future measures, and presented to all participants and staff of UNAFEI, followed by a question-and-answer session.

- Groups A and B: "Strengthening the Criminal Justice Response to Youth Involvement in Terrorism"
- Group C: "Effective and Rehabilitative Treatment of Youths Involved in International Terrorism"

4. Feedback from the Participants

Overall, most participants found the seminar meaningful, noting that they were able to obtain a comprehensive understanding of good practices in tackling youth-involved terrorism. Many participants were particularly impressed with the practical method and the protocol of interviewing youth. Moreover, many participants expressed their satisfaction in learning good practices of the Japanese correctional system in treating young inmates. They also reported that the programme was effective in establishing a network among their fellow criminal justice practitioners. There was some constructive feedback to make future seminars more meaningful, such as to include police facilities, a prosecutors' office and the court as part of the study visit. UNAFEI would like to express its sincere appreciation for all comments and suggestions received, and will endeavour to reflect this feedback in future courses and seminars.

5. Comments from the Programming Officers

Youth-involved terrorism is an imminent issue that must be tackled now. Throughout the Seminar, the participants had an ample opportunity to fully discuss and gain useful information and knowledge to tackle this huge challenge, with the valuable contribution from the visiting experts and through the peer learning experience. We expect that the knowledge gained will be applied to strengthening and enhancing the criminal justice responses within each participant's jurisdiction. In particular, we hope participants understood the unique nature of youth, i.e. suggestibility, and the importance of open-ended questioning approaches in interviewing youth victims, witnesses and suspects to obtain credible statements. We would also like to emphasize the importance of disengagement of youths involved in terrorism. Successful disengagement is critical in the rehabilitation and reintegration of these youths. If we fail to do so, they will simply revert to the terrorist groups. In this sense, we hope participants have learned the good practices from the treatment of youth offenders in the Japanese correctional and probation systems (including the efforts by the correctional service to disengage inmates from organized crime groups and the support activities by *hogoshi*, the voluntary probation officers), as well as from the lectures by the visiting experts. We have also learned from the various activities by the UN in these areas. We highly recommend the participants to continue to enhance their knowledge by researching these critical activities. Furthermore, given the transnational nature of this issue, international cooperation is the key to resolving the problem. In this sense, the seminar was also meaningful in that it brought together senior criminal justice practitioners from different regions. The participants developed a global network which will function as a practical and useful channel for future cooperation and collaboration in combating terrorism.

UNAFEI sincerely hopes that we all will jointly strengthen momentum across the world toward building resilient societies to foster rehabilitation and reintegration of youth involved in terrorism.

PARTICIPANTS' PAPERS

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES REGARDING YOUTH INVOLVED IN TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH

*Khaleda Yeasmin Urme**

I. INTRODUCTION

The involvement of youth in terrorism poses significant challenges to societal stability and national security in Bangladesh. As globalization and digital communication become increasingly prevalent, young individuals are more vulnerable to extremism, driven by a variety of social, economic and ideological factors. The alarming trend of youth participation in terrorist activities necessitates a thorough examination of the criminal justice issues related to this phenomenon. This paper explores the current situation of youth involvement in terrorism in Bangladesh, identifies the root causes of this issue, discusses the challenges faced by the criminal justice system, highlights effective practices and proposes potential countermeasures. The analysis is further enriched by a case study of the 2016 “Holey Artisan Bakery Attack”, focusing on the investigation, prosecution and prison management aspects of the case.

II. CURRENT SITUATION

In this century, Bangladesh has witnessed a rise in incidents of terrorism, with young people increasingly implicated in these acts. The country saw a surge in terrorism with groups like “Jamatu Mujahidin Bangladesh” conducting bombings and assassinations. The most notable case involved synchronized bombings by JMB in 2005, where over 400 bombs exploded across 63 districts out of 64 districts of Bangladesh in a single day. A tragic event occurred in the Jhalkati district when two subordinate court judges were travelling in an office microbus to the district court, a suicidal bomber affiliated with the JMB detonated an explosive device near the vehicle carrying the judges. Both judges were killed instantly. The attack was a part of the JMB campaign against the judicial system of Bangladesh. Since then the Bangladesh government has actively combated these groups, significantly reducing these activities in recent years.

Bangladesh has enacted several Laws and Acts to combat terrorism and extremism. These laws provide legal frameworks for prosecuting terrorist activities and national security.

1. **The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2009 (Amended in 2012 and 2013):** Defines terrorism, terrorist organizations and activities related to terrorism, and allows for the freezing of assets of individuals and organizations linked to terrorism.
2. **The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act 2006 (amended in 2013):** designed to regulate cyberspace and combat cybercrimes including online extremism and terrorism.
3. **The Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2012:** Aims to prevent and combat money-laundering and terrorist financing.
4. **The Digital Security Act, 2018.**

* Additional District and Session Judge, Munsiganj, Bangladesh.

III. CASE STUDY: “THE HOLEY ARTISAN BAKERY ATTACK-2016”

The Holey Artisan Bakery was a popular café located in the diplomatic area of Gulshan, Dhaka, frequented by diplomats and local elites. The Holey Artisan Bakery attack, which took place on 1-2 July 2016, remains one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Bangladesh’s history. A total of 22 people were killed, including 17 foreigners from Italy, Japan, India, and the United States. The attackers targeted this café to instil fear by targeting foreigners and to gain global attention. The assault, carried out by five armed militants, resulted in the deaths of 22 hostages, mostly young people, and drew international condemnation. Two Bangladeshi police officers were killed during the initial rescue attempt. After a 12-hour standoff, Bangladeshi security forces launched Operation Thunderbolt, a coordinated assault involving the Paracommando, Army, Police, and Rapid Action Battalion. The operation resulted in the deaths of all five attackers and the rescue of 13 hostages. The attack highlighted the urgent need for strengthened counter-terrorism measures, including improved intelligence sharing and addressing the issue of radicalization.

According to reports from various agencies, youth radicalization is exacerbated by socioeconomic disparities, lack of access to education and a perceived lack of opportunities. Furthermore, the proliferation of extremist ideologies, facilitated by social media and online platforms, has made it easier for radical groups to target and recruit young individuals.

Profile of the attackers: The militants were young, educated individuals from affluent families, breaking the stereotype of poverty-driven radicalization. They had attended prestigious schools and universities.

Judicial actions: In 2019, seven Neo-JMB operatives were sentenced to death for their roles in planning and supporting the attack. This marked a significant step in holding extremists accountable.

Investigation: Following the attack, the Bangladesh government launched a large-scale investigation involving multiple agencies. The investigation revealed that the attackers were part of a larger network of extremists, many of whom were young individuals radicalized through social media. The authorities faced challenges in gathering intelligence and conducting effective investigations, partly due to the lack of collaboration between agencies.

Prosecution: The prosecution of the attackers was marked by significant challenges. Many of the accused were linked to extremist groups. This case underscored the need for reforms in the judicial process to expedite the prosecution of terrorism-related offences while upholding due process rights.

IV. ANTI-TERRORISM COURTS IN BANGLADESH

In Bangladesh, Anti-Terrorism courts were established under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009. These courts dealt only with the cases relating to terrorism. These courts aim to address terrorism-related cases efficiently and ensure justice against acts threatening national and international security. The Bangladesh government established seven anti-terrorism tribunals in seven divisional headquarters for speedy disposal of cases.

A. Disposal of Anti-terrorism Cases

The backlog of cases in the judiciary of Bangladesh is a significant issue, severely impacting the efficiency of the judicial system. The ratio of judges to the population is critically low. Each judge handles an average of 1000-1500 cases annually. According to the Anti-Terrorism Act there is a provision to dispose of a case within six months. The below table shows the reality of the disposal of cases under the tribunals.

Table: Anti-terrorism cases:
(1 January 2024 to 30 September 2024)

Serial no.	Tribunal/ District Name	Number of Cases			Total Case	Total Disposal	Transferred to other Courts	Pending (under trial) cases	Pending over 5 (five) years	Held by higher court order
		Previous Balance	New Filling	Forwarded from other courts						
01	Dhaka	450	75	-	525	97	01	427	-	46
02	Chittagong	117	08	-	125	-	-	125	65	05
03	Rajshahi	45	04	-	49	08	-	41	01	04
04	Khulna	13	03	-	16	03	01	12	03	-
05	Barishal	10	-	1	11	04	-	07	03	-
06	Rangpur	11	-	1	12	-	-	12	-	01
07	Sylhet	33	-	2	35	-	14	21	-	-
	Total	679	90	4	773	112	16	645	72	56

B. Trial Procedure for Juvenile Offenders in Bangladesh

The trial procedure for juvenile offenders in Bangladesh is governed primarily by the Children Act 2013, which emphasizes a rehabilitative and child-friendly approach. A person under the age of 18 is treated as a minor under the Children Act 2013. According to this law, children cannot be detained in regular jails with adults. Juveniles are entitled to bail in most cases, as detention is considered a measure of last resort. Juveniles cannot be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.

V. ROOT CAUSES, CHALLENGES, GOOD PRACTICES AND POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES

A. Root Causes

Several factors contribute to youth involvement in terrorism in Bangladesh:

- ✓ High poverty and unemployment, especially among youth, create fertile ground for radicalization, as many young people feel disconnected from the mainstream economy and more open to extremist ideologies.
- ✓ Inconsistent education quality in Bangladesh leaves many youths without critical thinking skills, making them vulnerable to extremist beliefs due to a lack of awareness.
- ✓ Family and community influences are crucial; some families may unintentionally support extremist ideologies or fail to provide proper guidance, making youths more susceptible to radicalization.
- ✓ The internet plays a key role in spreading extremist propaganda, exposing young people to radical ideologies through social media and online platforms.

B. Challenges

The criminal justice system in Bangladesh faces numerous challenges in addressing youth involvement in terrorism:

- ✓ Police and security forces lack proper training and resources, hindering their ability to prevent attacks and catch perpetrators promptly.
- ✓ Prisons are overcrowded and lack proper facilities or rehabilitation programmes, which can contribute to the radicalization of incarcerated youth.
- ✓ Youth involved in terrorism face social stigma, making reintegration into society difficult and potentially

fueling further violence and radicalization.

- ✓ Bangladesh requires a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that includes prevention, intervention and rehabilitation. Currently, the approach is more reactive, focusing on punishment rather than addressing the root causes of radicalization.

C. Good Practices

Despite the challenges, several good practices have emerged in Bangladesh that can be leveraged to address youth involvement in terrorism:

- ✓ The government is implementing community-based initiatives that promote dialogue, education and social cohesion to effectively prevent radicalization by engaging local communities in countering extremist ideologies.
- ✓ Efforts to provide young people with opportunities for education, employment and personal development, including skill-building and entrepreneurship programmes, are being prioritized to reduce their vulnerability to radicalization.
- ✓ Public awareness campaigns focused on promoting tolerance, inclusivity, and countering extremist narratives, especially through social media, are being launched by the government to prevent radicalization among youth.

D. Possible Countermeasures

Addressing the issue of youth involvement in terrorism in Bangladesh requires a multifaceted approach that encompasses prevention, intervention and rehabilitation. Possible countermeasures include:

- ✓ Improving law enforcement: Providing training, resources, and fostering collaboration among agencies can help prevent and respond to terrorism. Intelligence-sharing can also enable early intervention and disrupt extremist networks.
- ✓ Educational reforms: Investing in education that promotes critical thinking, tolerance and inclusivity can help youth resist extremist ideologies. Changes to the curriculum, including peace education and civic engagement, can strengthen a sense of community.
- ✓ Supporting community-based initiatives: Encouraging local programmes that empower youth and focus on counter-radicalization can effectively prevent young people from engaging in terrorism by using local knowledge and resources.
- ✓ Improving rehabilitation programmes: Effective rehabilitation programmes should address the psychological and social needs of young offenders, offer vocational training, and encourage positive relationships with mentors and peers to aid successful reintegration into society.

VI. CONCLUSION

The issue of youth involvement in terrorism in Bangladesh presents a complex challenge for the criminal justice system. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive understanding of the root causes, challenges and potential solutions. The 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack serves as a poignant reminder of the urgent need for effective countermeasures to prevent youth radicalization and ensure national security. By investing in community engagement, educational reforms and rehabilitation programmes, Bangladesh can create a more resilient society that empowers its youth and fosters a culture of peace and tolerance.

RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT ON THE INTERNET: CONFRONTING THE WHOLE OF SOCIETY APPROACH

*Camilo Graziani**

I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorist organizations systematically and globally exploit youth, especially those subjected to social vulnerability. This exploration represents an important contemporary criminal justice challenge. States and their institutions must reassess their traditional strategies for confronting terrorism in the face of this modern challenge. Contemporary terrorist organizations have developed an incredible understanding of the social vulnerability of young people, have developed sophisticated strategies to exploit these vulnerabilities and have been very successful in radicalizing and recruiting young people to their causes. To successfully address the exploitation of youth by terrorist organizations, according to Neumann (2023), States must focus on the root causes of the problem, especially on stabilizing the lives of young people and strengthening protective factors, such as family, education, and community ties.

II. COUNTER-TERRORISM IN BRAZIL: CURRENT DYNAMICS, CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES

Brazil's counter-terrorism approach reflects a sophisticated understanding of the transnational nature of contemporary terrorist threats. Despite not having experienced direct terrorist attacks on its soil, the country has developed a proactive strategy focused on prevention, intelligence gathering, and international cooperation. The Federal Police's Division for Combating Terrorism (DETER) plays a central role in monitoring and mitigating potential terrorist risks.

The Brazilian counter-terrorism model demonstrates several good practices:

- a. Legal Framework:** Law 13.260/2016 provides a comprehensive legal basis for identifying and prosecuting terrorist activities, enabling a structured approach to threat management.
- b. International Cooperation:** Brazil actively participates in global anti-terrorism networks, sharing intelligence and maintaining alignment with UN Security Council resolutions regarding recognized terrorist organizations.
- c. Multifaceted Intelligence Strategy:** DETER employs a holistic approach, monitoring not only direct terrorist activities but also related criminal domains such as money-laundering, document fraud and clandestine immigration.
- d. Cyber Monitoring:** Recognizing the digital nature of modern radicalization, Brazilian authorities have developed capabilities to track online recruitment and extremist content dissemination.

However, there are significant challenges that complicate Brazil's counter-terrorism efforts:

- a. Online Radicalization:** The increasing vulnerability of young Brazilians to online extremist content represents a critical challenge for preventive strategies.

* Commissioner of Police, Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division, Brazilian Federal Police, Brazil.

- b. Diverse Threat Landscape:** Brazil must monitor multiple terrorist groups with different motivational backgrounds, from religiously motivated organizations like ISIS and Hezbollah to ideologically driven violent extremist movements.
- c. Migration Dynamics:** Humanitarian visa policies, particularly those related to conflict zones like Afghanistan, create potential vulnerabilities in border control and terrorist infiltration.
- d. Limited Historical Experience:** The relative absence of direct terrorist attacks can potentially lead to complacency in threat perception and preparedness.

In order to address these challenges, Brazil may consider some strategic countermeasures:

- a. Enhanced Digital Deradicalization Programmes:** Develop comprehensive educational and psychological intervention strategies targeting potential online recruitment vulnerabilities.
- b. Technological Intelligence Upgrades:** Continuously invest in advanced technological capabilities for digital surveillance and threat detection.
- c. Interdisciplinary Training:** Create specialized training programmes for law enforcement and intelligence personnel that integrate psychological, sociological and technological perspectives on counter-terrorism.
- d. Community Engagement:** Develop robust community-level programmes that promote social inclusion, intercultural dialogue and early identification of potential radicalization indicators.

Summing up, Brazil's counter-terrorism strategy demonstrates a nuanced, proactive approach that balances preventive intelligence, legal frameworks and international cooperation. By continuously adapting to the evolving global terrorist landscape, the country can effectively mitigate potential risks while maintaining its commitment to democratic principles and human rights.

III. RECENT TRENDS IN YOUTH TERRORIST RECRUITMENT

The reality of recruitment for terrorist purposes has evolved significantly in recent years. Contemporary terrorist organizations have operated simultaneously in the physical and virtual domains, but with great emphasis on the latter. These organizations today have a massive virtual presence, where they can easily propagate their ideas, ideologies and narratives. This propaganda especially targets young individuals, with personality, character and values still in formation, searching for identity, purpose and belonging.

As Selim (2022) notes: "Preventing the next generation of recruits for terrorism has become more important than ever. A generation ago, individuals may have been radicalized by members of their local communities over several years; Now, while this is still happening, it is much more common to self-radicalize online."

Contemporary terrorist organizations are at an increasing level of sophistication when it comes to recruiting young people, sometimes adopting age-specific approaches. In this segmentation, preference is given to pre-adolescents and adolescents, in whom developmental vulnerabilities are explored.

Regarding the reality of the physical territory, traditional recruitment continues in conflict zones, educational institutions, schools, community centres, family environments and other social circles such as scout youth groups (in relation to the latter environment, it is found that it has been frequently used by Hezbollah in southern Brazil, where there is a significant Lebanese Shiite community).

In the virtual environment, the Internet and social media have become the preferred stage for terrorist groups to disseminate their ideals, ideas and narratives. The internet has become the main environment for communicating ideas, radicalization, recruitment and inspiring attacks by small groups or even lone actors

(lone wolves). According to Gonçalves and Reis (2023), in the information age, the Internet serves as a precondition for terrorism.

IV. PREVENTIVE APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS

Strategies to confront and prevent this phenomenon of radicalization and terrorist recruitment do not only involve public security. Strong public security, intelligence-based, interagency and international cooperation are important, and the response of states to this phenomenon is essential. The discovery of the sources of radicalization, the means used and the investigation and arrest of recruiters and radicalizers are essential from the point of view of disruption and deterrence. But the solution cannot be limited to public security. The solution must be the product of a holistic and integrative whole-of-state and whole-of-society approach that should focus on the root causes of the problem.

A. Educational Intervention

Education is a key pillar in tackling terrorist radicalization and recruitment targeting young people. Quality education during childhood and adolescence builds strong and lasting values and prevents the influence of radical and extremist worldviews. In addition, quality education develops independent and critical thinking, gives a better cultural and historical understanding to young people, and develops the capacity for resilience against radical and extremist narratives.

In addition, not only schools but the family and community around young people must be involved in the education process. Priority should be given to the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of relevant family ties. The family should also be aware of the types of friendships and relationships maintained by its young members and should encourage healthy relationships. Finally, a sense of belonging to that society and to that group must be developed in young people so that they do not feel isolated and are attracted to radical and extremist groups, which also maliciously exploit this sense of belonging.

B. Digital Counterstrategy

Allied to the pillar of education, states must develop their own and effective strategies to confront radicalization and terrorist recruitment on the Internet. These strategies must consider the peculiarities of each country. Nevertheless, they can be based on the strategy developed by the European Union, which is quite comprehensive and useful. This strategy emphasizes:

1. Mechanisms for the early detection and identification of:
 - i) Risk behaviours;
 - ii) Radical ideological narratives;
 - iii) Online recruitment standards.
2. Preventive Monitoring through the implementation of:
 - i) Social media surveillance systems;
 - ii) Content filtering mechanisms;
 - iii) Information campaigns and counter-narratives.

V. MITIGATION STRATEGIES

Also based on the European Union's "Strategy to Combat Radicalization and Recruitment for Terrorism", in addition to technological detection and monitoring mechanisms, effective responses to these phenomena

must include a social support system, with the implementation of family support programmes, community engagement initiatives and projects to train young people for work.

While the social support pillar is the family, the school, and the community, which play an essential role in relation to the virtual environment, technology companies also play a fundamental role. Digital platforms must have responsibility for content moderation and the protection of their users and must develop and make available educational resources for responsible use of the Internet and offensive or harmful content. In addition, technology companies should engage in collaborative initiatives to develop monitoring systems, unified response protocols, proactive collaboration with law enforcement agencies, and removal of offensive, disinformation, extremist and violent content.

VI. DIGITAL RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT: A CASE STUDY OF JUVENILE VULNERABILITY TO ISLAMIC STATE EXTREMISM IN BRAZIL

The case of Fábio Samuel provides a compelling analysis of digital radicalization processes and the challenges of preventing youth involvement in terrorist organizations. In mid-2023, Brazilian counter-terrorism authorities apprehended Samuel while attempting to depart from Guarulhos Airport in São Paulo, with the explicit intention of joining the Islamic State (IS).

The investigation, conducted by the Specialized Counterterrorism Division (DETER) in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), emerged from an intelligence-driven approach that spanned approximately one year. The investigation transitioned from intelligence gathering to a formal police investigation, revealing Samuel's direct communications with terrorist group members and systematic online recruitment strategies.

Samuel employed sophisticated digital recruitment techniques targeting adolescents through multiple social media platforms, including WhatsApp, Telegram and Discord.

His recruitment strategy involved:

- i) Sharing extremist Islamic State propaganda;
- ii) Distributing violent multimedia content;
- iii) Discussing potential terrorist attack plans;
- iv) Positioning himself as a religious mentor.

Investigative evidence included:

- i) Social media group postings related to the Islamic State;
- ii) Travel planning communications;
- iii) Video recordings expressing intent to work with the terrorist organization;
- iv) One-way ticket purchase to Istanbul.

In 2022, DETER conducted an early intervention with Samuel, then a minor, involving:

- i) Personal interviews;
- ii) Counselling;
- iii) Family guidance;

- iv) Social service involvement;
- v) Psychological support.

Despite this comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach, the intervention failed to interrupt Samuel's radicalization trajectory. The judicial process recognized the Islamic State as an internationally condemned terrorist organization. Samuel was ultimately convicted of promoting terrorism and the corruption of minors. He was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment, highlighting the legal system's response to digital terrorist recruitment.

This case illuminates critical challenges in contemporary counter-terrorism efforts, specifically:

- i) The vulnerability of adolescents to online extremist ideologies;
- ii) Limitations of current deradicalization strategies;
- iii) The sophisticated nature of digital terrorist recruitment.

Samuel's case represents a significant example of how terrorist organizations leverage digital platforms to target and radicalize vulnerable youth. The case demonstrates the complex landscape of digital radicalization, revealing the vulnerabilities of young individuals to extremist ideologies and the limitations of current deradicalization strategies in Brazil. It underscores the urgent need for more effective prevention and intervention strategies.

VII. CONCLUSION

Confronting the radicalization and recruitment of young people by terrorist organizations requires states and society to have holistic and multifaceted strategies beyond the traditional and limited approach of public security and law enforcement. This confrontation requires the involvement of the whole society in a true whole-of-society approach, which provides for preventive measures, focused especially on quality education, strong family ties and the development of a sense of belonging of young people to the community that surrounds them. In addition, states, in partnership with technology companies, must develop robust systems for detecting, monitoring, cooperating and disseminating effective counter-narratives. Only through this comprehensive approach will we be able to confront and counter the sophisticated strategies of radicalization and terrorist recruitment aimed at our youths. When all these tools fail, then criminal law must be applied and those involved must suffer the consequences of the law.

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ADDRESSING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM AMONG YOUTH IN NIGERIA

*Gene Chaka-Nweze**

I. BACKGROUND

The post-colonial trajectory of Nigeria, particularly the civil war between 1967-1970 and its aftermath, has significantly influenced the emergence and persistence of violent extremism and terrorism in the country. Ethnic and regional divisions, economic disparities and perceived governance failures have all played a role in fostering insecurity.

Nigeria's history with terrorism and violent extremism can be traced back to the early 2000s. In the year 2009 it began to gain global recognition with the rise of the Boko Haram terrorist group, which was originally founded as a religious group against perceived western influences with a goal to establish an Islamic state implementing strict Sharia law. The group quickly transformed into a violent insurgency that has continued to wage war against the Nigerian government and civilians across Nigeria.

The Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) on the other hand emerged from a faction of the Boko Haram terrorist group with similar goals and the modus operandi of widespread violence through bombings, kidnappings, and attacks on schools and military facilities.

The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a separatist group in Nigeria founded by Nnamdi Kanu that advocates for the secession of the Southeastern region of Nigeria, which the group considers to be the independent Republic of Biafra. The movement harkens back to the Nigerian civil war between when the Southeastern region in Nigeria attempted to secede from Nigeria, leading to a devastating civil war that resulted in over a million deaths.

Over the years since its inception IPOB has engaged in protests that resulted in violent clashes with security forces, and its activities had included calls for a referendum and mobilizing youth to confront state authorities. IPOB's open advocacy for an independent Biafra is viewed as a direct challenge to Nigeria's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Consequently, on 20 September 2017, the Federal High Court granted the order proscribing IPOB as a terrorist organization under the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011. IPOB has continued to operate declaring sit at home orders aimed at suspending movements and work on Mondays in the Southeast and maintains a significant presence online and abroad.

II. TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

A. Nigeria at a Glance

Nigeria is popularly referred to as the giant of Africa. This is because it is the most populous country in Africa with a population of over 200 million people. It is a country endowed with human resources and vast natural resources (Oil and Gas, Gold, Coal, Iron Ore, Tin and Columbite, Limestone, Lead and Zinc, Bitumen and other Minerals), and it is a culturally and ethnically diverse group comprising of more than 250 ethnic groups and tribes.

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B. Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Nigeria

In the past two decades terrorism and violent extremism has emerged as the most pressing issue, threatening the national security and the lives of millions of Nigerian citizens. The rise of terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram, ISWAP and the proscribed IPOB has had a significantly devastating impact on regions of Nigeria. Banditry from unknown assailants has become prevalent and continues to threaten the North Central parts of Nigeria. These groups have carried out heinous acts of violence intended to intimidate, cause widespread destruction and harm to individuals and the Nigerian government with the purpose of advancing their political, religious and ideological causes. This has led to the displacement of millions of people and the destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods in Nigeria.

C. Youth Involvement in Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Nigeria's youth have borne the brunt of the menace of terrorism. Boko Haram and ISWAP often target children and young adults for recruitment to undertake trainings aimed at radicalizing and furthering violent agendas. These recruitments are often done online through digital social media platforms like Facebook, TikTok, Telegram and YouTube and through the community mosques, places of worship, camps for internally displaced people and detention centres.

Young people are recruited and trained in weapons handling, bomb making and suicide bombing. They are lured by promises of financial incentives, protection, belonging and purpose. Recruitments are also conducted through abductions, and Boko Haram and ISWAP target clusters with children like schools and places of worship. One of the most notorious abduction incidents recorded in Nigeria was the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from a boarding school in Chibok, Borno State, in 2014 that sparked global outrage and birthed the hashtag #bringbackourgirls. Young girls are especially targeted and forced into marriage to breed children with terrorist combatants and made to convert to Islam.

Kidnapping for ransom is prevalent to finance terrorist activities, attacks are carried out against interstate travellers on the road and on the train tracks and hostages are held for ransoms as high as One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$100,000) per hostage. Young people are often tasked by financiers to move and hide the cash ransoms on behalf of financiers.

D. Root Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

In Nigeria, widespread poverty, unemployment, insecurity, hunger, perceived injustice, diminished trust and confidence in public institutions and officials, social and political marginalization, educational gaps and ideological indoctrination are the root causes of terrorism. Terrorism is a byproduct of the vulnerabilities and grievances that stem from a breakdown of the rule of law in society. Terrorist groups like Boko Haram, ISWAP and IPOB have presented themselves as alternatives to the perceived neglect and injustice experienced in communities in Nigeria.

III. NIGERIA'S RESPONSE

A. Legal Framework

The Nigerian government has taken steps over the years to address the rise of terrorism and violent extremism through its counter-terrorism efforts and the development of a legal framework for terrorism. *The Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011*, later amended in 2013 and now the *Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022* provides the legal basis for prosecuting terrorism-related offences. Our robust legal framework criminalizes acts of terrorism, support for terrorist activities and the financing of terrorist operations. Financial institutions like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Units (NFIU) are active and responsible for tracking the financial flow that supports terrorism to ensure that those involved in funding extremist activities are held accountable. In Nigeria several laws govern and protect children and youth, ensuring their rights, welfare and development.

Nigeria recognizes that terrorism is transnational and has sought cooperation with international partners to strengthen its counter-terrorism capabilities. Nigeria is a signatory to a host of United Nations counter-terrorism conventions and protocols and African Union counter-terrorism instruments and has ratified them as such:

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1. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997)
2. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)
3. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973)
5. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979)
6. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970) and its protocols.
7. AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999)
8. Protocol to the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2004).
9. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
10. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)
11. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
12. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999
13. The Child Rights Act 2003
14. The Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act 2015
15. The Labour Act (Cap L1, LFN 2004)
16. The Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition, Enforcement and Administration Act 2015)
17. Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015
18. The Cybercrimes (Prohibition and Prevention) Act 2015

B. Federal Ministry of Justice

The Federal Ministry of Justice in Nigeria is headed by the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice who serves as the chief law officer and Nigeria's Central Authority. The Federal Ministry of Justice recognizes the transnational nature of terrorism-related offences in that the Complex Casework Group Unit (CCG) responsible for prosecuting terrorism, terrorism financing and financial crimes is domiciled at the International Criminal Justice Cooperation Department to foster international judicial cooperation in criminal matters such as terrorism more efficiently. Mutual legal assistance, extradition and transfer of sentenced persons requests are processed through the Federal Ministry of Justice in Abuja, Nigeria.

C. Interventions

Beyond legal interventions, Nigeria has recognized the importance of addressing the socio-economic and ideological drivers of terrorism that have gravely impacted the youth population. To this end, the government is still implementing deradicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DRR) programmes for youth such as Operation Safe Corridor that was launched in 2016 as a non-kinetic approach to the insurgency in the Northeast aimed at encouraging defection from extremist groups and providing rehabilitation for former terrorists. This programme includes vocational trainings, psychological counselling and religious re-education aimed at facilitating reintegration into society. Special attention has been given to youth, recognizing the links between unemployment, lack of education and radicalization with terrorism, efforts to rebuild educational infrastructure in conflict zones, alongside campaigns to encourage citizens to return to school that are ongoing in the Northeast region of Nigeria. While these responses represent the current Nigerian approach to addressing youth involvement in terrorism, challenges persist in practice and implementation.

IV. CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

Despite the robust legal framework and the counter-terrorism efforts summarized above, Nigeria faces significant challenges in the effective prosecution and management of youth involvement in terrorism which has impacted public perception. The sheer volume of suspects detained in connection with terrorism has overwhelmed the judicial system and has led to delays in trials and extended pre-trial detention and has sparked many fundamental rights concerns. The backlog that exists has hampered the ability of the courts to dispense justice efficiently.

Furthermore, the capacity of law enforcement agencies to determine the age of a suspect, conduct thorough investigations of online platforms and gather actionable intelligence is often hindered by the poor record-keeping of births and the absence of a centralized birth registration system, limited resources,

insufficient training and inadequate inter-agency cooperation, which often results in weak cases that do not meet the evidentiary requirements for a successful prosecution.

A. Rehabilitation and Reintegration

One key challenge in the rehabilitation and reintegration of former extremists is the stigma they face within their communities. Especially when young people have gone through deradicalization programmes and have demonstrated a willingness to change, community members often remain sceptical about their intentions.

Community resistance is particularly pronounced in areas that have suffered the most from terrorist attacks, where memories of the violence and loss remain fresh. The resistance and lack of trust is often justified when some rehabilitated and reintegrated individuals return to extremist activities, which begs the question of the efficacy of DRR programmes such as Operation Safe Corridor.

Reports from the Joint Task Force in Maiduguri in 2024 suggest that many of the new arrests are former and repentant terrorists that were reintegrated into society and went back to terrorist groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP. The challenge is in effective rehabilitation, preventing recidivism and fostering reconciliation in their communities.

B. Inadequate Funding

Adequate funding and lean resources remain a challenge in Nigeria's counter-terrorism and reintegration efforts. Budget constraints have limited the scope and reach of government programmes. Rehabilitation centres, educational initiatives and youth empowerment programmes like the N-Power initiative under the National Social Investment Program (NSIP) operate under tight financial conditions, reducing their capacity to deliver meaningful support and to provide long-term impact.

V. CONCLUSION

The challenge of youth involvement in terrorism and violent extremism in Nigeria remains a pressing issue, exacerbated by poor birth record-keeping, socio-economic vulnerabilities and ideological indoctrination. While Nigeria has made significant strides in developing a robust legal framework and counter-terrorism strategies, challenges in enforcement, rehabilitation and reintegration persist. Addressing these challenges requires a multifaceted and sustainable approach. To strengthen Nigeria's response, the following key recommendations are proposed:

1. Development of a Centralized Birth Registration System: A nationwide digital database for birth records should be established to ensure accurate age determination. This will help law enforcement and judicial authorities verify individuals' ages, particularly in terrorism-related cases and prevent prosecutions of minors. It will also prevent adult accused persons from falsely claiming to be minors in order to evade full legal responsibility.
2. Enhanced Training and Funding for Law Enforcement: Law enforcement agencies require specialized training in counter-terrorism intelligence, digital monitoring of recruitment platforms and community engagement. Increased funding is necessary to equip personnel with the skills and tools needed to combat terrorism effectively.
3. Strengthening Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes: Deradicalization programmes like Operation Safe Corridor must be evaluated for effectiveness, with improvements in psychological support, vocational training and long-term reintegration monitoring. Addressing community resistance through sensitization and reconciliation efforts is critical to ensuring the successful reintegration of rehabilitated individuals.
4. Adoption of a Community-Based Approach: Nigeria can learn from Japan's *hogoshi* (volunteer probation officers) and BBS (Big Brothers and Sisters) programmes, which focus on community-driven rehabilitation and reintegration. By involving trusted community figures in mentorship and

rehabilitation, trust can be rebuilt, and recidivism reduced.

5. Sustained Investment in Education and Youth Empowerment: Educational initiatives and employment programmes must be expanded and properly funded to provide viable alternatives for young people susceptible to radicalization. Government programmes like N-Power should be strengthened to ensure long-term impact and sustainability.

By implementing these recommendations, Nigeria can enhance the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism efforts, reduce youth radicalization, and ensure sustainable reintegration programmes that prevent recidivism. A holistic, community-based and well-funded approach will contribute to long-term national security and stability.

COUNTERING TERRORISM IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA: CHALLENGES, STRATEGIES AND THE PATH TO STABILITY

*Syed Ashfaq Anwar**

I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is one of the most significant challenges facing the modern world, impacting local, regional and international security. The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan, has been particularly affected due to its geopolitical significance and proximity to conflict zones like Afghanistan. KP has served as a battleground for terrorism for decades, initially influenced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which led to the displacement of millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistan.¹

In the aftermath of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan post-9/11 and reseizure of power by the Taliban again in 2021, KP became a critical region for militant activity, with terrorist groups such as *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)* and *Al-Qaeda* using the area to launch attacks. In the month of October 2024 alone, more than 35 terrorist attacks took place in KP, while more than 193 security personnel have lost their lives besides many others injured. While military operations such as *Zarb-e-Azb* have helped reduce terrorism in the region, the threat continues to evolve with the militants finding new ways and means for generation of revenues for their operations and finding new safe havens.² This paper examines the spectrum of terrorism, explores its dynamics, causes and reviews counter-terrorism strategies adopted by KP Police, and identifies the challenges they face while suggesting a way forward for sustained peace and security.

II. SPECTRUM OF TERRORISM

Terrorism in KP manifests in diverse and evolving forms. Over the years, terrorists have employed a variety of tactics, each designed to instil fear, destabilize communities and undermine the State's control. Common methods include suicide bombings, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), targeted killings, kidnappings for ransom and extortion. These strategies have been particularly devastating due to their ability to target both high-profile and civilian areas.

Among the most active groups in KP are *Tehrik Taliban Pakistan* and *Al Qaeda* both of which have orchestrated numerous attacks. Suicide bombings, in particular, have been devastating, often targeting densely populated public spaces or security personnel. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have also been a preferred method for targeting military/police convoys, checkpoints and infrastructure. IED attacks cause significant loss of life, disrupt public services and spread fear throughout the region.

In addition to these direct acts of terrorism, a strong nexus exists between terrorist groups and criminal organizations. The blending of terrorism with organized crime, such as drug trafficking, extortion, smuggling and informal financial transactions via *hundi/hawala* systems, has provided these groups with the necessary resources to continue their operations.³ The ability of terrorist organizations to finance their activities through criminal networks has made it harder for law enforcement agencies to dismantle these groups, as the line between terrorism and organized crime becomes blurred.⁴

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¹ Perri, T. (2021). *Militant financing: A regional perspective on South Asia*. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies.

² KP Police, 2024.

³ Fair, C. C. (2014). *Militant conflicts and terrorist financing in Pakistan*. *South Asia Journal of Political Studies*, 4(1), 45–60.

⁴ Stern, Jessica. *Terrorism Financing: The Failure of Counter Measures*. *International Security Journal*, 2010.

III. EXTENT AND DYNAMICS OF TERRORISM

The scale of terrorism in KP has been immense, with the province enduring over 4,100 terrorist attacks over the past two decades. These attacks have claimed more than 50,000 lives, including members of the police, military and civilians. KP has also been the site of some of Pakistan's deadliest terrorist incidents, such as the 2014 Army Public School (APS) attack, which left 144 people dead, most of them children, a suicide attack inside a mosque of Police Lines Peshawar claiming lives of more than 100 police personnel in 2023 and an attack on Chinese engineers working on construction of Dassu Dam in district Kohistan killing five of them on the spot.⁵ These attacks shocked the nation and underscored the vulnerability of educational institutions, law enforcement agencies and foreigners working on the infrastructure development of the country to the militants' violence.

The dynamics of terrorism in KP are shaped by a combination of internal and external factors. A key driver of militancy in the region is its geographic proximity to Afghanistan, which has a long and porous border with Pakistan. This border allows militants to easily cross between the two countries, using former tribal areas as safe havens. The border areas, characterized by difficult terrain and minimal governance, have historically provided ideal conditions for militant groups to hide, train, regroup and launch attacks.

Another critical factor shaping the dynamics of terrorism in KP is the geopolitical context. The post-9/11 war on terror brought new challenges to KP, as militants fleeing Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion in 2001 sought refuge in Pakistan's tribal belt. These militants, once welcomed as part of the Afghan resistance against the Soviets, became a source of instability for Pakistan as they targeted the State for aligning with Western powers. They got another boost when the Afghan Taliban got hold of affairs in Afghanistan in 2021. Being their ex-comrades-in-arms, they not only turned a blind eye on their terrorist activities in Pakistan but also allowed them to use Afghanistan as their launching pad for attacks inside KP. The failure of the State to integrate displaced populations combined with a weak governance system in the former tribal areas, diminishing returns of the kinetic operations and loopholes in the legal framework have allowed extremist ideologies to take root, particularly in underdeveloped regions of KP.

IV. MOST VIOLENT RECENT CASES IN KP

KP has been the scene of some of the most lethal terrorist incidents in the history of Pakistan. These cases have not only caused tremors in the security infrastructure of the country but also posed serious challenges to the KP Police, which has long been on the forefront in fight against militancy.

A. Police Lines Peshawar Case, 2023

Peshawar is the capital of KP province and hub of business and commercial activities. Tragically on 30 January 2023 a suicide bomber detonated explosives amid policeman who gathered in the mosque of Peshawar Police Lines for mid-day prayers. Resultantly, more than 100 police officers lost their lives, while 200 were injured. The explosion was so devastating that it not only razed the whole mosque to the ground but also shook foundations of the nearby buildings. This incident demoralized the local police and raised serious questions about increasing capacity of the militants to infiltrate deep into the headquarters of the local police. The Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) of KP Police took up the investigation and started a multifaceted and multipronged hunt for the perpetrators. Soon the investigators found clues about the culprits, but they were shocked to know that the militant group TTP had succeeded to allure and brainwash one of their own police constables who was working in the same premises. Further interrogation revealed that he was initially influenced by the militant's propaganda tools through social media and later on contacted through social media apps. Once in the loop he was influenced to such a level that he not only informed the militants about the exact map of the police headquarters but also made one of them do reconnaissance for the mission. On the day of the incident, he made the suicide bomber wear a police uniform and brought him on a motorcycle to police lines. He succeeded in getting him passed through all checkpoints, taking benefit of the police uniform and dropped him near the police mosque, causing the mayhem. He was later on arrested and

⁵ KP Police, 2024.

formally charged in a court of law. The involvement of a young serving police officer in such a gruesome incident brought to the fore a new challenge for the KP police to keep a close watch on its new entrants and their activities on social media. It led to the formulation and enforcement of social media regulations by KP Police and psychological testing before recruitment.⁶

B. Attack on Chinese Engineers, 2024

Pakistan and China have started a joint development project called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2014. Under this initiative a number of infrastructure development projects have been started. The construction of Dassu Dam in KP is one such project which was designed not only to provide cheap hydro-electricity but also irrigation water during winter.

On 26 March 2024, when the Chinese engineers working on the project were travelling from Pakistan's capital Islamabad to the dam site, their coaster vehicle was hit by an explosive laden car driven by a suicide bomber. The coaster after the incident fell into a deep ravine killing all five engineers on board. This incident created serious diplomatic problems for Pakistan as the Chinese government called upon Pakistan to bring the culprits to justice as soon as possible.⁷ The KP Police Counter Terrorism Department took up this challenge and with the help of ground intelligence, profiling and interviews of the previously held militants and technical tools, unearthed the whole network. This network of more than 20 young men got together in Afghanistan where they fought by the side of Afghan Taliban against the coalition forces. This incident was planned and executed by a group of young men all in their early twenties. However, the most alarming aspect which came to the fore during investigation was that a number of the network's members were already in jails in other militancy related cases, but they provided the motivation, guidance, planning techniques, social contacts and mentors for the execution of this plan from jails through cell phones and social media apps. The CTD arrested a few of them, who are now facing prosecution. This incident showed the capacity and tenacity of the militants to use the modern social media tools and operate from within the jails to achieve their targets.

V. CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN KP

Several interrelated factors have contributed to the rise of terrorism in KP, including geopolitical events, socio-economic conditions and ideological influences.

- **Geopolitical Context and Historical Conflict:** The roots of terrorism in KP can be traced back to the Soviet-Afghan war in the late 1970s and 1980s, when millions of Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan in the face of the Russian invasion, bringing with them radical ideologies and militant groups. These groups, initially backed by global powers during the Cold War, later turned their attention toward destabilizing Pakistan, particularly after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan post-9/11. The constant conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan has had a direct impact on KP, as militants used the porous border to escape military crackdowns. They felt more religiously inspired/motivated and encouraged particularly after the seizure of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021.
- **Socio-Economic Deprivation:** KP is one of Pakistan's most impoverished regions, with weak institutions and limited access to education, healthcare and employment opportunities. The lack of development, particularly in the former tribal areas, has made the local population vulnerable to militant recruitment. Terrorist organizations often exploit the grievances of young men who feel marginalized and powerless, offering them a sense of purpose, financial stability and ideological justification for their actions.
- **Radicalization and Ideological Influence:** Extremist ideologies have played a significant role in fuelling terrorism in KP. Many of these ideologies are propagated through religious schools (*madaris*)

⁶ Counter Terrorism Department, *Case File FIR No. 12 dated 31-01-2023 u/s 302,324 353,427 PPC, 7ATA PS CTD* (Peshawar: Criminal Record, 2023).

⁷ Counter Terrorism Department, *Case File FIR No. 05 dated 26-03-2024 u/s 302,324 353,427 PPC, 7ATA PS CTD* (Malakand: Criminal Record, 2024).

that promote radical interpretations of Islam. These *madaris*, often operating without oversight, serve as breeding grounds for future militants. Additionally, the rise of online propaganda has further facilitated the radicalization of young people. Terrorist groups use social media and encrypted communication platforms to reach vulnerable individuals, often luring them into militancy with promises of martyrdom or financial gains.

VI. RESPONSE STRATEGY

In response to the growing threat of terrorism, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police have developed a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. This strategy focuses on three key pillars: capacitating the force, obstructing militant activities and promoting public trust.⁸

- **Capacitating the Force:** Recognizing the limitations of traditional policing methods, the KP government established specialized units to enhance the capacity of law enforcement to deal with terrorism. The Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), the Rapid Response Force (RRF) and the Special Combat Unit (SCU) are some of the specialized units that have been developed. These units are equipped with modern technology and trained to conduct intelligence-based operations (IBOs), investigate terrorism-related crimes and engage militants in combat. The establishment of these units has allowed for more targeted and efficient counter-terrorism efforts.
- **Obstructing Militants:** One of the key strategies employed by the KP Police is to obstruct militant activities by denying them the space and resources to operate. Laws such as the KP Restriction of Rented Buildings (Security) Act and the KP Restriction of Hotel Businesses (Security) Act, both passed in 2014, require landlords and hotel owners to verify the identities of tenants and guests. This makes it more difficult for militants to hide in urban areas. In addition, the KP Police have increased snap-checking, surveillance and intelligence gathering in high-risk areas to pre-empt potential attacks. Police have also focused on target hardening by securing sensitive installations and infrastructure to prevent attacks on high-profile targets.
- **Promoting Public Trust:** The success of any counter-terrorism strategy depends on public cooperation. To foster better relationships with the local population, the KP Police established Dispute Resolution Councils (DRCs) and Public Liaison Councils (PLCs). These councils serve as platforms for resolving conflicts and grievances at the community level, which helps build trust between the police and local residents. Police Assistance Lines (PALs) have also been set up to facilitate the reporting of suspicious activities by the public, further enhancing the ability of the police to gather intelligence.

VII. CHALLENGES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN KP

Despite the progress made by the KP Police, several challenges remain in the fight against terrorism.

- **Geographic and Legal Complexities:** KP's geographic location, with its long and porous border with Afghanistan, continues to pose a major challenge. Militants can easily evade capture by crossing into Afghanistan, where they can regroup and plan further attacks. The former tribal areas have been brought into the mainstream legal frameworks recently, but the new system has yet to take root there, making it difficult for the KP Police to conduct operations in these regions. The Durand Line – the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, is extremely treacherous and difficult to manage, within limited human, financial and technical resources.
- **Resource Constraints and Fragmented Roles:** Although specialized units have been established, the KP Police face ongoing resource constraints. Many units are underfunded and underequipped, lacking modern investigative tools such as forensic labs, digital extraction and cybersecurity capabilities.

⁸ KP Police, 2024.

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These limitations hinder the police's ability to track, investigate and prosecute militants effectively to prevent attacks. Similarly, duplicity and fragmented roles among military, paramilitary, police and intelligence tentacles have led to tactical and operational inefficiencies in action against militants on the ground.

- **Evolving Tactics of Terrorists:** Terrorist groups in KP have adapted their tactics over time, shifting their focus to soft targets such as schools, universities and public markets. The 2014 APS attack and the 2023 Police Lines Peshawar Mosque attack demonstrate how militants have increasingly changed their modus operandi and targeted less guarded institutions. Additionally, the use of encrypted communication tools by militants has made it more difficult for security agencies to intercept their communications and prevent planned attacks.
- **Malpractice and Public Distrust:** Allegations of malpractice within the police force, particularly in recruitment and procurement, have undermined public confidence in law enforcement. Public perception of rampant corruption, heavy handed security measures and state neglect erodes the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts making it difficult for police to gain the trust and cooperation of local communities, which is a key to success for any counter-terrorism strategy.

VIII. WAY FORWARD

To effectively combat terrorism in KP, a comprehensive, multifaceted and integrated approach is needed. The following strategies can help ensure long-term peace and security in the region:

- **Strengthening Border Security:** Improved border management along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is critical. This includes the construction of a digitally monitored secure fence, establishment of more regulated crossing points, and enhanced intelligence sharing between Pakistani and Afghan security forces for dismantling the militants' safe havens along the border.
- **Enhancing Law Enforcement Capacity:** The KP Police need continued investment in modern investigative tools and technologies. Forensic labs, surveillance systems and cybersecurity capabilities should be expanded to help police better track and prosecute militants to prevent attacks.
- **Community Engagement and Trust Building:** Strengthening programmes like Police Assistance Lines (PALs) and Dispute Resolution Councils (DRCs) can help enhance public trust in law enforcement particularly in the former tribal areas, where the traditional *Jirga System* has been abolished after the 25th amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. Engaging community leaders, addressing local grievances and involving residents in security efforts will create stronger partnerships between the police and the public, thus reducing operational space for militants.
- **Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Former Militants:** Vocational training, psychological counselling and educational plus economic opportunities for former militants are essential for preventing re-radicalization. Programmes focused on youth empowerment, job creation, skills acquisition and DE radicalization can help rehabilitate those who have been involved in militant activities.
- **Addressing Root Causes of Terrorism:** Long-term solutions must address the ideological indoctrination and socio-economic deprivation that fuels terrorism. Investments in education, healthcare, and infrastructure, particularly in former tribal areas, are necessary to reduce poverty, unemployment and radicalization.
- **Regional and International Cooperation:** Strengthening regional cooperation with Afghanistan, China, Russia and international organizations is vital for countering terrorism in KP. Pakistan must collaborate with neighbouring countries and global counter-terrorism agencies to disrupt militant networks, cut off their financial resources and deny bases to them.
- **Reinvigoration of the Legal Framework:** The current legal framework has not been able to ensure

speedy and timely prosecution of those involved in the acts of terrorism. Several loopholes and procedural flaws enable the perpetrators of terror to go scot free. The inability of investigators to collect and connect the evidence, the lack of hands-on knowledge of the prosecutors and fear of reprisal from terrorists among the prosecutors and judiciary play a crucial role in undermining counter-terrorism efforts.

IX. CONCLUSION

Terrorism in KP remains a complex and evolving threat, shaped by both local vulnerabilities and international dynamics. It poses a serious threat to Pakistan's stability and prosperity. While progress has been made through police reforms and military operations, significant challenges remain which require a more integrated strategy involving institutional reforms, community engagement and kinetic precision. Addressing the root causes of extremism, such as ideological indoctrination, socio-economic deprivation and radicalization, is also essential for ensuring long-term peace and stability in the region.

By focusing on international cooperation, border management, enhancement of law enforcement capacity, overhauling of legal framework and promoting community engagement, KP can fight the challenge of terrorism. With continued efforts from the government, law enforcement agencies and people, KP can achieve lasting peace and serve as a model for others facing similar challenges.

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PART THREE

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 120

**WORK PRODUCT OF THE 187TH
INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE**

UNAFEI

REPORT OF THE COURSE

THE 187TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE

“Current Challenges and Effective Countermeasures
in the Fight Against Money-Laundering”

1. Duration and Participants

- From 9 May to 5 June 2025
- 11 overseas participants from 10 countries
- 3 participants from Japan

2. Overview of the Course

This Course aimed to share the current situation regarding money-laundering, examine key issues and challenges of prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of money-laundering, and explore effective countermeasures. The Course fulfilled its objectives by highlighting the importance of inter-agency collaboration, international cooperation and public-private partnership through the lectures of experts and individual presentations by the participants. The Course also fostered mutual trust and understanding among the participants as a foundation for a global network of criminal justice practitioners committed to combating money-laundering.

3. Contents of the Course

(1) Lectures

● Overseas Experts

A) “Digital Fundamentals”

“Introduction to Darknet and Cryptocurrencies”

Joshua James

Regional Counter-Cybercrime Coordinator

UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

B) “UNODC Global Programme on Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Countering the Financing of Terrorism”

“AML/CFT International Standards and UN Instruments”

“The Evolving Threat - Southeast Asia & Global Money-Laundering Trends & Typologies”

“Effective Domestic Coordination in AML/CFT”

“Building a Collaborative National Defense Coordination”

Aibek Turdukulov

Programme Officer (Anti-Money-Laundering/Counter-Financing of Terrorism)

UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

C) “Current Challenges and Effective Countermeasures in the Fight Against Money-Laundering”

Gavin Raper

Director of Technical Assistance and Typologies Team, Asia/Pacific Group On Money Laundering (APG)

Stephen Munro

Deputy Director of Technical Assistance and Typologies Team, Asia/Pacific Group On Money Laundering (APG)

D) “International Cooperation in the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime and Associated Money-Laundering: Thailand’s Perspectives

Jumpon Phansumrit

Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Thailand

E) “Countermeasures Against Money-Laundering”

Jennifer Wallis

Senior Trial Attorney with the United States Department of Justice Criminal Division,

International Unit of Money-Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (MLARS)

- Lectures by Japanese Experts
 - A) “Current Status and Challenges of AML/CFT Measures in Japan”
Hamada Koki
Financial Crimes Office, Risk Analysis Division, Strategy Development and Management Bureau,
Financial Services Agency
 - B) “Measures Against Money-Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Japan”
Fukutani Masahiro
Government Attorney, Public Security Division, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice
 - C) “Current Situation of Money-Laundering in Japan”
Hiramoto Masaki
Second Organized Crime Division, Organized Crime Department, Criminal Affairs Bureau,
National Police Agency
 - D) “Outline of Countermeasures Against Proceeds of Crime in Japan”
Tachi Shinichi
First Organized Crime Division, Organized Crime Department, Criminal Affairs Bureau,
National Police Agency
 - E) “Anti-Money-Laundering Measures”
Watanabe Shintaro
Managing Director, Head of AML Department, Financial Crimes Office for Japan, MUFG Bank,
Ltd.
 - F) “Use of Digital Forensics in the Investigations of Crime including Money-Laundering”
McIlroy Nanae
Public Prosecutor, Japan Prosecutors Unit on Emerging Crimes (JPEC), Supreme Public
Prosecutors Office
 - G) “Investigation of Cross-Border Money-Laundering Cases”
Tate Junya
Criminal Proceeds Division, Organized Crime Department, Tokyo Metropolitan Police
Department, Superintendent Designated by the National Police Agency
 - H) “Investigation and Prosecution of Money-Laundering Cases Using Crypto Assets”
Tokutake Keiichi
Public Prosecutor, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office

(2) Individual Presentations

Each participant made an “Individual Presentation” outlining the legal frameworks against money-laundering, current situation and challenges, as well as best practices in each country. The presentation was followed by numerous questions and active discussions among the participants.

(3) Study Visits

The participants visited the following facilities to learn about effective countermeasures against money-laundering:

- Tokyo Customs, Haneda Airport Branch
- Tachikawa Branch of the Tokyo District Court

(4) Group Discussion

The participants were divided into three groups and discussed the following topics based on the knowledge gained through the individual presentations, lectures by experts and study visits:

- Prevention of money-laundering

REPORT OF THE COURSE

- Detection, investigation and prosecution of money-laundering

The results of the discussions were summarized as concrete action plans for possible future measures, and presented to all participants and staff of UNAFEI, followed by question-and-answer sessions.

4. Feedback from the Participants

Most participants highly appreciated the structure and contents of the Course, noting that they were able to enhance their knowledge and understanding of global trends and emerging anti-money-laundering issues through the lectures by overseas and Japanese experts highlighting the importance of inter-agency collaboration and international cooperation. Many participants also commented positively that the Course provided them with the opportunity to learn good practices from other countries through individual presentations and question-and-answer sessions. They also reported that the Course was effective in establishing a robust human network among their fellow criminal justice practitioners for future cooperation. UNAFEI would like to express its sincere appreciation for all comments and suggestions received, and will take such feedback into account in the planning of future courses and seminars.

5. Comments from the Programming Officer

Money-laundering is a criminal offence involving concealment, transfer and reintegration of proceeds of crime derived from predicate offences such as drug trafficking, fraud or illegal gambling. Such reintegration enables these organizations to exploit laundered assets in furtherance of future criminal activities. To dismantle criminal organizations, it is essential not only to prosecute and punish those who commit predicate offences, but also to impose strict penalties on those engaged in money-laundering activities and to ensure the comprehensive confiscation of criminal proceeds. This approach disrupts the financial infrastructure of criminal groups and deprives them of the economic resource to operate. Moreover, perpetrators of organized crime often circumvent jurisdictions that strictly enforce anti-money-laundering (AML) measures, exploiting legal and institutional loopholes in countries with weaker controls. Money-laundering cannot be effectively addressed by any one country acting alone; it represents a global challenge that requires coordinated international action. In recognition of this, the international community has adopted several key legal instruments—including the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)—and has promoted the implementation of effective AML measures through bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Despite these efforts, money-laundering continues to pose significant challenges.

One of the key takeaways from this training programme is the recognition that many countries, including Japan, continue to face significant challenges in combating money-laundering. The cross-border nature of such crimes frequently necessitates complex procedures for international cooperation in criminal matters. Furthermore, the rapid evolution of digital technologies—including the rise of crypto-assets and the use of dark web platforms—has outpaced the capacity of many national investigative authorities, thereby complicating investigations and delaying enforcement efforts. Unlike cases of murder or robbery, money-laundering may lack an immediately identifiable “victim,” and unlike corruption cases, there may be no obvious “villains” such as a corrupt public official who has accepted a bribe. These characteristics may, in part, explain why AML measures have not been prioritized or have only been implemented with limited urgency in some jurisdictions. Nonetheless, without concerted efforts by all countries to close the gaps that facilitate money-laundering, it will be impossible to prevent criminal organizations from accessing illicit funds and reinforcing their criminal activities.

Effectively combating organized crime requires a fundamental shift in mind-sets among all relevant stakeholders—both public and private—and a commitment to sustained, robust anti-money-laundering action. This Course has emphasized that AML measures cannot be effectively implemented by a single country or institution in isolation. Instead, a “whole-of-society approach” is imperative. To that end, the programme featured contributions from a broad range of stakeholders, including international organizations, national government agencies and private financial institutions. These diverse perspectives helped to underscore the importance of enhanced coordination and cooperation across jurisdictions and sectors.

Over the course of approximately one month, participants stayed at the UNAFEI facility where they engaged in extensive deliberations on AML strategies, exchanged ideas and learned from one another.

UNAFEI sincerely hopes that the expertise gained through this course will contribute to strengthening AML measures in the participants' home countries. We are also confident that the friendship and trust fostered during this course will serve as a valuable foundation for future cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime.

PREVENTING AND COMBATING MONEY-LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, GLOBAL TRENDS AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COORDINATION

*Aibek Turdukulov**

I. INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIME

The fight against money-laundering (ML), terrorist financing (TF) and the financing of proliferation (PF) is a cornerstone of global security and economic stability. The scale of the problem is immense, with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimating that the amount of money laundered globally in one year is between 2 to 5 percent of global GDP, or US\$800 billion–US\$2 trillion. Criminal and terrorist networks exploit vulnerabilities in the financial system to conceal the proceeds of their activities, undermining the rule of law, fuelling corruption, distorting economic competition and threatening sustainable development.

A robust international framework, underpinned by United Nations conventions and driven by the standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), provides the foundation for national efforts to combat these threats. The UNODC, through its Global Programme on Money Laundering (GPML), plays a pivotal role in supporting Member States by providing technical assistance, policy guidance and fostering international cooperation.

This paper synthesizes key concepts from the prevailing international AML/CFT regime. It will first outline the foundational standards and legal instruments, then explore the evolving nature of global ML/TF threats with a focus on Southeast Asia, and finally, examine the critical importance of effective domestic coordination as the lynchpin of a successful national strategy.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL AML/CFT STANDARDS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

An effective response to transnational financial crime requires a universally recognized set of standards and legal obligations. The FATF and key UN Conventions form the pillars of this global architecture.

A. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The FATF is the inter-governmental body that sets the international standards for combating money-laundering and terrorist financing. Its core mandate involves:

- 1. Developing the FATF Standards:** The FATF Recommendations (the “40 Recommendations”) provide a complete framework of measures that countries should implement. They are not hard law but carry significant weight through the peer-review process. These standards cover the entire AML/CFT spectrum, including the crucial **Risk-Based Approach (RBA)**, requirements for **Customer Due Diligence (CDD)**, robust measures for **beneficial ownership transparency** of legal persons and arrangements, the powers and responsibilities of **competent authorities**, and mechanisms for **international cooperation**.
- 2. Monitoring Compliance:** Through a rigorous process of peer-review, known as Mutual Evaluations, the FATF assesses countries’ implementation of the standards. This process has two distinct components:

* Programme Officer (AML/CFT), UNODC.

- o **Technical Compliance Assessment:** This evaluates whether the necessary laws, regulations, and powers exist on paper. Jurisdictions are rated on each of the 40 Recommendations as either *Compliant (C)*, *Largely Compliant (LC)*, *Partially Compliant (PC)*, or *Non-Compliant (NC)*.
 - o **Effectiveness Assessment:** This is a qualitative assessment of how well a country's AML/CFT system works in practice. It measures performance against 11 "Immediate Outcomes" (e.g., "IO.7: Money laundering is investigated and prosecuted," "IO.8: Proceeds of crime are confiscated"). Jurisdictions are rated as having a *High (HE)*, *Substantial (SE)*, *Moderate (ME)*, or *Low (LE)* level of effectiveness for each outcome.
- 3. Identifying High-Risk Jurisdictions:** The FATF identifies jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies.
- o **Jurisdictions Under Increased Monitoring ("Grey List"):** These countries are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes. Being "greylisted" can result in significant reputational damage, a decline in foreign direct investment, de-risking by global correspondent banks, and increased transaction costs for businesses.
 - o **High-Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action ("Black List"):** These are countries with significant strategic deficiencies that the FATF calls on its members and all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence and, in the most serious cases, countermeasures to protect the international financial system.

B. Foundational United Nations Conventions

The FATF standards are reinforced by international law, primarily through three key UN conventions that provide the legal mandate for domestic action and international cooperation:

- 1. The Vienna Convention (1988):** The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was the first international treaty to require the criminalization of money-laundering, laying the critical groundwork for future efforts, although its scope was limited to drug trafficking proceeds.
- 2. The Palermo Convention (UNTOC, 2000):** The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime significantly expanded AML obligations, requiring the criminalization of laundering the proceeds of a wide range of "serious crimes". Its key contributions include Article 7, which laid out measures such as customer identification and suspicious transaction reporting, and the formal introduction of the concept of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). Crucially, its robust chapter on international cooperation (Article 18) provides a powerful legal basis for Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) even in the absence of bilateral treaties.
- 3. The Merida Convention (UNCAC, 2003):** The UN Convention Against Corruption is the only legally binding universal anti-corruption instrument. It established corruption offences (e.g., bribery, embezzlement) as key predicate offences for money-laundering. Its most groundbreaking feature is **Chapter V on Asset Recovery**, which establishes the return of stolen assets as a fundamental principle of international law. It obligates states to cooperate extensively in tracing, freezing, confiscating, and returning the proceeds of corruption, introducing innovative legal mechanisms like non-conviction-based asset forfeiture (Article 54) and direct recovery of property (Article 53).

Together, these instruments provide the comprehensive legal basis for countries to criminalize money-laundering, confiscate illicit assets, and cooperate effectively across borders.

III. EVOLVING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL MONEY-LAUNDERING TRENDS

The threat landscape of financial crime is not static. Criminal organizations continuously adapt their methods, exploiting new technologies and regulatory loopholes. Analysis of trends in Southeast Asia, a global

hub for such activity, reveals a dynamic and converging criminal ecosystem.

A. The Rise of Casino and Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Hubs

Across the Mekong region, a rapid and often unregulated expansion of casinos and SEZs has created a permissive environment for large-scale money-laundering. These zones, frequently located in remote border areas with limited government oversight, function as de facto extrajudicial territories and have become safe havens for transnational organized crime. Illicit actors leverage these zones to:

- **Launder Proceeds at Scale:** The commingling of vast amounts of cash from both legitimate gaming and illicit activities makes casinos a classic vehicle for laundering proceeds from drug trafficking, the primary predicate offence in the region.
- **Establish Criminal Infrastructure:** These zones house sophisticated cyber-fraud and online scam centres, often staffed by victims of human trafficking who are forced to work under brutal conditions.
- **Exploit Regulatory Gaps:** They host a proliferation of illegal and high-risk Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), which operate outside of regulatory perimeters to launder funds globally.

B. Convergence of Crime and Technology

A clear and dangerous convergence of criminal activities is occurring. The vast profits from the drug trade have fuelled investment in the infrastructure needed for large-scale cybercrime. These criminal enterprises are characterized by:

- **Technological Sophistication:** An increasing reliance on technology to anonymize and expedite their operations. This includes the use of **cryptocurrencies**, laundered through mixers, tumblers and chain-hopping across different blockchains to obscure the money trail; **deepfake technology** to create fraudulent identity documents and bypass biometric KYC controls; and **advanced communications tools** like the Starlink satellite internet service, which provides resilient, hard-to-trace connectivity for criminal compounds in remote areas.
- **Professionalization and Specialization:** The growth of a criminal “as-a-service” model, where specialized groups sell hacking tools, malware, stolen data and even “Laundering-as-a-Service” (LaaS) on underground markets. This lowers the barrier to entry and increases the efficiency of criminal operations.
- **Exploitation of Data:** The proliferation of underground data markets, fuelled by “infostealer” malware that harvests credentials and personal data from victims worldwide. This stolen information is the lifeblood of modern fraud, used for victim profiling, extortion and creating mule accounts for laundering illicit funds.

On-chain analysis of cryptocurrency flows from these regional hubs shows undeniable links to global criminal activity, including North Korean sanctions evasion, proliferation financing and the laundering of funds stolen by state-sponsored hacking groups like the Lazarus Group.

IV. THE IMPERATIVE OF DOMESTIC COORDINATION

While international standards provide the blueprint, their effectiveness depends entirely on robust implementation at the national level. Effective domestic coordination is arguably the most critical element of a functional AML/CFT regime. As FATF Recommendation 2 states, countries must have national AML/CFT policies based on identified risks and ensure effective cooperation and coordination between all relevant authorities.

A. Key Domestic Players

A “whole-of-government” and societal approach is essential, involving a collaborative chain of stakeholders:

- **Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU):** The central national agency for receiving, analysing and disseminating financial intelligence. It serves as the crucial link between the private sector and law enforcement.
- **Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs):** Police, customs and specialized financial crime units that use FIU intelligence to investigate predicate crimes and money-laundering.
- **Prosecutorial Services and Judiciary:** Responsible for prosecuting ML/TF cases, ensuring evidence is admissible, securing convictions and issuing the court orders necessary for freezing and confiscating assets while safeguarding due process.
- **Supervisory Authorities:** Central banks and other bodies that regulate and supervise financial institutions and DNFBPs. Their role is to ensure the private sector effectively implements its AML/CFT obligations, including the RBA and CDD.
- **Policy-Making Ministries:** Ministries of Finance, Justice and Foreign Affairs that provide political will, oversee the legal and policy framework, and manage international cooperation.
- **Private Sector:** Financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are the gatekeepers of the financial system and the first line of defence, responsible for implementing preventive measures and reporting suspicious activity to the FIU.

B. Models for Coordination and Information Sharing

Effective coordination must occur at both the policy and operational levels. Common mechanisms include:

- **High-Level Coordination:** National AML/CFT Committees, often chaired by a senior figure from a ministry of finance or justice, are essential for setting national policy. Their primary tasks include conducting the **National Risk Assessment (NRA)**, developing a national strategy based on its findings, and ensuring the allocation of adequate resources and political will.
- **Operational Coordination:** This involves hands-on collaboration through multi-agency **task forces** focused on specific threats (e.g., cyber-fraud, wildlife trafficking), **joint investigation teams** for complex cases and the **secondment of staff** between agencies to build trust, share expertise and break down cultural silos.
- **Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs):** These are increasingly vital. Formal platforms, like the UK's Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT), allow the FIU, law enforcement and major private sector entities to exchange strategic intelligence and typologies in a trusted environment, dramatically improving the quality and utility of suspicious transaction reports.

The fuel for all coordination is **information sharing**. Legal frameworks must provide clear “gateways” that permit or mandate the timely and proactive sharing of operational and strategic intelligence, moving from a reactive “need to know” culture to a proactive “need to share” paradigm. The failure to share information creates silos where crucial pieces of the puzzle are missed, leading to failed investigations and allowing illicit funds to dissipate.

V. CONCLUSION AND KEY TAKEAWAY

Combating money-laundering and terrorist financing is a complex, enduring challenge that requires sustained commitment and adaptation. The key takeaways from this overview are clear:

1. **A Strong Foundation is Essential:** Adherence to the global standards set by the FATF and the legal obligations within the UNTOC and UNCAC is the non-negotiable price of entry for any country seeking to protect its financial system and participate in the global economy.

- 2. Threats are Dynamic and Converging:** Criminals are agile, technology-driven and operate transnationally. The convergence of cybercrime, fraud and traditional predicate offences like drug trafficking presents a formidable, borderless challenge that requires an equally agile and collaborative international response.
- 3. Domestic Coordination is Key:** A national AML/CFT framework is only as strong as the collaboration between its constituent parts. Breaking down institutional silos and fostering seamless, real-time information sharing between the FIU, law enforcement, prosecutors, supervisors and the private sector is the single most critical factor for success.
- 4. Public-Private Collaboration is Crucial:** The private sector is the first and most important line of defence. Empowering financial institutions and DNFBPs with the actionable intelligence and collaborative frameworks they need to identify and report illicit activity is a force multiplier that is indispensable in the fight against financial crime.

PARTICIPANTS' PAPERS

CURRENT CHALLENGES AND EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY-LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCE IN THE MALDIVES

*Mariyam Loveza**

I. DEFINITION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING (PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM ACT 10/2014)

The conversion or transfer of property, by any person who knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of such property or assisting any person who is involved in the commission of a predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her actions; or the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, transferee, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, by any person who knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that such property is the proceeds of crime; or the acquisition, possession or use of property by any person who knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that such property is the proceeds of crime; or participation in or conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the activities contained in (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection. The offence of money-laundering shall also apply to people who have committed the predicate offence.

II. DEFINITION OF TERRORISM FINANCING (PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM ACT 10/2014)

“Financing of terrorism” shall mean an act by any person who by any means, directly or indirectly, wilfully, provides or collects funds, or attempts to do so, with the intention to use the funds or with the knowledge that the funds are to be used, in full or in part, to carry out a terrorist act, by an individual terrorist, or by a terrorist organization. The offence is committed irrespective of any link to a specific terrorist act, or whether the funds have been used to commit such act.

III. PREDICATE OFFENCES

Predicate offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act 10/2014 include: Terrorism; Terrorism financing; Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; Human trafficking; Illicit arms trafficking; Counterfeiting currency; Insider trading; Corruption; Crimes committed by organized criminal groups; Any offence categorized as a “serious offence” under other Maldivian laws; Aiding, abetting, or participating in the commission of any of the offences listed above.

* Terrorism and Violent Extremism Investigations, Maldives Police Service, Maldives.

IV. KEY INSTITUTIONS COUNTERING MONEY-LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING IN THE MALDIVES

A. Maldives Financial Intelligence Unit (MFIU)

The primary national agency responsible for AML/CFT intelligence gathering receives and analyses Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) from financial and non-financial institutions, shares intelligence with law enforcement and international counterparts, operates under the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) and is a member of the Egmont Group (global FIU network).

B. Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA)

The Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) serves as the central bank and main financial regulator, overseeing banks, insurance companies, finance firms and money service businesses. Although the Maldives is not a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the MMA aligns its regulatory framework with FATF Recommendations and global best practices. It issues AML/CFT regulations, supervises compliance and promotes risk-based approaches to customer due diligence (CDD), Know Your Customer (KYC) and transaction monitoring. MMA plays a key role in national AML/CFT efforts, working closely with the Maldives Financial Intelligence Unit (MFIU), law enforcement and regional bodies such as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to strengthen the country's financial integrity system.

C. Capital Market Development Authority CMDA

The Capital Market Development Authority (CMDA) is the independent regulator of capital markets in the Maldives, including the Maldives Stock Exchange and related financial service providers. It also oversees AML/CFT compliance within the capital market sector. CMDA monitors brokers, dealers, investment advisers and listed companies to ensure adherence to obligations such as customer due diligence, beneficial ownership transparency, suspicious transaction reporting and record-keeping. It plays a key role in preventing the misuse of capital markets for money-laundering or market manipulation and works with the MFIU and other agencies to share intelligence, strengthen enforcement and raise AML/CFT awareness in the investment sector.

D. Maldives Police Service (MPS)

The Maldives Police Service (MPS) is responsible for detecting and investigating money-laundering and terrorism financing offences, utilizing a range of investigative techniques including digital forensics tools to analyse electronic evidence such as transaction records, communication data and digital wallets. They conduct evidence gathering, search and seizure operations, and prepare investigative reports while maintaining close coordination with the Maldives Financial Intelligence Unit, Maldives Monetary Authority and the Prosecutor General's Office (PGO). For international cases, Maldives Police Service prioritizes police-to-police cooperation before submitting formal Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) requests. MLA requests are carefully drafted to ensure clear objectives, verification of dual criminality and inclusion of necessary documentation.

E. Prosecutor General's Office (PGO)

The Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) provides legal oversight throughout investigations and prosecutions, offering guidance to law enforcement and reviewing MLA requests to ensure legal accuracy and compliance with international standards. The PGO determines charges, prepares prosecution cases and manages follow-up on MLA outcomes. It emphasizes pre-submission consultations and strong coordination with investigative agencies and foreign counterparts to enhance the effectiveness of AML/CFT prosecutions in the Maldives.

F. Judiciary (Courts)

The judiciary plays a central role in adjudicating ML and TF cases. Courts are responsible for ensuring due process and upholding the right to a fair trial. They have the authority to issue orders for search, arrest, and asset freezing or confiscation. Upon conviction, the courts impose penalties which may include imprisonment, fines or the forfeiture of illicit assets, thereby reinforcing the rule of law and the integrity of the justice system.

G. Penalties and Sentencing Considerations for ML/TF

1. Penalties for Money-Laundering (ML)

Imprisonment: Convictions for money-laundering can lead to up to 10 years in prison. **Fines:** Fines are significant, with amounts that can be imposed depending on the severity of the crime, but specific fine amounts are generally discretionary and determined on a case-by-case basis.

2. Penalties for Terrorism Financing (TF)

Imprisonment: Those convicted of financing terrorism can face up to 15 years in prison. For money-laundering, fines may be levied, although the specifics depend on the details of the case.

3. Other Relevant Points

Confiscation of Assets: Both money-laundering and terrorism financing can result in the seizure and confiscation of assets related to the crime.

Corporate Liability: Companies involved in money-laundering or terrorism financing can face substantial penalties, including fines and operational restrictions.

Increased Penalties for Aggravated Offences: If the offence involves organized criminal groups or terrorism-related activities, the penalties can be more severe, especially for repeat offenders or high-profile cases.

4. Factors that Lead to Stricter Sentencing

- Repeat offender
- Abuse of position
- Use of front or shell companies
- Large amounts involved
- Cross-border transactions
- Organized criminal group involvement

5. Factors for Reducing Sentencing:

- Cooperation with authorities
- Voluntary disclosure
- First-time offender
- Minor role in the offence
- Restitution or compensation

V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION UNDER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM ACT 10/2014

- Enables Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) for investigation, prosecution, asset freezing, and evidence sharing in ML/TF cases.
- Allows exchange of financial intelligence between Maldives authorities and foreign counterparts. (FIU to FIU)
- Aligns with international standards such as FATF Recommendations, including principles of dual criminality and reciprocity.
- Designates key agencies responsible for cooperation: MFIU, Maldives Police Service, Prosecutor General's Office, and Maldives Monetary Authority.
- Supports collaboration with regional and international bodies like the Egmont Group the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG).

VI. STATISTICS OF MONEY-LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING CASES (2019-2024)

Year	TF Investigations	TF Prosecutions	ML Investigations	ML Prosecutions
2019	1	1	13	1
2020	1	0	25	1
2021	2	1	17	3
2022	0	0	27	7
2023	0	1	30	19
2024	0	0	46	19

VII. CASE STUDY: SUSPICIOUS REMITTANCE FOUND DURING HOUSE SEARCH¹

In the Maldives, reported cases related to terrorism financing (TF) have historically been very limited. However, even isolated cases can reveal serious vulnerabilities in the financial system. The following case study—though fictional—illustrates how a routine search can expose potential TF indicators and why proactive monitoring, and international cooperation are essential.

During an ongoing investigation, the Maldives Police Service Investigation Team conducted a search at the residence of a suspect, “Ben.” The search uncovered a significant amount of cash alongside a MoneyGram receipt indicating an international money transfer from an individual named “Jack,” residing in another country. Subsequent checks revealed that Jack has a criminal history related to terrorist activities in his home country, raising serious concerns that the transferred funds might be connected to terrorist financing or other illicit activities.

To further the investigation, police-to-police cooperation took place with the law enforcement agency in Jack’s country to quickly share intelligence and coordinate preliminary investigative actions. Simultaneously, a formal Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) request was submitted to obtain detailed financial records and relevant evidence from the foreign jurisdiction. This coordinated approach allowed for efficient cross-border information exchange, helping to trace the origin and intended use of the funds.

This case highlights how a small piece of evidence, such as a remittance receipt, can uncover larger criminal networks. It also emphasizes the importance of strong international cooperation through both direct police collaboration and formal MLA channels to effectively combat money-laundering and terrorism financing.

VIII. CURRENT CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES

A. Institutional Capacity of the FIU and Law Enforcement

The effectiveness of the Maldives Financial Intelligence Unit (MFIU) is constrained by limited staffing, outdated technology and insufficient training opportunities. According to national assessments, the overall competency of law enforcement agencies to identify, investigate and prosecute money-laundering remains low. This is further hampered by weak inter-agency collaboration and unclear procedural coordination during complex financial crime cases. As a result, the volume and quality of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) remain below optimal levels, and financial intelligence is not always effectively turned into actionable investigations.

¹ The names and details used in this case study are fictitious and serve solely for illustrative purposes.

Countermeasures

- Launch targeted and ongoing capacity-building programmes for MFIU staff, police and prosecutors, including training in digital forensics and financial investigations.
- Secure consistent budgetary and technical resource allocation to the FIU to improve analysis capabilities.
- Strengthen inter-agency mechanisms through formal coordination protocols, task forces and information-sharing platforms.
- Promote joint operations and early-stage collaboration between FIU, MPS, MMA and the PGO to close operational gaps.

B. Supervision of Non-Banking Financial Institutions and Informal Systems

Non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs) such as remittance services, currency exchange operators, and informal value transfer systems (like *hawala*) continue to operate with weak or inconsistent AML/CFT supervision. These entities are especially vulnerable to abuse due to limited licensing requirements, minimal regulatory reporting and gaps in customer due diligence enforcement. The lack of oversight also hinders the ability of authorities to trace cross-border fund flows used in money-laundering or terrorism financing.

Countermeasures

- Expand the scope of AML/CFT regulations to fully cover NBFIs and require mandatory licensing, risk assessments, and periodic compliance audits.
- Increase regulatory outreach and on-site inspections to monitor AML/CFT controls within these sectors.
- Promote the use of formal financial channels by launching national awareness campaigns to build trust in regulated institutions.
- Integrate informal operators into the formal financial system where possible, with appropriate safeguards.

C. Emerging Terrorist Financing (TF) Risks

Though reported TF cases in the Maldives remain low, the country faces growing risk due to ideological radicalization and foreign affiliations. National risk assessments highlight concerns over the use of both formal banking systems and informal remittance channels to fund extremist activities. Designations of Maldivian nationals under UNSCR 1267 and 1373 for links to ISIS and Al-Qaida underscore the potential for terrorist financing, including overseas facilitation networks. Moreover, the unregulated use of virtual assets such as cryptocurrencies presents a new and emerging threat vector, especially given the anonymity and borderless nature of such transactions.

Countermeasures

- Fully implement targeted financial sanctions (TFS) and ensure effective asset freezing mechanisms are in place, in line with FATF Recommendation 6.
- Upgrade transaction monitoring systems and STR frameworks to detect TF indicators across banks, NBFIs and informal channels.
- Strengthen international cooperation through formal Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), police-to-police collaboration, and intelligence-sharing with partner FIUs and counter-terrorism units.
- Develop a legal framework for virtual asset regulation, including licensing and supervision of Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), to prevent their misuse for terrorism financing.

- Conduct public-private sector engagement to raise awareness on TF typologies, including online radicalization and cross-border funding risks.

COMBATING MONEY-LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING IN THE MALDIVES

*Abdulla Shahuneez**

I. INTRODUCTION

The Maldives faces unique challenges in combating money-laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) due to its geography and economy. This paper analyses the current situation, identifies root causes, discusses challenges and suggests countermeasures.

II. CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MALDIVES

A. Economic Vulnerabilities

Tourism, fishing and import/export sectors are highly vulnerable to ML due to cash transactions and complex business structures. The Maldives' geographical location and proximity to major drug-producing and transit countries make it a vulnerable transit point for narcotics.

B. Regulatory Framework

The Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) and Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) oversee AML/CFT efforts. The Maldives Police Service (MPS) is central to investigations, requiring even the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to collaborate via Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). The Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) and courts handle prosecutions and adjudications. Despite a significant increase in the number of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) disseminated by the FIU to the MPS, the rate of successful prosecutions remains very low, with no asset attachments or arrests made in the period from 2019 to 2024. Transaction Analysis Reports (TARs) have proven more effective than STRs in leading to prosecutions and asset attachments, with a high percentage of disseminations resulting in investigations and a proportionally higher number of prosecutions and asset seizures.

Key laws include the Anti-Money-Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Law No. 10/2014), Anti-Terrorism Act (Law No. 32/2025), Criminal Procedure Code (Law No. 9/2016) and FIU Regulations.

C. Legal Framework

Laws provide a framework for prevention, oversight and enforcement.

D. Challenges in Anti-Money-Laundering/Counter Terrorism Financing Implementation

Lack of a national AML/CFT strategy and coordinated approach exists. There is limited use of FIU intelligence by law enforcement and an absence of ML convictions and asset confiscations aligning with risk profiles. TF investigations are stalled, indicating a lack of demonstrated effectiveness. Delayed implementation of UN-mandated Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) is also evident. Unidentified high-risk Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) persist, and varying AML/CFT knowledge across financial and non-financial sectors is a concern.

1. Drug Trafficking Impact

In the last four months of 2021, 1,480 kilos of drugs were seized en route to Sri Lanka and the Maldives, with over 400 kilos seized by Maldivian authorities. Extrapolating this, approximately 1,200 kilos of drugs could be seized annually by local authorities. Major heroin smuggling routes in the region include heroin

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transported from areas controlled by Afghan warlords to Pakistan, routed via sea and land to countries such as India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

2. Corruption and Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)

The FIU's 2021 analysis of TARs and STRs revealed the misuse of authority and corruption by Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), family members and associates. This includes embezzlement and influence peddling, with individuals using nominees, family members and third parties to obscure the identity of those controlling illicit funds. The 2014 Maldives Media & Public Relations Corporation (MMPRC) corruption scandal involved allegations of corruption against public officials, including the former President and Ministers.

3. National Risk Assessment (NRA) Findings

- **Overall ML risk:** “High” due to “High” threat and “Medium High” vulnerability.
- **ML threat:** “High” due to drug trafficking, corruption and organized crime.
- **ML vulnerability:** “Medium High” due to limited law enforcement capacity, cash-based economy and gaps in DNFBP regulations.
- **High-risk sectors:** real estate, money changers, NPOs, legal/accountancy professionals, precious metals dealers and the banking sector.
- **US Department of State 2016 INCSR:** Maldives as a “Monitored” jurisdiction, citing transit point concerns, limited oversight, and illicit funds from drug trafficking and corruption.
- **Major crimes generating illicit funds:** drug trafficking, corruption and organized crime.
- **Drug trafficking routes:** Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, UAE.

4. Financial Data

- **Total Seizures/Confiscations 2020-2021 (Source: Prosecutor General's Office)**
 - Drug Trafficking Offences:
 - MVR 616,220 (2020)
 - MVR 1,232,440 (2021)
 - Corruption Offences:
 - MVR 45,308,093 (2020)
 - 1 Luxury Apartment (2020)
 - Rolex Watch (2020)
 - MVR 15,420,000 (2021)

The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in their Annual Report 2021 identified the misuse of authority and corruption by Politically Exposed Persons, family members and associates; misuse of public power entrusted to them for embezzlement and influence peddling. Individuals in publicly prominent positions were noted to have used nominees, family members and third parties to obscure the identity of the persons controlling the funds.

III. ROOT CAUSES OF ML/TF IN THE MALDIVES

A. Weak Regulatory Enforcement

- Limited resources and capacity within law enforcement and regulatory agencies hinder effective enforcement.
- Concerns about corruption and lack of transparency can undermine AML/CFT efforts.

B. Geographic Vulnerabilities

- The archipelagic nature of the Maldives makes it difficult to monitor and control remote islands.
- Open borders and transit routes facilitate the movement of illicit funds.

C. Economic Factors

- The prevalence of a cash-based economy creates opportunities for ML.
- Rapid development and investment projects can attract illicit funds.

D. Social and Cultural Factors

- Informal financial systems may operate outside of regulatory oversight.
- Lack of public awareness about ML/TF risks can contribute to the problem.

IV. GOOD PRACTICES AND CHALLENGES

A. Good Practices

- The Maldives has made efforts to improve its AML/CFT framework in line with international standards.
- Collaboration with international organizations and regional partners has been strengthened.
- Public awareness campaigns are being implemented.

B. Challenges

- Resource constraints, including funding, personnel and technology, remain a significant challenge.
- Capacity-building is needed to enhance the expertise of AML/CFT professionals.
- Data collection and analysis processes require improvement.

V. COUNTERMEASURES

A. Strengthening the Regulatory Framework

- Increase funding and resources for the FIU and law enforcement agencies.

- Update and strengthen AML/CFT laws and regulations.
- Implement stricter due diligence requirements for financial institutions.

B. Enhancing International Cooperation

- Strengthening the role of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) of the Maldives in facilitating international cooperation.
- Utilizing Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) to exchange information and evidence with foreign jurisdictions.
- Effectively using INTERPOL notices (e.g., Red Notices for wanted persons, Blue Notices for information gathering) related to money-laundering and terrorist financing.

C. Improving Public Awareness

- Launch targeted public awareness campaigns.
- Engage with civil society organizations and the private sector.
- Implement youth education programmes about financial crimes.

D. Technological Solutions

- Deploy advanced data analytics and transaction monitoring systems.
- Explore the use of blockchain technology for transparent financial transactions.
- Improve national cybersecurity infrastructure.

VI. CASE STUDY

A. Analysis of Money-Laundering Methods in the 500K Scam

This case study analyses the money-laundering methods employed in a significant scam incident in the Maldives, highlighting the challenges in tracing illicit funds and identifying the complex networks involved.

- **Introduction**
 - This case study explores a real-world money-laundering operation uncovered during the investigation of the 500K Scam in the Maldives. The case originated with the unauthorized withdrawal of MVR 582,149 from two individual accounts, which exposed a broader laundering network that funnelled more than MVR 27 million through multiple personal bank accounts, mule operatives and crypto channels.
 - This case demonstrates how modern money-laundering operations exploit digital vulnerabilities and how law enforcement, prosecutors and courts work together to respond.
- **Background**
 - The case was initiated in February 2024 after reports of unauthorized fund transfers from the victim's accounts. The scam resulted in the fraudulent transfer of MVR 582,149 from the victim's accounts. These funds were rapidly transferred and layered through at least 16 accounts and 20+ SIM cards, indicating a pre-planned laundering network.

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- Investigations revealed links to broader scam activities, and laundering techniques included layering via transfers, ATM withdrawals, purchasing goods and cryptocurrency conversion (USDT).
- Scam cases represent a significant financial crime threat in the Maldives, resulting in substantial losses to the public.
- In the past year, total losses from scam cases reached MVR 2,402,618.81 and \$350,824.68.
- The first quarter of this year saw losses amounting to MVR 13,761,259.6, indicating a potential increase in scam-related money-laundering.

- **Objectives**

- To detail the methods used to launder funds obtained through the scam.
- To trace the flow of illicit funds through various accounts and transactions.
- To identify the layering techniques used to obscure the origin and destination of the money.
- To assess the challenges in recovering the laundered funds.

- **Money-Laundering Methods (MO)**

The operation was built on a multi-step strategy designed to steal, transfer and clean funds without raising suspicion:

- *Phishing & Credential Theft:* Victims were tricked into revealing banking credentials via fake job ads, phishing links or investment schemes.
- *SIM Swapping and OTP Interception:* Using forged ID cards, the perpetrators duplicated SIM cards registered to victims. This allowed them to intercept OTPs and login verifications for bank apps and mobile wallets.
- *Unauthorized Bank Access:* Access was gained to multiple victim accounts, where transfers were quickly initiated to mule accounts under control of the network. Amounts like MVR 250,000 and MVR 557,149 were transferred from victim accounts.
- *Layered Transactions through Fake or Rented Accounts:* Funds were structured into smaller chunks (e.g., MVR 5,000–50,000) and transferred across 16+ accounts. Some accounts were opened using fake names; others were rented from low-income individuals promised commissions.
- *Rapid Withdrawal and Dispersal:* The network attempted to immediately withdraw or use the laundered money via ATM, POS purchases or cash handovers. In some cases, funds were moved across 8–9 accounts within hours.
- *Use of Digital Payment Platforms:* Transactions were routed through mobile apps and social media-based payments, using vulnerabilities in e-wallet KYC systems.
- *Cross-Border Transfers:* A portion of the stolen funds was traced to international accounts, pointing to a transnational element and possible integration into foreign financial markets.

- **Flow of Funds & Timeline**

- *Initial Fraudulent Transfers:* 12 February 2024, 13:50–14:30.
- *First-layer Transfers:* Executed within 2 hours.

- *Cash Withdrawals / Goods Purchases*: Initiated within the same day.
- *Crypto Conversion*: Completed via a third-party merchant by next day.

- **Laundering Techniques in Detail**

- *The Structuring (Smurfing)*: The laundered funds were broken down into smaller transfers to avoid bank scrutiny.
- *Account Layering*: Over 21 documented transactions showed deliberate layering through various accounts to obscure the audit trail.
- *Fake Identity Use*: One highlighted case involved a fraudulently named account (Mohamed Hussain) used to process over MVR 582,000.
- *Mobile Banking Exploitation*: OTPs and access codes were obtained from compromised SIMs. Several transfers occurred moments after unauthorized logins, indicating precise coordination.

- **Police Investigation Process**

- *Complaint Received & Financial Tracing Initiated*: Victim reports triggered a rapid tracing of outgoing transfers and ATM transactions.
- *Account Freezes & Interagency Alerts*: Immediate bank coordination led to freezing over MVR 7 million in suspect accounts.
- *Telecom & Device Forensics*: SIM ownership and duplication data were retrieved and cross-referenced with IMEI logs and login IPs.
- *Suspect Identification*: Linked accounts and phone records were used to identify key suspects.
- *Arrests Made*: 8 suspects were arrested, including:
 - 2 primary coordinators (organized logistics and crypto transfers)
 - 3 money mules who received and withdrew funds
 - 2 individuals who opened accounts using forged IDs
 - 1 digital payment intermediary

- **Prosecution and Court Proceedings**

- *Jurisdiction*: The case was heard under the Maldives Criminal Court, which has original jurisdiction over offences under the Penal Code, Anti-Money-Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Law No. 10/2014), and the Evidence Act.
- *Charges*: The suspects were charged with:
 - Money-laundering (under the AML/CFT Act)
 - Unauthorized access and fraudulent transfer
 - Identity fraud and use of forged documents
 - Obtaining property by deception

- **Prosecution Strategy**

- *Evidence Submission:* Transaction logs, SIM registration records, forensic reports from bank apps and IP logs, and CDR data.
- *Witness Testimony:* Police investigators, telecom reps, bank compliance officers.
- *Digital Evidence:* Crypto purchase receipts, OTP logs, app activity records.

- **Outcome (Current Status)**

- Proceedings are ongoing.
- Further investigations continue regarding crypto trail and potential foreign links.

How ML Cases Are Handled in the Maldives: Investigation-Prosecution-Court

Stage	Description
Police Investigation	Initiated by victim complaint or STRs. FIU alerts, KYC violations, and CDR/IP analysis are used to trace laundering.
Account Freezing	Law enforcement issues urgent freeze orders; coordination with MMA and banks is critical.
Prosecutor General's Office (PGO)	Reviews evidence under the AML/CFT Act. Prepares formal charges and court submissions.
Criminal Court	Hears cases under relevant financial and criminal statutes. Accepts digital forensics and foreign evidence.
Asset Recovery	If convicted, court may order recovery, confiscation or restitution of laundered assets.

- **Challenges**

Investigating and prosecuting the 500K Scam presented multiple layers of operational, technical and legal challenges, including:

- *High Complexity of the Operation:* The case involved multiple individuals, over 16 accounts, layered transactions and SIM duplication, making it logistically complex to trace the full money trail and coordinate freezes in time.
- *Difficulty Identifying Ultimate Beneficiaries:* Layering techniques, third-party mule accounts and forged identities made it difficult to trace the real owners and end-users of the laundered funds.
- *Use of Social Media to Obscure Transactions:* A portion of the funds was spent on goods and services coordinated via social media platforms, making it difficult to confirm the value trail or identify vendors who accepted illicit payments.
- *Delayed Victim Reporting:* By the time most victims reported the fraud, the funds had already passed through multiple layers, often withdrawn or converted, reducing recovery prospects.
- *Lack of Integrated AML Tools in Banks:* Many banks did not have automated monitoring or alert systems to detect suspicious transaction patterns or high-risk account activity in real time, delaying escalation.
- *Anonymous SIM Registrations and Weak Telecom Controls:* The ability to register duplicate SIMs without biometric verification enabled SIM hijacking and unauthorized access to mobile banking apps and OTPs.
- *Forgery and KYC Weaknesses:* Suspects used forged identity documents to open multiple accounts, bypassing weak e-KYC procedures and enabling rapid setup of mule accounts.

- *Cross-Border Crypto Conversion:* The use of USDT (Tether) to move funds out of the formal financial system complicated jurisdiction and blocked local recovery options.

- **Recommendations**

To strengthen the national response to money-laundering and prevent future incidents like the 500K Scam, the following strategic measures are recommended:

- *Strengthen e-KYC and Identity Verification:* Mandate biometric verification, secure digital onboarding and enhanced due diligence for high-risk individuals to prevent the misuse of fake or forged identities in opening bank and telecom accounts.
- *Integrate Real-Time AML Monitoring Systems:* Require all banks and mobile wallet providers to implement AI-driven monitoring tools capable of detecting unusual transaction patterns, rapid layering and account behaviour anomalies.
- *Enforce Robust SIM Registration and Telecom Oversight:* Enact stricter telecom regulations to prevent anonymous SIM issuance and enable real-time alerts for SIM swaps. Telecom operators should integrate SIM activity monitoring with financial crime intelligence systems.
- *Enhance Cross-Sector Information Sharing:* Establish formal, real-time communication protocols among the FIU, law enforcement, banks and telecom providers to ensure timely action on suspicious transactions and fraud indicators.
- *Expand Public Awareness Campaigns:* Launch nationwide education initiatives on financial scams, phishing risks, OTP protection and money mule recruitment. Target both the general public and vulnerable populations often exploited in scam networks.
- *Regulate Cryptocurrency Access and Exchanges:* Bring crypto on-ramps and exchanges under AML/CFT oversight, requiring KYC compliance, transaction reporting and cooperation with local authorities for cross-border investigations.

VII. CONCLUSION

The 500K Scam case highlights the evolving sophistication of money-laundering operations in the Maldives. It revealed how criminals exploit digital platforms, identity loopholes and institutional blind spots to rapidly move and conceal illicit funds. The use of layering techniques, mobile banking manipulation, and cryptocurrency conversions posed significant challenges to investigation and recovery efforts.

Through direct involvement in this case, I witnessed the critical importance of fast, coordinated interagency action, proactive financial surveillance and robust legal frameworks to combat money-laundering and related financial crimes.

To effectively address ML/TF threats, the Maldives must adopt a holistic approach that includes:

- Stronger regulation and enforcement mechanisms
- Technological upgrades for real-time monitoring and risk detection
- Enhanced public awareness to reduce vulnerability to scams
- International cooperation to trace cross-border transactions and crypto flows
- Dedicated resources and oversight for cases involving drug trafficking and high-risk entities like politically exposed persons (PEPs)

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Given the growing volume of illicit financial flows, particularly from drug-related activities and corruption, the country must invest in capacity-building, digital infrastructure and continuous vigilance. This case underscores that safeguarding the Maldivian economy and its financial integrity will require persistent, well-resourced and collaborative efforts at all levels.

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THE CURRENT SITUATION AND CHALLENGES OF MONEY-LAUNDERING IN INVESTIGATING, PROSECUTING AND ADJUDICATING IN VIET NAM

*Nguyễn Thị Quỳnh Châu**

I. THE CURRENT SITUATION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING IN VIET NAM

A. General Situation

Money-laundering and terrorist financing are global issues that cause immeasurable harm to the economy, society and global security. In newly developed or developing countries, money-laundering can impact the government's budget, leading to tax revenue losses and resulting in a loss of control over economic policies. Viet Nam is prone to becoming a target of money-laundering because the economy relies heavily on cash and commercial activities and investments are steadily increasing.

Since 2013, the number of suspicious transactions detected by the Anti-Money-Laundering Department has continuously increased each year. Based on the information provided by the department, relevant authorities have conducted investigations, inspections and audits. As a result, 21 cases have led to prosecution decisions, 15 cases resulted in tax recoveries totalling more than 257 billion VND, 159 cases required additional information requests, one case received an administrative penalty decision and five cases had other forms of resolution.

Viet Nam is facing an increasing risk of money-laundering crimes due to increasingly sophisticated and difficult-to-detect laundering techniques. Some identified money-laundering methods in the current period include: Establishing "shell" companies for fraudulent trade; Money-laundering through online gambling; Online investment scams through fraudulent projects; Money-laundering through real estate transactions; Money-laundering through stocks and bonds; Money-laundering through virtual currencies and digital assets.

B. The Current Situation at Our Organization of Handling Money-Laundering Crimes and Predicate Offences Related to Money-Laundering

1. Viet Nam's Legal Regulations on Money-Laundering

The Anti-Money-Laundering Law in Viet Nam was first introduced in 2012 and later amended in 2022. With the enforcement of the 2015 Penal Code, a more comprehensive legal framework has been established to address money-laundering crimes.

The current definition of money-laundering, as stated in the 2022 Anti-Money-Laundering Law, is as follows:

Money laundering is the act of an organization or individual aimed at legitimizing the origin of assets obtained from criminal activities. Assets obtained from criminal activities are those acquired directly or indirectly through criminal acts, including income, profits, interests, and proceeds generated from such assets. (Article 3, Anti-Money-Laundering Law, 2022).

According to Viet Nam's National Risk Assessment (NRA), money-laundering crimes originate from 17 predicate offences, ranked based on their money-laundering risks, including:

- (a) Embezzlement of assets (Article 353)
- (b) Organizing gambling (Article 322)
- (c) Illegal possession, transportation, trading, or appropriation of narcotics (Articles 249-252)
- (d) Receiving bribes (Article 354)

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- (e) Abuse of trust to appropriate property (Article 175)
- (f) Abuse of position and power to appropriate property (Article 355)
- (g) Gambling (Article 321)
- (h) Tax evasion (Article 200)
- (i) Violations of regulations on wildlife protection (Article 234)
- (j) Fraudulent appropriation of property (Article 174)
- (k) Illegal transportation of goods and money across borders (Article 189)
- (l) Human trafficking (Article 150)
- (m) Counterfeiting, possessing, transporting, or circulating counterfeit money (Article 207)
- (n) Manufacturing and trading counterfeit goods (Article 192)
- (o) Producing, possessing, transporting, or trading prohibited goods (Articles 190, 191)
- (p) Illegal manufacturing, possession, transportation, use, or trade of military weapons and technical equipment (Article 304)
- (q) Smuggling (Article 188).

2. Practical Experience in Handling Predicate Crimes and Money-Laundering

At our unit, the handling of predicate crimes and money-laundering cases has been carried out in accordance with the legal framework set forth by the 2015 Penal Code and the 2022 Anti-Money-Laundering Law. However, the process faces several challenges, including the complexity of financial transactions, the use of sophisticated technology by criminals and the difficulty in tracing illicit funds.

Money-laundering cases typically stem from fundamental predicate offences such as drug trafficking, fraud, abuse of trust to appropriate property, embezzlement, gambling, smuggling and other related crimes. These offences involve various sophisticated methods and tactics, including:

(a) Drug Trafficking, Illegal Transportation and Organizing Drug Use

Illegal drug use and distribution often occur in entertainment venues such as bars, nightclubs, karaoke lounges and other late-night establishments. Owners of these venues frequently facilitate or tolerate drug use by providing the necessary tools and spaces for customers. The illicit profits generated from these activities are then funnelled into legitimate business revenues, with portions reinvested in real estate, stock and bonds to launder the illicit funds.

On the other hand, individuals involved in the illegal sale or transportation of narcotics often lack stable employment and have low educational backgrounds. Once these individuals become addicted to drugs, they gradually develop the intention to earn money through illicit means. Many drug-related cases stem from the need to repay debts or acquire assets such as cars, houses, motorcycles or mobile phones.

Criminals use the illicit proceeds from drug-related offences to convert them into legitimate assets for themselves or to conduct legal transactions with others. When adjudicating these crimes, courts rarely impose asset confiscation measures due to the difficulty in proving that the assets possessed by the defendants were acquired through specific offences being prosecuted. As a result, courts primarily impose strict prison sentences as the main punishment and rarely apply additional penalties such as asset confiscation.

(b) Gambling Offences

This type of crime is currently most prevalent in the form of online betting on football matches, dice games, online gaming etc. Gamblers use online accounts and access websites provided by bookmakers. They deposit money into their accounts and place bets, with winnings converted and received through personal transactions or designated card exchange locations. By profiting from illegal gambling or organizing gambling activities, criminals use these funds to purchase other assets through legal transactions. This has also become a significant financial channel linked to drug-related crimes and terrorism financing.

(c) Fraud and Abuse of Trust to Misappropriate Assets

Fraudulent activities and trust-based asset misappropriation rely on gaining the victim's trust so that they voluntarily hand over their properties. Their typical targets include friends, neighbours, business partners and even family members. Criminals often use deceptive information or seemingly legal transactions, such as car rental agreements or investment contracts, to gain the victim's trust. Once assets are acquired, they are quickly converted into legally recognized property, such as real estate, gold, cars or stocks. A

significant challenge in tracing and recovering stolen assets is that criminals often transfer them to relatives, registering ownership under different names or hiding cash and gold. In Viet Nam, where cash and gold transactions remain common, tracking these assets is extremely difficult, making the recovery of illicit funds highly ineffective.

(d) Money-Laundering

In recent trials at our court, several money-laundering cases have involved criminals using fake identity documents and disposable SIM cards to open bank accounts. These bank accounts are used to receive illicit funds, which are then withdrawn in cash and transferred into legitimate accounts to launder the money. Criminals often hire unemployed individuals or those unaware of legal risks to open these accounts in exchange for high salaries or large bonuses, preying on their financial needs. The use of multiple fake bank accounts and many accomplices withdrawing funds significantly complicates law enforcement efforts to trace the real masterminds behind the crimes. Furthermore, the layering of transactions through multiple intermediaries makes tracking and recovering illicit funds an extremely challenging task for authorities.

II. CHALLENGES IN INVESTIGATING, PROSECUTING AND ADJUDICATING MONEY-LAUNDERING CRIMES

1. Criminals often use foreign IP addresses and fake identities on social media platforms to approach and defraud victims. This makes it difficult to verify their true identities and track the predicate crimes, leading to 10 challenges in prosecuting the primary offenders.
2. Investigative agencies spend significant time and effort tracing illicit funds because criminals withdraw and transfer money through multiple intermediaries and various bank accounts to obscure the money trail.
3. Viet Nam has not yet recognized virtual currency as a legal means of transaction. However, individuals still buy and sell cryptocurrencies through international exchanges. Crimes involving cryptocurrency theft have already occurred in Viet Nam. Since virtual currencies are not legally recognized, there are no regulations or legal sanctions for managing them, leaving transactions in this asset class an unregulated loophole exploited by money launderers.
4. Online gambling and betting networks are widely advertised and promoted on the Internet. Completely dismantling these networks is challenging because criminal organizations often use international IP addresses and implement automatic data deletion mechanisms when they suspect external intrusion. As a result, investigations often only capture individual gamblers, while the gambling organizers remain at large and continue their operations.
5. Viet Nam's economy still heavily relies on cash transactions, making it difficult to track the flow of money. Criminals exploit this by transferring illicitly obtained assets to family members—such as parents, siblings, or relatives—who then use the money to purchase high-value real estate or other assets.
6. Drug offenders are often repeat criminals with extensive experience in evading law enforcement. During prosecution and trial, they frequently collude in advance to align their testimonies, making it more difficult to dismantle the organized criminal networks behind them.

III. MAIN CAUSES OF CRIME

1. Subjective Causes from Offenders:
 - a) *Low Education Levels:* Many criminals lack proper education, have limited awareness of crime trends, criminal methods and legal regulations on money-laundering, making them more susceptible to criminal activities.

- b) *Difficult Family Circumstances*: Financially motivated offenders are often individuals without stable jobs or incomes, leading to greed for quick and easy financial gains through criminal activities.
 - c) *Recidivism After Release from Prison*: Many offenders struggle to find employment and a supportive environment for reintegration into society, causing them to become even more cunning and involved in organized crime networks.
2. Causes from the Management Mechanism
- a) *Loopholes in Financial and Banking Regulations*: Weak financial management laws create opportunities for criminals to exploit.
 - b) *Ineffective Cash Transaction Oversight*: The State has not yet fully controlled cash transactions, making the market fertile ground for criminal activities.
 - c) *Challenges in Regulating International Trade and Transactions*: The increasing trend of global trade and new transaction methods make financial oversight difficult due to incomplete or non-existent legal frameworks.
 - d) *Lack of Regulations for Cryptocurrency Transactions*: The absence of legal sanctions for managing virtual currencies allows criminals to exploit the system for laundering money.
 - e) *Ineffective Legal Awareness Campaigns*: Public awareness efforts on legal matters have not been highly effective in preventing crimes.
 - f) *Lack of Employment and Reintegration Support for Ex-Offenders*: The absence of proper social reintegration programmes leaves former criminals without stable livelihoods, increasing the likelihood of reoffending.

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE ANTI-MONEY-LAUNDERING EFFORTS

1. *Raise Public Awareness*: Educate people about criminal tactics and deceptive benefits used to lure victims into illegal activities.
2. *Strictly Regulate Bank Account Registration*: Strengthen oversight to prevent the use of fake IDs and unregistered SIM cards for opening bank accounts.
3. *Reduce Cash Transactions*: Minimize the use of cash in the market while improving foreign exchange and gold trading management among the public.
4. *Tax Unclear or Abnormally Acquired Assets*: Impose taxes on properties obtained from unverified income sources or those with sudden, suspicious value increases.
5. *Enhance Education and Social Awareness*: Improve education among youth, increase awareness of social issues and legal consequences, and provide employment opportunities for former offenders.
6. *Stricter Penalties for Money-Laundering Crimes*: Increase prison sentences and additional penalties to deter current and potential offenders.
7. *Confiscate Unjustified Assets*: Seize assets that criminals and their relatives cannot prove were obtained legally.
8. *Dismantle Online Gambling Networks*: Strengthen efforts to shut down illegal online betting platforms and regulate online gambling effectively.

9. *Improve Anti-Money-Laundering Regulations:* Enhance domestic and international cooperation in sharing anti-money-laundering information among relevant agencies.
10. *Investigate Suspicious Transactions:* Ensure that suspicious financial transactions are reported to law enforcement, treated as crime reports and subject to account freezing when necessary.
11. *Strengthen International Cooperation:* Collaborate with other countries and territories on extradition, information sharing, asset tracing and the recovery of illegally obtained funds.

V. CASE STUDY: JUDGMENT NO. 17/2022/HS-ST DATED 23 FEBRUARY 2022, OF THE PEOPLE'S COURT OF THUA THIEN HUE PROVINCE

The case involved defendant Pham Ngoc Duy and accomplices, who were prosecuted for the crime of "Money Laundering" as stipulated in Article 324 of the 2015 Penal Code.

A. Case Details

On 21 February 2020, Ms. Châu Thị Ngọc Hải, residing at 12/8 Luong Y Street, Thuan Loc Ward, Hue City, befriended a man on Facebook who identified himself as Frederik Hannes (whose real identity, background and address have not yet been determined).

After a period of acquaintance, on 23 March 2020, Frederik Hannes told Ms. Hải that he was involved in a project to build a shopping centre in Phuket Province, Thailand. However, due to procedural obstacles and other issues, he asked to borrow money from Ms. Hải. Hannes promised that if she lent him money, he would fully repay her once the project was approved and would add a 10 per cent bonus as a token of appreciation.

Believing his claims, Ms. Hải agreed and transferred money to Frederik Hannes five times. On 8 April 2020, Frederik Hannes contacted Ms. Hải again to borrow more money. Since she no longer had funds, she provided him with the phone number of Mr. Trần Nguyên Hùng, who resided at Apartment 616-CTI, Aranya Condominium, Xuân Phú Ward, Hue City. Mr. Hùng, a friend of Ms. Hải, had previously helped transfer money to Frederik Hannes multiple times.

Mr. Hùng agreed to lend money and, along with Ms. Hải, made four additional transfers to Frederik Hannes. After nine money transfers, Ms. Hải and Mr. Hùng had transferred a total of 3,933,493,716 VND to Frederik Hannes, in which Ms. Hải transferred 1,474,130,000 VND, and Mr. Hùng transferred 2,459,363,716 VND.

The investigation agency examined Frederik Hannes' personal Facebook account and found that the account's IP address (Internet Protocol) originated from an unidentified foreign location, and the person managing and using the account could not be determined. Additionally, all communication data related to the case on WhatsApp had been deleted. Based on the money transfer transactions, the investigation could not identify the specific individual who directly committed the fraud and misappropriated Ms. Hải and Mr. Hùng's money. However, the authorities discovered a group of individuals involved in withdrawing money obtained through criminal activities for illegal profits. The specific details are as follows:

Between early 2020 and 17 April 2020, in Ho Chi Minh City, the defendants Nnaka Chibuzor Frankline, Nnameka Samuel Ugochukwu, Umeh Stanly Chidiebere, Ngô Hải Nghi, Vũ Ái Linh and Pham Ngoc Duy used the Internet to purchase fake identification documents (citizenship ID cards). They then used these fake IDs to open multiple bank accounts at various banks and utilized these accounts to receive and withdraw money obtained through criminal activities for unlawful profits.

- The total amount of illicit money withdrawn by Nnameka Samuel Ugochukwu and Ngô Hải Nghi was 270 million VND.
- Nnameka Samuel Ugochukwu made an illegal profit of 21.6 million VND, and Ngô Hải Nghi made an

illegal profit of 10 million VND.

- The total amount of illicit money withdrawn by Umeh Stanly Chidiebere and Vũ Ái Linh was 200 million VND, with both making an illegal profit of 6 million VND.
- Nnaka Chibuzor Frankline, who orchestrated the withdrawals by instructing Nnameka Samuel Ugochukwu and other accomplices, was held criminally responsible for 470 million VND.

The People's Procuracy of Thừa Thiên Huế Province prosecuted the defendants Umeh Stanley Chidiebere and Vũ Ái Linh for the crime of "Money Laundering" under Point e, Clause 2, Article 324 of the Penal Code.

The defendants Nnaka Chibuzor Frankline, Nnaemeka Samuel Ugochukwu and Ngô Hải Nghi were prosecuted for "Money Laundering" under Points c and e, Clause 2, Article 324 of the Penal Code.

Defendant Pham NgQC Duy was prosecuted for "Money Laundering" under Point a, Clause 3, Article 324 of the Penal Code.

B. Penalties Imposed by the Court

1. Principal Penalties

Based on Point a, Clause 3, Article 324; Points b, s, t, Clause 1, Article 51; Point g, Clause 1, Article 52; Article 38 of the 2015 Penal Code (amended and supplemented in 2017):

- Defendant Pham Ngqc Duy was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The prison term was calculated from 1 June 2020, the date of detention.

Based on Points c and e, Clause 2, Article 324; Point s, Clause 1, Article 51; Article 38 of the 2015 Penal Code (amended and supplemented in 2017):

- Defendant Nnaka Chibuzor Frankline (alias: Tony) was sentenced to 7 years in prison, starting from 18 May 2020 (date of detention).
- Defendant Nnaemeka Samuel Ugochukwu (alias: Richard) was sentenced to 6 years and 6 months in prison, starting from 18 May 2020.
- Defendant Ngô Hải Nghi was sentenced to 6 years in prison, starting from 18 May 2020.

Based on Point e, Clause 2, Article 324; Point s, Clause 1, Article 51; Article 54; Article 38 of the Penal Code:

- Defendant Umeh Stanley Chidiebere was sentenced to 4 years in prison, starting from 18 May 2020.
- Defendant Vũ Ái Linh was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in prison, starting from 18 May 2020.

2. Additional Penalties

Based on Article 37 of the 2015 Penal Code (amended and supplemented in 2017), Defendants Nnaka Chibuzor Frankline (Tony), Nnaemeka Samuel Ugochukwu (Richard) and Umeh Stanley Chidiebere were expelled from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam upon completing their prison sentences.

C. Case Study Analysis

Taking advantage of loopholes in the management of unregistered SIM cards (also known as "trash SIMs" which are phone SIMS without registered owners or activated through dealers or the Internet without proper registration), fake identity document services on the Internet (which are often advertised on Facebook or websites), and lax banking account opening procedures (where customers only need to submit an application, present their identity card and provide a phone number to open an account), the defendants were able to easily order fake identity cards online, purchase unregistered SIM cards and visit different banks to open multiple transaction accounts for the purpose of money-laundering.

PARTICIPANTS' PAPERS

The defendants used these bank accounts to receive and withdraw money derived from criminal activities and then transferred it to other individuals in exchange for a commission. Their illicit profits were based on the number of transactions and the amounts withdrawn and transferred.

The source of the funds transferred into these fraudulent bank accounts originated from predicate crimes, which law enforcement agencies have yet to identify due to the sophisticated and hard-to-trace methods used by the perpetrators. These criminals typically:

- Create accounts with IP addresses from foreign countries, making it impossible to determine who manages or operates them.
- Delete all communication records on platforms such as WhatsApp after defrauding victims and receiving their money.
- Transfer the illicit funds into fake bank accounts set up by the defendants and instruct them to withdraw cash.
- Pass the money through multiple intermediaries, conducting numerous withdrawals and transfers to make it difficult for investigators to trace the money's origin.

As a result, thoroughly investigating and dismantling these criminal networks is extremely challenging. Prosecuting authorities often must handle each offence separately at different stages based on the evidence available.

The acts of opening and withdrawing money from these bank accounts were determined to constitute:

Directly or indirectly participating in financial or banking transactions, including carrying out, assisting in, or using others to perform or assist in actions such as opening accounts, depositing or withdrawing money at credit institutions or foreign bank branches to conceal the illegal origin of money or assets obtained from crimes or that they knew or should have known were derived from criminal activities.

This definition is outlined in Resolution No. 03/NQ-HĐTP of the Supreme People's Court of Viet Nam, which provides guidance on identifying money-laundering offences under Article 324 of the 2015 Penal Code. Therefore, the prosecution and adjudication of the defendants for money-laundering was fully in accordance with Vietnamese law.

In addition, in this case, the court could not adjudicate the predicate crime (fraud) of money-laundering because the investigative agency was unable to identify the identity of the criminals and trace the origin of the IP addresses or the information of the offenders. Therefore, the court faces many difficulties in thoroughly handling and solving this type of crime.

D. Measures to Prevent Money-Laundering Crimes

- *Strictly Regulate Bank Account Opening:* Strengthen controls to prevent the use of fake national IDs and unregistered SIM cards for opening bank accounts.
- *Monitor Suspicious Financial Transactions:* Track and investigate accounts involved in unusual or illegal transactions.
- *Dismantle Fake ID Trading Networks:* Crack down on online networks selling forged identification documents.
- *Enhance Public Legal Awareness:* Educate citizens about the risks of transactions with unclear origins and assets suspected of being linked to criminal activities such as: inform the public about common tactics used by criminals, such as online or phone scams involving investment schemes, high-interest loans or stock market fraud. Criminals often exploit victims' greed to commit fraud, which in turn

leads to predicate offences for money-laundering.

- *International cooperation:* related to providing information on IP addresses or identity suspected of money-laundering.

PART FOUR

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES
No. 120

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

UNAFEI

VISITING EXPERTS' PRESENTATIONS





UNAFEI 186 INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR

**“CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES
REGARDING YOUTH INVOLVED IN
TERRORISM”**

TOPICS

I. SECURING THE FUTURE: ADDRESSING FOREIGN TERRORIST
FIGHTERS IN CUSTODIAL SETTINGS

II. PREVENTION MEASURES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN PRISON (AND
PROBATION)

7. FEBRUARY 2025
TOKYO, JAPAN
MR. TORBEN ADAMS


 **Freie
Hansestadt
Bremen** DIE SENATORIN FÜR JUSTIZ UND VERFASSUNG

CONTENT

- Background FTF Figures
- Al Hol Camp/ NES (Iraqi Nationals in NES: Context and Analysis)
- UN Support
- Operational Mechanisms
- FTF Related Challenges
- UNODC Support
- Discussion




BACKGROUND FTF - FIGURES



BACKGROUND FTF - FIGURES

- IS Peak in 2015
- Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR)
- Establishment of Camps (Al Hol, Roj)
- Establishment of so called “Makeshift Prisons”

How the area under IS control has shrunk



AL HOL CAMP IRAQI NATIONALS IN NES: CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS



Al Hol. Established 2014
53,800 IDP **in 2019**

27,700 Iraqi Nationals
18,100 Syrian Nationals
8,000 Third Country Nationals

UN SUPPORT



Global

UNSCR 2178 (2014)
UNSCR 2396 (2017)

Iraq specific:

All of UN Framework for Implementation of the Global Framework in Iraq: Supporting the return of Iraqi Nationals from northeast Syria

OPERATIONAL MECHANISMS (IRAQ CONTEXT)




UN APPROACH

4 Technical Working Groups

UNODC in charge of:
**CRIMINAL JUSTICE-BASED REHABILITATION
OF ADULT RETURNING IRAQI DETAINEES**



OPERATIONAL MECHANISMS




From Al Hol once cleared to Jeddah.....

In Jeddah, required support.....


From Jeddah back to the communities....

OPERATIONAL MECHANISMS (IRAQI CONTEXT)

Breakdown of the nationalities of residents of Al Hol camp



Al Hol camp population-age groups



15 Transport rounds conducted so far

As of 1 May 2024 the total of 2,261 Households (8,901 individuals) have left Al-Hol.

Currently in Jeddah 1: 829 Households (3078 individuals)



UN(ODC) SUPPORT




POLICY DIALOGUE



TECHNICAL SUPPORT



CAPACITY BUILDING



MEMBER STATE ENGAGEMENT



FTF RELATED CHALLENGES



LACK OF COMMITMENT

Repatriation to Member States

(Minors, even not criminal responsible and liable)



OVERCROWDED PRISONS

300% over capacity

Limited capacity of staff and management



PUNITIVE SOCIETY

No structured restorative justice mechanism in place

Lack of political support for structured restitution.



HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Individuals not willing to disengage from violent extremists beliefs.

Dire conditions in the camp(s)

UNODC – RESOURCES ON FTF AND VEP PROGRAMS

Read the reports

Supporting the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons (2018-2022)



Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters Detention Program (2019-2023)



Post-release Monitoring and Probation of Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Violent Extremist Prisoners in the Kyrgyz Republic (2021-2023)



Strengthening the Capacity of the Nigerian Correctional Service to Effectively Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Prisoners



GROUP WORK EXERCISE

You are already aware that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2396, adopted on 21 December 2017, focuses on counterterrorism measures, particularly addressing the threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) returning from or relocating to conflict zones.

While the resolution primarily emphasizes border security, data-sharing, and risk assessments, it also highlights the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration for individuals involved in terrorism, including those in prison settings.

UNSCR 2396 specifically urges the adoption of programs to **prevent radicalization and recruitment** **Addressing Radicalization in Prisons:** within correctional facilities, recognizing prisons as critical environments for both risk and opportunity in counterterrorism efforts.

- **Scenario:** You work as a counselor in the Prime Minister's office in Country X. The Prime Minister informally asks you: **"Please explain to me why we need measures in our prisons to prevent radicalization and why prisoners are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organizations."**

- **Form** small groups of 4–5 participants.
- **Appoint** one rapporteur to take notes and summarize the discussion.
- **Discuss** the topic within your group for 7 minutes.
- **Present** your group's findings briefly, with a maximum of 2 minutes per group.




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THANK YOU!

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NEXT: QUESTION AND ANSWER PANEL



UNAFEI 186 INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR


**“CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES
REGARDING YOUTH INVOLVED IN
TERRORISM”**

TOPICS

I. SECURING THE FUTURE: ADDRESSING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN CUSTODIAL
SETTINGS

**II. PREVENTION MEASURES OF VIOLENT
EXTREMISM IN PRISON (AND PROBATION)**

7. FEBRUARY 2025
TOKYO, JAPAN
MR. TORBEN ADAMS

 Freie
Hansestadt
Bremen

DIE SENATORIN FÜR JUSTIZ UND VERFASSUNG

PREVENTION MEASURES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN PRISON (AND PROBATION)


Addressing Radicalization through Structured Interventions and
Community Engagement

PREVENTION MEASURES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN PRISON (AND PROBATION)

Identify key drivers of radicalization in custodial settings.

Learn effective intervention and prevention measures.

Understand the role of community and staff in preventing violent extremism.



RADICALIZATION IN PRISONS

Dynamics and Influencing Factors:

- Overcrowding and lack of engagement opportunities.
- Peer influence and ideological recruitment.
- Vulnerabilities: Juveniles and at-risk individuals.

BEST PRACTICES FOR PREVENTION

Structured interventions:

- Motivational interviewing.
- Cognitive-behavioral approaches.
- Role of chaplaincy and social support networks.
- Dynamic security and staff-prisoner relationships.
- Emphasize the importance of a multi-faceted approach, combining psychological, social, and operational strategies.

REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION STRATEGIES


- Pro-social modeling: Reinforcing positive behaviors.
- Community-based approaches and aftercare programs.
- Focus on long-term reintegration.

INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT

- Training and capacity building for staff.
- Designing youth-friendly rehabilitation facilities.
- Integrating policy frameworks with practical interventions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Understanding radicalization dynamics and vulnerabilities.
- Effective use of motivational interviewing and cognitive-behavioral approaches.
- Importance of institutional support and community reintegration programs.



UNAFEI 186 INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR


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**SUGGESTED CORE SKILLS FOR CORRECTIONAL
PROFESSIONALS DEALING WITH JUVENILE
RADICALIZED PRISONERS**



7. FEBRUARY 2025
TOKYO, JAPAN
MR. TORBEN ADAMS



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CORE CORRECTIONAL SKILLS FOR ADDRESSING RADICALIZED JUVENILES

Enhancing Professional Competence in Risk Assessment and Rehabilitation

Introduce the session focus on practical skills and institutional improvements for effective rehabilitation.



Mr. Torben Adams & Dr. Burkhard Hasenpusch

TRAINING OBJECTIVES

- Introduce core correctional skills, including risk assessment, motivational interviewing, and cognitive-behavioral approaches.
- Emphasize the importance of pro-social modeling and structured problem-solving.
- Address institutional and infrastructural needs for effective rehabilitation.

BUILDING A WORKING ALLIANCE

- Using empathy, humor, and optimism to establish trust.
- Role-playing scenarios to practice rapport-building.

MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING

- Enhancing internal motivation through empathetic and directive communication.
- Identifying and amplifying change talk.

PRO SOCIAL MODELING

- Reinforcing positive behaviors and attitudes.
- Addressing anti-social tendencies through practical exercises.

PROBLEM-SOLVING SKILLS

- Addressing cognitive distortions and promoting adaptive thinking.
- Units on schema identification, self-talk, and perspective-taking

INSTITUTIONAL AND INFRASTRUCTURAL NEEDS

- Creating youth-friendly rehabilitation environments.
- Developing aftercare programs and community reintegration strategies.
- Holistic approaches combining psychological, educational, and vocational interventions.



THANK YOU!

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NEXT: QUESTION AND ANSWER PANEL




IIJ - UNAFEI

**JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING
CHILDREN SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM**

**I. WHY ACT DIFFERENTLY IN FAVOR OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE
ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST GROUPS? BREAKING THE CHAIN OF
RADICALISATION**



- Children and young people ~ inherently vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation
- The situation in the Sahel and the need to break the chain of radicalisation

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II. WHY ACT DIFFERENTLY IN THE CASE OF YOUNG PEOPLE SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST OFFENCES: Fundamental principles and norms setting out the specificity in the field of juvenile justice

- Prioritising the best interests of the child
- Maintaining family ties

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III. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES ENACTED IN FAVOUR OF CHILDREN

- Preliminary Investigations
- Interviewing child suspects
 - Importance of the child's interview
 - Mechanisms for hearings involving children
 - What use is an admission or other information collected from the juvenile during the hearing?


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The Prosecution stage

- Directorate of investigation: Monitoring compliance with procedures and respect for the child's rights
- Verification of the regularity and reliability of the confessions and information provided by the child
- The prosecutor: Between prosecution and reintegration measures based on the child 's statements and other elements of investigations

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Investigation of cases involving child suspects

- Investigation for the prosecution and for the defence
- The juvenile judge, an indissoluble link between the child, his family and society
- Juvenile Judge, Protection Judge

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Adjudication of cases involving children

1. Creating an enabling environment that allows juvenile to express themselves freely and confidently
2. Analysis of the facts subject to the proceedings
3. Then decide whether the child acted with discernment to find him guilty of these acts. The question of discernment as the basis of judicial decision-making
4. Finally, to decide on the appropriate measure against the child in the event of a conviction

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THE SPECIAL CASE OF CHILDREN RETURNING FROM COMBAT ZONES OF TERRORIST GROUPS

1. A vulnerable public
2. Implementation of protocols: The need for an appropriate normative framework
3. Some legal situations require psychological or psychiatric expertise
4. Establishing civil status: a real challenge
5. Prevention of radical commitment and disengagement

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V. About the process of reintegration of children: challenges and prospects



Reception and
reintegration centers



Legal support for
reintegration



Involving the juvenile's
community for
successful reintegration



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United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime



UNAFEI 186th International Senior Seminar

Prevention of Violent Extremism & Terrorism: Children and Youth

Masood Karimipour
Regional Representative
UNODC Regional Office for
Southeast Asia & the Pacific



United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime

Prevention of Violent Extremism & Terrorism: Children and Youth

- **Context:** Broader international frameworks, strategies, and consensus on terrorism and violent extremism, and the role of children and youth.
- **Global trend in terrorism generally and with youth offenders**
- **Recruitment of youth**
- **Criminal justice systems' treatment of youth (investigation, prosecution and adjudication)**
- **Rehabilitation and reintegration of youth from conflict area and de-radicalization**
- **UNODC mandates, strategy, and programming**
- **Best Practices**
- **UNODC resources to support authorities and civil society**

2



United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime

International Legal Framework against Terrorism

- **UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly. UNGA reviews the Strategy biennially, updating priorities, based on emerging threats and trends, and based on international consensus.**
- **19 international legal instruments to prevent terrorist acts**

3



United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime

UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006)

*Unanimously adopted by the General Assembly (all UN Member States)
in resolution 60/288 – 8 September 2006, and reviewed every two years*

Pillar I

Addressing
the conditions
conductive to
the spread of
terrorism

Pillar II

Preventing and
combatting
Terrorism

Pillar III

Building States'
capacity and
strengthening
the role of the
United Nations

Pillar IV

Ensuring
Human Rights
and the rule of
law

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

4

International Legal Framework: Children & Youth

International Human Rights Law

- **Convention on the Rights of the Child:** civil, political, economic, social, health and cultural rights of children.
- **Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict:** prohibits the compulsory recruitment of children into the armed forces of States parties.
- **Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography**
- **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**
- **Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), of the International Labour Organization:** calls for the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including the compulsory recruitment of children in armed forces.
- **Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:** requires States parties to take effective measures to prevent torture in any territory under their jurisdiction and forbids States to transport people to any country where there is reason to believe they will be in danger of being tortured.

International Legal Framework: Children & Youth

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

- **UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001):** established a framework for improved international cooperation against terrorism.
- **Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter** which creates legal obligations on Member States for maintaining international peace and security. Adopted on September 28, 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
- **Legal obligations to implement measures to enhance their capacity to counter terrorism and to cooperate to prevent and suppress terrorist acts.**
- **Prevent, criminalize financing of terrorist acts / Freeze the funds/assets/economic resources / Criminalize terrorist acts as serious offenses / preparation and support of terrorist acts. Greatest measure of international cooperation in criminal matter / Deny safe haven • Extradite or prosecute / Prevent fraudulent use of identity papers & travel documents**
- **Established the UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), with all 15 members of the Security Council.**

International Legal Framework: Children & Youth

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

- **UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)**, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: creates legal obligation on Member States to take action to prevent terrorism through the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Recent case: Japan-based organize crime figure pleaded guilty on 08 January 2025 in the US to charges of trafficking uranium and plutonium from Myanmar under the belief that Iran would use it for nuclear weapons.

He also worked to send massive quantities of heroin and methamphetamine to US in exchange for heavy-duty weaponry such as surface-to-air missiles to be used on battlefields in Burma and laundered what he believed to be drug money from New York to Tokyo.

International Legal Framework: Children & Youth

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

- **UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999)**: required member states to freeze the assets of the targeted individuals and entities. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
- **UN Security Council Resolution 1735 (2006)**: Requires arms embargo, travel ban and financial sanctions against all terrorist groups and individuals. Preamble expressed concern at misuse of the Internet by terrorist groups and individuals, further noting the changing nature of the threat, particularly in the way terrorists would promote their ideologies.
- **UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005)**: urged Member States to adopt measures to prevent incitement to commit terrorist acts and recruitment into terrorist groups by countering violent extremism.
- **UN Security Council resolution 2178 (2014)**: condemned violent extremism and addressed the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, including their recruitment of children, and called upon all Member States to develop rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returnees.
- **UN Security Council resolution 2427 (2018)**: calls for protections for children affected by armed conflict.

International Legal Framework: Children & Youth

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

- **Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly resolution 217 A (III))**
- **United Nations standards and norms in juvenile justice**
- **United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) (General Assembly resolution 40/33, annex)**
- **United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines) (General Assembly resolution 45/112, annex)**
- **United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (General Assembly resolution 45/113, annex)**
- **Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System (EcoSoc resolution 1997/30, annex)**
- **Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime (EcoSoc resolution 2005/20, annex)**
- **United Nations Model Strategies and Practical Measures on the Elimination of Violence against Children in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (General Assembly resolution 69/194, annex)**

International Legal Framework: Children & Youth

OTHER RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS AND NORMS IN CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

- **Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (General Assembly resolution 40/34, annex)**
- **United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules) (General Assembly resolution 45/110, annex)**
- **United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) (General Assembly resolution 65/229, annex)**
- **Basic principles on the use of restorative justice programmes in criminal matters (Economic and Social Council resolution 2002/12, annex)**
- **United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems (General Assembly resolution 67/187, annex)**

International Legal Framework: Children & Youth

OTHER SOFT LAW

- **Paris Commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or armed groups**
- **Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups**

OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS

- **Mainstreaming holistic approaches in youth crime prevention (Economic and Social Council resolution 2016/18)**
- **Technical assistance for implementing the international conventions and protocols related to counter-terrorism (Economic and Social Council resolution 2017/17)**

International Legal Framework: Children & Youth

International humanitarian law

- **Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) (Third Geneva Convention)**
- **Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)**
- **The additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions supplement shortcomings of the Geneva Conventions related to the conduct of combatants and protection of civilians. (Some of the provisions are considered customary law, whereas others apply only to States that have ratified the protocol.)**
- **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)**
- **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)**

UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism

UNGA (Feb. 2016) adopted a resolution **welcoming** the initiative by the Secretary-General, and **taking note** of his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.

The Plan of Action calls for a comprehensive approach encompassing not only essential security-based counter-terrorism measures but also **systematic preventive steps to address the underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalize and join violent extremist groups**.

The Plan is an appeal for concerted action by the international community. It provides more than 70 recommendations to Member States and the United Nations System to prevent the further spread of violent extremism.

Terrorism Definitions

Terrorism is commonly understood to refer to acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims.

But, in legal terms, the international community has yet to adopt a comprehensive definition of terrorism. Several conventions, declarations, and resolutions define certain acts as terrorism (hijacking, hostage-taking, bombing, financing of terrorism, nuclear terrorism, etc.).

UN General Assembly Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (in resolution 49/60)(1994): terrorism includes "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes" and that such acts "are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them."



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Terrorism Definitions (cont'd)

Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004): criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.

Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: any action that is “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” and identified a number of key elements, with further reference to the definitions contained in the *1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* and *Security Council resolution 1566 (2004)*.

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Definitions of Violent Extremism

Violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition.

UN General Assembly Resolution 77/243 declared 12 February the International Day for the Prevention of Violent Extremism as and when Conducive to Terrorism, in order to raise awareness of the threats linked to **violent extremism, as and when conducive to terrorism**, and to enhance international cooperation in this regard.

GA emphasized in this context the primary responsibility of Member States and their respective national institutions in countering terrorism, and underlined the important role of intergovernmental organizations, civil society, academia, religious leaders and the media in countering terrorism and preventing **violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism**.

The resolution reaffirmed that terrorism and violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group.

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Definitions of Children and Youth

Children - defined in international law as human beings **under the age of 18 years** and holders of a distinct set of rights.

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)

Youth – not defined in international law. In the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism, UNODC follows the UN Security Council in defining youth as persons **aged 18-29**.

UN Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) on Youth, Peace and Security

Recent Global Trends in Terrorism (*Global Terrorism Index*):

- Deaths from terrorism are now at their highest level since 2017. However, they are still almost 25 per cent lower than at their peak in 2015.
- The epicentre of terrorism has shifted from the Middle East and North Africa into sub-Saharan Africa, concentrated largely in the Sahel region. This region now accounts for almost half of all deaths from terrorism globally.
- Terrorism has become more concentrated over the past decade. The number of countries recording at least one death from terrorism fell to 41 in 2023, down from 44 in 2022 and 57 in 2015.
- South Asia has the highest regional average impact from terrorism, although it improved over the past year.

Recent Global Trends in Terrorism (*Global Terrorism Index*):

(cont'd)

- Over the past decade the average impact of terrorism has only increased in two regions: North America and sub-Saharan Africa. Every other region has recorded a decrease in the average impact since 2013.
- Total deaths from terrorism are now considerably higher in sub-Saharan Africa than any other region. Sub-Saharan Africa has recorded the most deaths from terrorism for the past seven years.
- Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia have far more deaths from terrorism than any other regions. Collectively they accounted for just under 94 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2023.
- In 2023, 98 per cent of terrorism deaths occurred in countries experiencing some level of conflict. Most of these occurred in countries at war, but the number of deaths in countries involved in minor conflicts has been steadily rising.



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Global trend in terrorism with youth offenders

- **Digital Radicalization:** Terrorist groups exploit social media algorithms, creating echo chambers to indoctrinate youth.
- **Gaming Platforms:** Used as covert spaces to connect with and radicalize young players.
- **Youth as Lone Actors:** Rising cases of self-radicalized individuals, especially in regions with high internet penetration.
- **Global Patterns:**
 - Terrorist groups leverage global crises to amplify propaganda and attract youth.
 - ISIL and al-Qaeda affiliates dominate the online recruitment space in Asia.

Overall situation on Youth Involvement in Terrorism

- **Global Concern:** Youth represent a significant proportion of individuals recruited by terrorist groups due to their adaptability to digital tools and their impressionable stage in life.
- **Key Statistics:**
 - In Bangladesh, **82% of individuals arrested for extremism-related activities** were radicalized through social media.
 - Increasing use of gaming platforms popular among children and youth, and alternative communication apps for covert radicalization.
- **Gendered Impact:** Men are typically recruited for combat or operational roles, while women are recruited for propaganda or logistical support.
- **Regional Variances:** In South Asia, online radicalization is prevalent due to widespread grievances, while Southeast Asia has witnessed increased use of encrypted platforms for youth recruitment.

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
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Research

Aim of increasing knowledge regarding children associated with groups designated "terrorist".

**STRIVE
JUVENILE**

 Preventing and Responding to Violence against
Children by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups

**UNODC
END VAC**


Scan QR to
download the report

**TARGETED BY
TERRORISTS:**
CHILD RECRUITMENT, EXPLOITATION
AND REINTEGRATION IN INDONESIA,
IRAQ AND NIGERIA

Seven key findings:

- 1. Child recruitment by terrorist groups is not exceptional and largely overlaps child recruitment by other armed and criminal groups.**
- 2. Children do not join terrorist groups voluntarily. Their association is characterized by a spectrum of coercion, even when they exercise some form of agency.**
- 3. A background of political conflict and the perception of a broken social contract are determinants of children's association with terrorist groups both in conflict and non-conflict settings.**
- 4. While children's roles in association with terrorist groups vary according to the duration of the association, their gender, and other factors, their experiences are consistently characterized by violence and harm.**

Seven key findings (cont'd):

- 5. Children exit and disengage from terrorist groups despite serious risk of retaliation when they reach a tipping point of negative experience within the group and positive prospects for life outside it.**
- 6. The barriers and incentives to successful reintegration are determined by gendered and stereotypical representations of children's association with terrorist groups.**
- 7. While upholding children's rights has proved challenging in efforts to counter terrorism, it contributes to the effectiveness of counter-terrorist programmes and the promotion of peace and security.**

How are youth recruited?



Online Recruitment:

- **Social Media:** Extremist groups use platforms like Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram to spread messages and target vulnerable youth.
- **Gaming & Online Communities:** Extremists recruit youth through in-game chats, forums, and encrypted messaging apps.
- **Generative AI:** AI tools enable the creation of personalized propaganda targeting specific vulnerabilities.



Offline Recruitment:

- **Peer Influence & Social Networks:** Youth are recruited through friends, family, and local networks.
- **Community Institutions:** Extremist groups exploit educational institutions, religious schools, and local community centres to spread their ideology and recruit vulnerable youth

Root causes of why youth are recruited

- **Conditions: Conflict, Weak Governance and Rule of Law**
- **Vulnerability: Children and Youth are easy targets for manipulation**
- **Socioeconomic Factors:**
 - High unemployment, poverty, displacement, and lack of education make youth susceptible to promises of financial stability and belonging.
- **Psychological Needs:**
 - Desire for identity, purpose, and a sense of belonging drives youth to join extremist groups.
- **Marginalization and Discrimination:**
 - Ethnic, religious, and political disenfranchisement exploited by VEOs.
- **Digital Accessibility:**
 - Widespread internet penetration allows recruiters to reach vulnerable individuals.

The role of youth joined in terrorist groups

Youth are exploited in various roles, both directly in conflict and in supporting terrorist operations:

- **Combatants:** Forced or coerced into direct combat or attacks.
- **Human Shields:** Used as protection during conflicts.
- **Suicide Bombers:** Exploited to carry out bombings, including children as young as 12.
- **Informants:** Used to identify individuals who resist recruitment.
- **Support Roles:** Assigned tasks like cooking, cleaning, or carrying equipment.
- **Forced Marriage:** Girls compelled to marry group members.
- **Recruiters:** Used to attract peers through social and peer influence.
- **Operational Roles:** Fighters, logisticians.
- **Support Roles:** Propagandists, fundraisers.

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Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Youth

- **Psychological Support:**
 - Provide trauma counseling and psychological therapy to address mental health issues caused by conflict experiences; Establish peer support groups to foster a sense of belonging and mutual encouragement.
- **Education and Skill Development:**
 - Offer formal education opportunities to bridge educational gaps caused by conflict; Introduce vocational training programs tailored to local labor market demands to ensure employability.
- **Community-Based Reintegration:**
 - Engage local communities in reintegration efforts to reduce stigma and foster acceptance; Promote community dialogue and awareness campaigns to facilitate social cohesion and trust.
- **Economic Empowerment:**
 - Offer micro-finance opportunities, grants, or start-up funding to help youth establish small businesses; Collaborate with local businesses to create employment opportunities for rehabilitated youth.

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Youth Participation

	<p>Recognise the contribution of young people to peace-building and emphasize the importance of youth participation</p>	
	<p>Note the important and positive contribution of youth in efforts to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism</p>	
	<p>Calls for Youth Empowerment, amplifying the voices of youth and supports youth participation in PVE</p>	

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UNODC Approaches to Youth and Children in the Context of Terrorism and Violent Extremism

<p>Youth (18-29)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNODC's Approach to the Preventing and Countering the Involvement of Youth in Terrorism and Violent Extremism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ <i>Global Programme on Preventing and Countering Terrorism (TPB)</i>
<p>Children (<18)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNODC's Approach to the Treatment of Children Associated with Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ <i>Global Programme to End Violence against Children (END VAC)</i>

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UNODC's Mandate


The UN's crime prevention and criminal justice agency

Guardian of the international conventions and protocols against illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, corruption and **terrorism**

UNODC's has been given a mandate on terrorism prevention since 2003 and continuously renewed by UN General Assembly resolutions

Global HQ in Vienna, Austria and Regional HQ for Southeast Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand.

Country and Project Offices in the region: Indonesia, The Philippines, Malaysia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Fiji and Papua New Guinea.



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UNODC



Tackling the world drug problem

through balanced, evidence-based responses to address drug abuse and drug use disorders, as well as the production and trafficking of illicit drugs



Preventing corruption

by promoting integrity and good governance and helping recover stolen assets



Countering terrorism

through effective, accountable and inclusive legal, crime prevention and criminal justice measures in line with international norms and the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy



Combating organized crime

by providing technical assistance and support and strengthening international cooperation to address organized criminal activity and all forms of trafficking



Preventing crime and promoting criminal justice

through human rights-based and victim-centered approaches that strengthen the rule of law and access to justice

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UNODC Around the World




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UNODC's Global Programme on Preventing Terrorism (2022-2027)

Outcomes:

1. Increased Member States' adherence to and implementation of the **international legal framework against terrorism**.
2. Development and implementation of terrorism **prevention** measures that are **partnership-based, gender-responsive & youth-empowering**.
3. Increased effectiveness of **criminal justice** institutions to prevent and counter terrorism, in line with international **human rights** obligations.



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
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UNODC's Global Programme on Preventing Terrorism (2022-2027)

Outcome 2: Comprehensive measures to prevent terrorism that are inclusive, partnership-based, gender-responsive, and **youth-empowering** are developed and implemented

Including:

- **Youth-led**, socially inclusive platforms and networks are established to prevent terrorism, with leaders and volunteers supported to build bridges with government institutions and shape policies and programmes through increased civic involvement, allowing for meaningful dialogue and participation, as well as building trust, and
- Initiatives are promoted between civil society actors, **including youth leaders** and women-led organizations that leverage collaborative approaches to prevent terrorism.



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UNODC Expertise on CT and P/CVE

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International legal framework • International cooperation in criminal matters related to terrorism • Promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism • Investigation, prosecution and adjudication of terrorism-related cases • Gender mainstreaming • Preventing CBRN terrorism • Countering the financing of terrorism • Criminal justice responses to preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism • Protecting the rights of victims of terrorism • Preventing the use of the Internet and social media for terrorist purposes • Evidence management • Addressing the threat of (R)FTFs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies • Preventing XRIRB terrorism • Responding to transport-related terrorism offences • Countering the use of IED • Engaging and empowering youth to prevent terrorism and violent extremism • Treatment of children recruited and exploited by terrorist and violent extremist groups • Support to prison administrations in PVE in prisons and managing terrorist and violent extremist offenders • Reintegration and alternatives to imprisonment for former terrorists • Links between organized crime and terrorism • Education for universities (EDU4U) |
|--|--|



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UNODC's Work on Youth and PVE (2019–Present)

Since 2019, UNODC has launched and participated in numerous workshops and activities aimed at addressing Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and engaging youth across various topics, including:

- **Youth Empowerment and Leadership Development**
- **Education and Awareness**
- **Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism**
- **Community Resilience and Rehabilitation**
- **Sports for PVE and Youth Empowerment**
- **Anti-Corruption Efforts Led by Youth**
- **Digital and Technological Solutions**
- **Global Campaigns and Partnerships**

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Youth-Led Action to Prevent Violent Extremism



UNODC established a network of youth-led and youth-focused civil society organizations to support the design and implementation of effective projects that promote peace and prevent terrorism within the broader criminal justice context.

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UNODC Holds First Regional Meeting of the Youth-led Action to Prevent Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 5-7 November 2024



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

www.unodc.org/searo

LEVERAGING SPORT TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM



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 The Dharma Initiative
PROMOTING A
CULTURE OF
LAWFULNESS



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VISITING EXPERTS' PRESENTATIONS



20 Young justice coders from four countries compete in global hackathon in California to design games promoting UNODC-mandated issues




Celebrating International Youth Day 2024: Empowering Young Digital Innovators for Sustainable Development

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UNODC PVE network initiatives



Promoting regional PVE networks to:


- ✓ Enhance regional cooperation, peer learning, knowledge- and experience-sharing;
- ✓ Bring together PVE stakeholders to enhance their expertise and capacities and promote multi-disciplinary coordination;
- ✓ Assist in developing training tools and resources;
- ✓ Provide online networking opportunities; and
- ✓ **Promote youth empowerment and engagement in PVE.**

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
SEAN-PVE (Southeast Asia Network for Preventing Violent Extremism)

- Focused on engaging youth in Southeast Asia to prevent violent extremism (PVE) through community-driven initiatives and capacity building.
- **Key Activities:**
 - Organizing regional youth dialogues and workshops to promote peacebuilding and counter extremist narratives.
 - Developing educational materials and curricula for schools to foster critical thinking and resilience against radicalization.
 - Partnering with local NGOs to implement grassroots campaigns aimed at empowering marginalized youth populations.



SAN-PVE (South Asia Network for Preventing Violent Extremism)

- Empowering youth in South Asia by addressing root causes of radicalization, such as poverty, lack of education, and social exclusion.
- **Key Activities:**
 - Hosting regional forums to facilitate youth participation in policymaking and advocacy for PVE strategies.
 - Providing technical support to governments in developing youth-focused PVE policies and programs.
 - Conducting youth empowerment campaigns, including sports, arts, and cultural initiatives, to promote social integration.



SAHEL-PVE Network (Preventing Violent Extremism in the Sahel Region)

- Addressing youth involvement in violent extremism in the Sahel region by promoting socio-economic development and resilience.
- **Key Activities:**
 - Training youth leaders as peace ambassadors to counter extremist ideologies within their communities.
 - Supporting economic empowerment programs, such as vocational training and entrepreneurship initiatives, to provide alternatives to radicalization.
 - Implementing community-based reintegration programs for youth disengaged from terrorist groups.




Launch of a youth-focused regional network on Preventing Violent Extremism in Sahel Region
SAHEL-PEV



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UNODC GLOBAL PROGRAMME TO END VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM TERRORISM SINCE 2015



Technical assistance for **over 50 countries**



Publication of groundbreaking research study
Targeted by Terrorists





Elaboration and dissemination of
35 manuals, guides and other tools



Capacity development for **over 3000 professionals**



Prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration efforts benefitting **over 20,000 children**



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UNODC's APPROACH

Relying on
international law

Knowledge of the
context on the ground:
Integrating child-rights
focus and security
perspective

No one-size fits-all
approaches to deal with
this issue

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UNODC ROADMAP ON THE TREATMENT OF CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST GROUPS

TEN PRINCIPLES FOR PRACTICE

1. Complementarity of security interests and child rights

2. Child recruitment is a serious form of violence against children

3. Child recruitment is never truly voluntary

4. Children should be treated primarily as victims

5. The best interests of the child must be the primary consideration


6. Prevention is a key priority

7. Securing effective rehabilitation and reintegration of children is a key objective for all interventions


8. International legal safeguards for children apply equally to children alleged as or accused of terrorism related crimes

9. Child- and gender-sensitive approaches must be applied

10. Child recruitment is first and foremost a developmental issue that demands multidisciplinary approaches and multi-sectoral responses



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UNODC Added-Value


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OVERCOME THE PERCEIVED DICHOTOMY
BETWEEN SECURITY INTERESTS AND CHILD
RIGHTS


UNODC APPROACH: BRIDGING THE GAP

PUBLIC SAFETY

CHILD
PROTECTION



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Our responses

Three Key Areas
of Work:

Advocating for a
comprehensive
approach

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VISITING EXPERTS' PRESENTATIONS

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UNODC and Indonesia's BNPT Organize Cross-Regional Event to Promote Children's Resilience to Recruitment and Exploitation by Terrorist Groups and Adoption of 2024 "Bali Conclusions", 29 May 2024

Conclusions of the Cross-Regional Event "Child Resilience in Insecurity Contexts"

Bali, 29-31 May 2024

We, experts and representatives of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Maldives, the Philippines, held a three-day dialogue discussing strategies and measures to prevent and respond to child association with terrorist groups¹.

We remain convinced that child association with terrorist groups continues to gravely affect children's well-being and enjoyment of their rights, while also posing considerable security concerns to the countries affected by this phenomenon. As such, this phenomenon deserves immediate attention and demands comprehensive intervention.

We endorse the 2019 "UNODC Roadmap on the Treatment of Children Associated with Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups" and we reaffirm the following principles as the basis for a comprehensive, just, and sustainable approach to the treatment of these children:

Adherence to international law shall guide all actions aimed to prevent and respond to child association with groups designated terrorists. In particular, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child sets out the fundamental rights of children, based on the recognition of their ongoing developmental process and their entitlement to special care and assistance. Furthermore, its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict establishes fundamental commitments to protect children from recruitment and from its harmful consequences on child development as well as on sustainable development, peace and security.

It is necessary to tackle the root causes of child recruitment and association, devising comprehensive strategies and measures that provide a bridge between development, security and peacebuilding efforts. Strengthening the nexus between these areas of interventions is key to responding to children's lived experiences and enhancing the potential for societal resilience. Integrated and comprehensive interventions require coordination and cooperation among different sectors, including (but not limited to) health, education, child protection, justice and security sectors.

Tackling child association with terrorist groups also requires taking into account and supporting children's agency to actively take part in decision-making processes that impact their lives. This includes providing opportunities for children to contribute ideas, voice their concerns, and shape interventions that affect them. In parallel, participatory mechanisms and platforms should be in place to allow community perspectives and needs to be integrated throughout the policy formulation and intervention development process.


¹ In accordance with Article 1 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, this document refers to children to include all human beings below 18 years of age.

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UNODC Workshops on PVE and Youth in the Philippines: Promoting Peaceful Engagement: Learning from and Empowering the Youth on Preventing Violent Extremism (2019)

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
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



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
UNODC Comprehensive Training Package



















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UNODC Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System



4 | **Human Rights
and Criminal Justice
Responses to Terrorism**

UNODC Legal Training Curriculum: [Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism](#)

UNODC Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System

- Strategies for preventing recruitment of children by terrorist and violent extremist groups
- Adopting a holistic approach: preventing violence against children
- Preventing recruitment of children by terrorist and violent extremist groups
- Child victims of recruitment and exploitation: their treatment in the justice system
- Recognizing as victims children recruited and exploited by terrorist and violent extremist groups
- Protecting child victims and witnesses during investigations and trials
- The right of child victims to reparation
- Justice for children accused of terrorism-related offences
- Specialized juvenile justice system
- Pretrial stage
- Trial and sentencing
- Children deprived of their liberty
- Rehabilitation and reintegration of children recruited and exploited by terrorist and violent extremist groups
- Promoting comprehensive reintegration policies and programmes

Best Practices in Preventing Children and Youth Involvement in Terrorism

- **Build coalitions:** empowering civil society and communities as allies and listen. Canaries in the coal mine, far more alert to at-risk youth and radicalization, and can help address the root causes of extremism.
- **Build resilience:** against violent extremism, by addressing risks of alienation, exclusion, and intolerance, along social, psychological, economic fissures. Build counter-narratives.
- **Build safe spaces:** to help young people vent frustration and channel energy and find off-ramps away from anti-social, destructive, or violent escalation.
- **Build new skills:** put more tools in your toolkit: Multi-disciplinary approaches that include mental health and education professionals can help to address the root causes of extremism.
- **Build good governance, rule of law, and human rights:** Address discrimination, marginalization, and poorly performing institutions of governance.
- **Beware complacency:** no (recent) attack is no assurance that you're doing enough to prevent one in the future.

Best Practices in Preventing Children and Youth Involvement in Terrorism

- **Develop a smarter terrorism prevention strategy**
- **Adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches**
- **Invest in prevention**
- **Be proactive in assessing and addressing risks before there is an attack**
- **Adopt intelligence-led policing policies and practices**
- **Design a counter-terrorism architecture, division of labour, and structured inter-agency cooperation and information sharing**
- **Update legal framework in line with international standards**
- **Build specialized capacity among all relevant agencies: forensic, analytical, tools, and training**
- **Integrate investigate technology and tools to identify and exploit evidence, especially digital evidence to both prevent attacks and to hold offenders accountable**
- **Establish specialized agency, court, and procedures for child suspects, detainees, witnesses, and victims, in line with international standards**
- **Ensure access to justice, through provisions for legal aid, psycho-social services, and secure facilities for children**

UNODC and BNPT Strengthen Child Protection through Training of Trainers in Indonesia – 9 August 2024, Jakarta, Indonesia



Supporting rehabilitation and reintegration of juveniles associated with terrorist and violent extremist groups through the rehabilitation of youth detention facilities in Iraq, May 2023



Funded by
the European Union



STRIVE
Juvenile



May 2023



United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime

UNODC
END VAC

Rebuilding resilience among children and youth in Nigeria




Youth Peace Champions working with children in Northeast Nigeria.



United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime

Rebuilding resilience among children and youth in Nigeria

UNODC
END VAC



UNODC RESOURCES

UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch [resources, publication, guidebooks, and online courses, including:](#)

[Model Legislative Provisions in Response to Terrorism to Protect Victims](#)

[Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism](#)

UNODC RESOURCES

The SHERLOC portal is an initiative to facilitate the dissemination of information regarding the implementation of [the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the three Protocols thereto and the international legal framework against terrorism.](#)

LEGISLATION DATABASE

- Legislation implementing the Organized Crime Convention, the Protocols thereto and the international legal framework against terrorism and addressing specific forms of organized crime and relevant "cross cutting" issues

CASE LAW DATABASE

- Case summaries of judicial decisions relating to organized crime and terrorism

CNA DIRECTORY

- Directory of central and competent national authorities designated for international cooperation in criminal matters

UNODC RESOURCES (CONT'D)

TREATIES DATABASE

- Bilateral and multilateral treaties concerning organized crime and terrorism, including information on the adherence status of each instrument

STRATEGIES DATABASE

- National and regional strategies to prevent and combat organized crime and terrorism



**Thank you and wishing
you great success in
delivering justice.**

Masood Karimipour

Regional Representative

UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia & the
Pacific

<https://www.unodc.org/roseap/>

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES

No. 120

APPENDIX

UNAFEI

PHOTOGRAPHS

THE 1ST ASEAN-JAPAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SEMINAR



THE 186TH INTERNATIONAL SENIOR SEMINAR



THE 187TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE



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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES INDEX			
Vol.	Training Course Name	Course No.	Course Dates
1	Public Participation in Social Defence	25	Sep-Dec 1970
2	Administration of Criminal Justice	26	Jan-Mar 1971
3	[Corrections]	27	Apr-Jul 1971
	[Police, Prosecution and Courts]	28	Sep-Dec 1971
4	Social Defence Planning	29	Feb-Mar 1972
	Treatment of Crime and Delinquency	30	Apr-Jul 1972
5	United Nations Training Course in Human Rights in the Administration of Criminal Justice	n/a	Aug-Sep 1972
	Administration of Criminal Justice	31	Sep-Dec 1972
6	Reform in Criminal Justice	32	Feb-Mar 1973
	Treatment of Offenders	33	Apr-Jul 1973
7	[Administration of Criminal Justice]	34	Sep-Dec 1973
8	Planning and Research for Crime Prevention	35	Feb-Mar 1974
	Administration of Criminal Justice	36	Apr-Jun 1974
9	International Evaluation Seminar	37	Jul 1974
	Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents and Youthful Offenders	38	Sep-Nov 1974
10	The Roles and Functions of the Police in a Changing Society	39	Feb-Mar 1975
	Treatment of Offenders	40	Apr-Jul 1975
	NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 1-10 (p. 139)	n/a	Oct 1975
11	Improvement in the Criminal Justice System	41	Sep-Dec 1975
12	Formation of a Sound Sentencing Structure and Policy	42	Feb-Mar 1976
	Treatment of Offenders	43	Apr-Jul 1976
13	Exploration of Adequate Measures for Abating and Preventing Crimes of Violence	44	Sep-Dec 1976
14	Increase of Community Involvement	45	Feb-Mar 1977
	Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents and Youthful Offenders	46	Apr-Jul 1977
15	Speedy and Fair Administration of Criminal Justice	47	Sep-Dec 1977
	Prevention and Control of Social and Economic Offences	48	Feb-Mar 1978
	Report of United Nations Human Rights Training Course	n/a	Dec 1977
16	Treatment of Offenders	49	Apr-Jul 1978
	Dispositional Decisions in Criminal Justice Process	50	Sep-Dec 1978
17	Treatment of Dangerous or Habitual Offenders	51	Feb-Mar 1979
	Community-Based Corrections	52	Apr-Jul 1979
18	Roles of the Criminal Justice System in Crime Prevention	53	Sep-Dec 1979
19	Arrest and Pre-Trial Detention	54	Feb-Mar 1980
	Institutional Treatment of Adult Offenders	55	Apr-Jul 1980
20	Institutional Treatment of Adult Offenders	55	Apr-Jul 1980
	Integrated Approach to Effective and Efficient Administration of Criminal Justice	56	Sep-Nov 1980
	NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 1-20 (p. 203)		Mar 1981
21	Crime Prevention and Sound National Development	57	Feb-Mar 1981

	Integrated Approach to Effective Juvenile Justice Administration (including Proposed Guidelines for the Formulation of the Standard Minimum Rules for Juvenile Justice Administration: A draft prepared by UNAFEI on the basis of the reports of the study groups at the 58th International Training Course)	58	May-Jul 1981
22	Contemporary Problems in Securing an Effective, Efficient and Fair Administration of Criminal Justice and Their Solutions	59	Feb-Mar 1982
	Securing Rational Exercise of Discretionary Powers at Adjudication and Pre-adjudication Stages of Criminal Justice Administration	60	Apr-Jul 1982
23	Improvement of Correctional Programmes for More Effective Rehabilitation of Offenders	61	Sep-Nov 1982
24	Promotion of Innovations for Effective, Efficient and Fair Administration of Criminal Justice	62	Feb-Mar 1983
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25	The Quest for a Better System and Administration of Juvenile Justice	64	Sep-Dec 1983
	Documents Produced during the International Meeting of Experts on the Development of the United Nations Draft Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice	n/a	Nov 1983
26	International Cooperation in Criminal Justice Administration	65	Feb-Mar 1984
	Promotion of Innovation in the Effective Treatment of Prisoners in Correctional Institutions	66	Apr-Jul 1984
27	An Integrated Approach to Drug Problems	67	Sep-Dec 1984
28	Contemporary Asian Problems in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and Policy Implications	68	Feb-Mar 1985
	Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of Experts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directions	n/a	Mar 1985
	Report of the International Workshop on the Role of Youth Organizations in the Prevention of Crime Among Youth	n/a	Jul 1985
	Follow-up Team for Ex-Participants of UNAFEI Courses	n/a	Dec 1985
	Community-Based Corrections	69	Apr-Jul 1985
29	In Pursuit of Greater Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Juvenile Justice System and Its Administration	70	Sep-Dec 1985
30	Promotion of Innovation in Criminal Justice Administration for the Prevention of New Criminality	71	Feb-Mar 1986
	The Quest for Effective and Efficient Treatment of Offenders in Correctional Institutions	72	Apr-Jul 1986
31	Economic Crime: Its Impact on Society and Effective Prevention	73	Sep-Nov 1986
	Report of the International Seminar on Drug Problems in Asia and the Pacific Region	n/a	Aug 1986
32	Advancement of Fair and Humane Treatment of Offenders and Victims in Criminal Justice Administration	74	Feb-Mar 1987
	Non-institutional Treatment of Offenders: Its Role and Improvement for More Effective Programmes	75	Apr-Jun 1987
33	Evaluation of UNAFEI's International Courses on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, and Drug Problems in Asia	76	Aug-Sep 1987
	Crime Related to Insurance	77	Oct-Dec 1987

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	Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of Experts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directions	n/a	Sep 1987
	Report of the Workshop on Implementation Modalities for the Twenty-Three Recommendations Adopted by the International Seminar on Drug Problems in Asia and the Pacific Region	n/a	Sep 1987
34	Footprints, Contemporary Achievements and Future Perspectives in Policies for Correction and Rehabilitation of Offenders	78	Feb-Mar 1988
	Search for the Solution of the Momentous and Urgent Issues in Contemporary Corrections	79	Apr-Jul 1988
	Resolution of the Asia and Pacific Regional Experts Meeting	n/a	Mar 1988
	Report of the Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Draft Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules)	n/a	Jul 1988
35	Quest for Effective International Countermeasures to Pressing Problems of Transnational Criminality	80	Sep-Nov 1988
36	Advancement of the Integration of Criminal Justice Administration	81	Feb-Mar 1989
	Innovative Measures for Effective and Efficient Administration of Institutional Correctional Treatment of Offenders	82	Apr-Jul 1989
	Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Adolescence and Crime Prevention in the ESCAP Region	n/a	Aug 1989
37	Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context of Development	83	Sep-Nov 1989
	International Workshop on Victimology and Victim's Rights	n/a	Oct 1989
38	Policy Perspectives on Contemporary Problems in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Administration	84	Jan-Mar 1990
	Wider Use and More Effective Implementation of Non-custodial Measures for Offenders	85	Apr-Jun 1990
39	Search for Effective and Appropriate Measures to Deal with the Drug Problem	86	Sep-Dec 1990
40	Development of an Effective International Crime and Justice Programme	87	Jan-Mar 1991
	Institutional Treatment of Offenders in Special Categories	88	Apr-Jul 1991
	NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 21-40 (p. 333)	n/a	n/a
41	Effective and Innovative Countermeasures against Economic Crime	89	Sep-Dec 1991
42	Quest for Solutions of the Pressing Problems of Contemporary Criminal Justice Administration	90	Jan-Feb 1992
	Further Use and Effectual Development of Non-Custodial Measures for Offenders	91	Apr-Jul 1992
43	Quest for Effective Methods of Organized Crime Control	92	Sep-Nov 1992
44	Policy Perspective for Organized Crime Suppression	93	Feb-Mar 1993
	Current Problems in Institutional Treatment and Their Solution	94	Apr-Jul 1993
45	Effective Countermeasures against Crimes Related to Urbanization and Industrialization—Urban Crime, Juvenile Delinquency and Environmental Crime	95	Sep-Dec 1993
46	Promotion of International Cooperation in Criminal Justice Administration	96	Jan-Mar 1994

	Effective Treatment of Drug Offenders and Juvenile Delinquents	97	Apr-Jul 1994
47	Economic Crime and Effective Countermeasures against It	98	Sep-Dec 1994
48	The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice: Public Participation and the Prevention of Corruption	99	Jan-Mar 1995
	The Institutional Treatment of Offenders: Relationships with Other Criminal Justice Agencies and Current Problems in Administration	100	Apr-Jul 1995
49	The Fair and Efficient Administration of Criminal Justice: The Proper Exercise of Authority and Procedural Justice	101	Sep-Dec 1995
50	Crime Prevention through Effective Firearms Regulation	102	Jan-Mar 1996
51	Improvement of the Treatment of Offenders through the Strengthening of Non-custodial Measures	103	Apr-Jul 1996
	International Cooperation in Criminal Justice Administration	104	Sep-Nov 1996
52	The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice for the Prevention of Corruption by Public Officials	105	Jan-Feb 1997
	The Quest for Effective Juvenile Justice Administration	106	Apr-Jul 1997
53	The Role and Function of Prosecution in Criminal Justice	107	Sep-Nov 1997
	The Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of Experts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directions	n/a	Oct 1997
54	Current Problems in the Combat of Organized Transnational Crime	108	Jan-Feb 1998
	Effective Treatment Measures for Prisoners to Facilitate Their Reintegration into Society	109	Apr-Jul 1998
55	Effective Countermeasures against Economic and Computer Crime	110	Aug-Nov 1998
	The Role of Police, Prosecution and the Judiciary in the Changing Society	111	Jan-Feb 1999
56	Participation of the Public and Victims for More Fair and Effective Criminal Justice	112	Apr-Jul 1999
	The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice for the Prevention of Corrupt Activities by Public Officials	113	Aug-Nov 1999
57	International Cooperation to Combat Transnational Organized Crime—with Special Emphasis on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition	114	Jan-Feb 2000
	Current Issues in Correctional Treatment and Effective Countermeasures	115	May-Jun 2000
58	Effective Methods to Combat Transnational Organized Crime in Criminal Justice Processes	116	Aug-Nov 2000
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59	Best Practices in the Institutional and Community-Based Treatment of Juvenile Offenders	118	May-Jul 2001
	Current Situation of and Countermeasures against Transnational Organized Crime	119	Sep-Nov 2001
60	Effective Administration of the Police and the Prosecution in Criminal Justice	120	Jan-Feb 2002
61	Enhancement of Community-Based Alternatives to Incarceration at all Stages of the Criminal Justice Process	121	May-Jul 2002

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62	The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice to Tackle Trafficking Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants	122	Sep-Oct 2002
63	The Protection of Victims of Crime and the Active Participation of Victims in the Criminal Justice Process Specifically Considering Restorative Justice Approaches	123	Jan-Feb 2003
64	The Effective Prevention and Enhancement of Treatment for Drug Abusers in the Criminal Justice Process	124	Apr-Jun 2003
65	Effective Countermeasures against Illicit Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering	125	Sep-Oct 2003
	Sixth International Training Course on Corruption Control in Criminal Justice	6th UNCAC	Nov 2003
66	Economic Crime in a Globalizing Society—Its Impact on the Sound Development of the State	126	Jan-Feb 2004
67	Implementing Effective Measures for the Treatment of Offenders after Fifty Years of United Nations Standard Setting in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	127	May-Jun 2004
	Measures to Combat Economic Crime, Including Money Laundering	128	Aug-Oct 2004
68	Crime Prevention in the 21st Century—Effective Prevention of Crime Associated with Urbanization Based upon Community Involvement and Prevention of Youth Crime and Juvenile Delinquency	129	Jan-Feb 2005
69	Integrated Strategies to Confront Domestic Violence and Child Abuse	130	May-Jun 2005
	Seventh Special Training Course on Corruption Control in Criminal Justice	7th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2005
70	The Use and Application of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power—Twenty Years after Its Adoption	131	Aug-Oct 2005
71	Strengthening the Legal Regime for Combating Terrorism	132	Jan-Feb 2006
	Eighth International Training Course on Corruption Control in Criminal Justice	8th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2005
72	Effective Prevention and Enhancement of Treatment for Sexual Offenders	133	May-Jun 2006
73	Challenges in the Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Transnational Organized Crime	134	Aug-Oct 2006
	Ninth International Training Course on Corruption Control in Criminal Justice	9th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2006
74	Promoting Public Safety and Controlling Recidivism Using Effective Interventions with Offenders: An Examination of Best Practices	135	Jan-Feb 2007
75	Effective Measures for the Treatment of Juvenile Offenders and their Reintegration into Society	136	May-Jun 2007
76	Corporate Crime and the Criminal Liability of Corporate Entities	137	Sep-Oct 2007
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77	Effective Legal and Practical Measures for Combating Corruption: A Criminal Justice Response	138	Jan-Feb 2008
78	Profiles and Effective Treatment of Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders	139	May-Jun 2008

79	The Criminal Justice Response to Cybercrime	140	Sep-Oct 2008
	Eleventh International Training Course on the Criminal Justice Response to Corruption	11th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2008
	The Improvement of the Treatment of Offenders through the Enhancement of Community-Based Alternatives to Incarceration	141	Jan-Feb 2009
80	Effective Countermeasures against Overcrowding of Correctional Facilities	142	May-Jun 2009
	Twelfth International Training Course on the Criminal Justice Response to Corruption	12th UNCAC	Jul-Aug 2009
	Ethics and Codes of Conduct for Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcement Officials	143	Sep-Nov 2009
81	The Enhancement of Appropriate Measures for Victims of Crime at Each Stage of the Criminal Justice Process	144	Jan-Feb 2010
82	Effective Resettlement of Offenders by Strengthening "Community Reintegration Factors"	145	May-Jun 2010
83	Attacking the Proceeds of Crime: Identification, Confiscation, Recovery and Anti-Money Laundering Measures	146	Aug-Oct 2010
	The 13th International Training Course on the Criminal Justice Response to Corruption	13th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2010
84	Community Involvement in Offender Treatment	147	Jan-Feb 2011
85	Drug Offender Treatment: New Approaches to an Old Problem	148	May-Jun 2011
86	Securing Protection and Cooperation of Witnesses and Whistle-blowers	149	Aug-Sep 2011
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87	Trafficking in Persons—Prevention, Prosecution, Victim Protection and Promotion of International Cooperation	150	Jan-Feb 2012
88	Evidence-Based Treatment of Offenders	151	May-Jun 2012
89	Trafficking in Persons—Prevention, Prosecution, Victim Protection and Promotion of International Cooperation	152	Aug-Sep 2012
	Effective Legal and Practical Measures against Corruption	15th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2012
90	Treatment of Female Offenders	153	Jan-Feb 2013
91	Stress Management of Correctional Personnel—Enhancing the Capacity of Mid-Level Staff	154	May-Jun 2013
92	Effective Collection and Utilization of Evidence in Criminal Cases	155	Aug-Oct 2013
	Effective Measures to Prevent and Combat Corruption and to Encourage Cooperation between the Public and Private Sectors	16th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2013
93	Protection for Victims of Crime and Use of Restorative Justice Programmes	156	Jan-Feb 2014
94	Assessment and Treatment of Special Needs Offenders	157	May-Jun 2014
95	Measures for Speedy and Efficient Criminal Trials	158	Aug-Sep 2014
	Effective Measures to Prevent and Combat Corruption Focusing on Identifying, Tracing, Freezing, Seizing, Confiscating and Recovering Proceeds of Corruption	17th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2014
96	Public Participation in Community Corrections	159	Jan-Feb 2015
97	The State of Cybercrime: Current Issues and Countermeasures	160	May-Jun 2015
98	Staff Training for Correctional Leadership	161	Aug-Sep 2015
	Effective Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Public-Private and International Cooperation	18th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2015

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99	Multi-Agency Cooperation in Community-Based Treatment of Offenders	162	Jan-Feb 2016
100	Children as Victims and Witnesses	163	May-Jun 2016
101	Effective Measures for Treatment, Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Juvenile Offenders	164	Aug-Sep 2016
	Effective Anti-Corruption Enforcement (Investigation and Prosecution) in the Area of Procurement	19th UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2016
102	Juvenile Justice and the United Nations Standards and Norms	165	Jan-Feb 2017
103	Criminal Justice Procedures and Practices to Disrupt Criminal Organizations	166	May-Jun 2017
104	Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Organized Crime Members and Terrorists	167	Aug-Sep 2017
	Effective Measures to Investigate the Proceeds of Corruption Crimes	20th UNCAC	Nov-Dec 2017
105	Enhancing the Rule of Law in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Policies and Practices Based on the United Nations Conventions and Standards and Norms	168	Jan-Feb 2018
106	Criminal Justice Practices against Illicit Drug Trafficking	169	May-Jun 2018
107	Treatment of Illicit Drug Users	170	Aug-Sep 2018
	Effective Criminal Justice Practices through International Cooperation and Engagement of Civil Society for Combating Corruption	21st UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2018
108	Criminal Justice Response to Crimes Motivated by Intolerance and Discrimination	171	Jan-Feb 2019
109	Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants	172	May-Jun 2019
110	Tackling Violence against Women and Children through Offender Treatment: Prevention of Reoffending	173	Aug-Sep 2019
	Detection, Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of High-Profile Corruption	22nd UNCAC	Oct-Nov 2019
111	Prevention of Reoffending and Fostering Social Inclusion: From Policy to Good Practice	174	Jan-Feb 2020
112	n/a (Training programmes postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic)	n/a	n/a
113	Tackling Emerging Treats of Corruption in the Borderless and Digitalized World	23rd UNCAC	Sep-Oct 2021
	Treatment of Women Offenders	175	Oct-Nov 2021
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114	Preventing Reoffending through a Multi-stakeholder Approach	177	Jan-Feb 2022
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115	Juvenile Justice and Beyond Effective Measures for the Rehabilitation of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law and Young Adult Offenders	179	Sep 2022
	Chair's Summary, Enhancing Technical Assistance to Reduce Reoffending and Promote Inclusive Societies	n/a	Oct 2022

	UNAFEI's 60th and ACPF's 40th Anniversary Event	n/a	Oct 2022
	Identifying, Tracing, Freezing, Seizing, Confiscating and Recovering Proceeds of Corruption: Challenges and Solutions	24th UNCAC	Nov 2022
116	Promoting Legal Aid for Offenders and Victims	180	Jan-Feb 2023
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117	Effective Support for Reintegration of Released Inmates – Towards Seamless Support for Employment, Housing and Medical Care	182	Sep 2023
	Effective Corruption Investigation Utilizing International Cooperation	25th UNCAC	Nov 2023
	Symposium on a Comparative Approach to a Culture of Lawfulness	Side Event, ASEAN-Japan Special Meeting of Justice Ministers	Jul 2023
118	Management of Correctional Institutions in the 21st Century – With a Focus on the Nelson Mandela Rules	183	Jan-Feb 2024
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119	Preventing Inmate Abuse and Corruption in Correctional Facilities: Creating a Rehabilitative Prison Environment	185	Sep 2024
	Strengthening Prevention, Detection and Prosecution of Corruption, and Public-Private Partnership	26th UNCAC	Nov 2024
120	Utilizing New Tools for Effective Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA Session)	1st AJCJS	Dec 2024
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	Current Challenges and Effective Countermeasures in the Fight against Money-Laundering	187	May-Jun 2025